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Introduction
Macroeconomic stabilization policies in general and automatic stabilizers in particular
have seen an increased focus from researchers, especially since the 2007–2008 financial
crisis and the following recession. At the same time, the crisis in Europe has urged
academics to better understand the economies of the EU and the European Monetary
Union. This thesis consists of four papers analyzing European economies, with a focus on
automatic stabilization. Automatic stabilizers are elements of fiscal policy that have the
potential to smooth the business cycle by automatically adjusting government spending
and revenue.
The first chapter, Crisis, Austerity and Automatic Stabilization, analyzes the changes of
the automatic stabilizers in Europe after the crisis, a period dominated by austerity and
political change. We analyze how reforms of tax-benefit systems in the period 2007–2014
have affected the automatic stabilization capacity in the EU27. Our analysis sheds light
on the effect of fiscal consolidation measures on automatic stabilizers. Our results show
that automatic stabilizers are heterogeneous across EU countries. Income stabilization
coefficients range from 20-30 percent in some Eastern and Southern European countries
to around 60 percent in Belgium, Germany, and Denmark. Our analysis shows that
automatic stabilizers could operate freely in the early phase of the financial and economic
crisis, but have been constrained in some EU countries by subsequent fiscal consolidation
measures. A comparison of our estimates of automatic stabilizers with macro measures
such as changes in the cyclical and the cyclically-adjusted budget balance reveals that
micro-based estimates can provide more precise information about the degree of household
income stabilization.
The second chapter, Labor Supply and Automatic Stabilization, moves away from the
context of the recent crisis and enriches the static model of the previous chapter by a
household labor supply model to isolate a specific channel through which automatic
stabilizers work: a marginal incentives channel, coming from the decrease in a progressive
tax system’s marginal tax rate. In this case, the tax rate that a household faces will
fall following an income decline in a recession, thereby increasing work incentives and
hence labor supply. This effect offsets part of the initial income decline, stabilizing
12
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aggregate income and output. The magnitude of the effect depends on the responsiveness
of the marginal tax rate after changes in gross income, and the elasticity of labor supply.
We estimate a structural discrete choice labor supply model and individual tax rates
for households in the EU based on EU-SILC data using the microsimulation model
EUROMOD.
The third chapter Dynamic Scoring of Tax Reforms in the EU is not directly concerned
with macroeconomic stabilization, but instead focuses on the more general question of
how to evaluate tax reforms in the European context. We use a labor supply model
to inform and calibrate realistically the macro DSGE model QUEST that is used for
policy analyses by EU institutions. It provides a bridge between the micro and macro
approaches encompassed in this thesis. It is the first dynamic scoring exercise linking a
microsimulation and a dynamic general equilibrium model for Europe. We illustrate our
novel methodology by analyzing hypothetical reforms of the social insurance contributions
system in Belgium. Our approach takes into account the feedback effects resulting from
adjustments and behavioral responses in the labor market and the economy-wide reaction
to the tax policy changes essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the reforms. We find
that the self-financing effect of a reduction in employers’ social insurance contribution is
substantially larger than that of a comparable reduction in employees’ social insurance
contributions.
The fourth chapter, Automatic Stabilizers in Monetary and Fiscal Unions, develops a
multi-country New-Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets
calibrated to the Euro area to assess the role of automatic stabilizers in a monetary union
when countries are affected by country specific shocks. In a monetary union, monetary
policy is constrained in two ways. First, it cannot condition on country specific shocks.
Second, countries cannot resort to nominal devaluation of the exchange rate. Recent
literature shows that automatic stabilizers are particularly important when monetary
policy is constrained. Another feature of the model are trade linkages between countries
to account for positive spillovers within the closely connected countries in the Euro area.
I propose a model experiment by shutting off automatic stabilizers to gauge their effect
on the EU business cycle. The model developed in this chapter provides a framework to
analyze several important questions in the future, such as whether there are benefits of a
unified fiscal authority.
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1. Crisis, Austerity and Automatic
Stabilization1
1.1. Introduction
The Great Recession and the resulting sovereign debt crisis in Europe have led to
budget consolidation measures in many EU countries. In some cases, fundamental
changes in the structure of tax and transfer systems have taken place. Tax increases and
spending cuts aimed at reducing soaring government budget deficits, but in many cases
exacerbated losses in household incomes. This paper is the first to investigate the short
and long-run effects of fiscal consolidation measures in Europe (“austerity measures”)
on the automatic stabilizers inherent in tax and transfer systems. Our analysis allows
to disentangle automatic changes from those that take place after explicit government
legislature (discretionary changes).
Automatic stabilizers are those elements of the tax and transfer system that mitigate
fluctuations in output without discretionary government action. The analysis of the
automatic stabilization capacity of existing tax-benefit systems in Europe is particularly
relevant in the context of the recent economic crisis, as monetary policy is near or at
the zero lower bound. In these cases, the importance of automatic stabilizers for overall
macroeconomic stabilization increases (McKay and Reis, 2016).
Previous work on automatic stabilizers has mostly relied on macro data (see, e.g., Fatás
and Mihov, 2001; in’t Veld et al., 2013; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016) or structural
models (McKay and Reis, 2016). Approaches based on macro data typically use aggregate
variables on government revenue and spending as proxies for automatic stabilizers.
However, these variables are endogenous to changes in household incomes as tax payments
decrease (for a given progressive tax system) or (unemployment) benefits increase when
households earn lower incomes or become unemployed. Therefore, studies based on macro
regressions (e.g. regressing changes in fiscal variables on the growth rate of GDP), such
as Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995), can be biased from
1This paper is joint work and circulates as Dolls, Fuest, Peichl, and Wittneben (2019).
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endogenous regressors and, moreover, cannot distinguish automatic stabilizer effects from
discretionary policy measures.2
To circumvent these problems, we follow the approach of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)
and Dolls et al. (2012) in using micro data for our analysis.3 The use of harmonized
European micro data and counterfactual simulation techniques allows us to identify the
cushioning effect of tax-benefit systems against exogenous income and unemployment
shocks. Specifically, we analyze how changes in tax-benefit systems over the period
2007–2014 have affected the workings of automatic stabilizers in the EU27. We combine
2007 pre-crisis micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) with the different tax-benefit rules in the period under investigation. This
allows us to disentangle the effect of changes in the tax and transfer systems (i.e. the
“policy effect”) from changes in actual incomes and demographics and to assess the
shock-absorption capacity of the tax and transfer systems.
We use the measure of the normalized tax change (Pechman, 1973, 1987; Auerbach
and Feenberg, 2000) as a metric for automatic stabilization. Following Dolls et al. (2012),
this measure of the stabilizing effect of the tax and transfer system is calculated for
two counterfactual scenarios. The first is a stylized proportional shock of 5 percent to
household gross incomes. The shock is the same in all countries and affects all households
equally. The second scenario is an idiosyncratic unemployment shock leading to an
increase in the national unemployment rate and the same aggregate income loss as in
the first scenario. For both scenarios, we compute how direct taxes, social insurance
contributions as well as transfers change in response to the simulated income change.
Relating the change in taxes and benefits to the income change yields the income
stabilization coefficient as a measure of automatic stabilization. We also compute short-
term stabilizing coefficients taking into account that the actual stabilization provided by
the tax-benefit system can be weaker (stronger) than in steady-state if tax hikes or cuts
in benefits (tax reductions or benefit extensions) coincide with macroeconomic shocks.
Our results show that automatic stabilizers are heterogeneous across EU countries.
Income stabilization coefficients range from 20-30 percent in some Eastern and Southern
European countries to around 60 percent in Belgium, Germany, and Denmark. Our
analysis shows that automatic stabilizers could operate freely in the early phase of
the financial and economic crisis, but have been constrained in some EU countries by
subsequent fiscal consolidation measures. A comparison of our estimates of automatic
2Other macro studies focus on the relation between output volatility, public sector size and openness of
the economy (Galí, 1994; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Auerbach and Hassett, 2002).
3Other micro studies include Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a,b).
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stabilizers inherent in tax-benefit systems with macro measures such as changes in the
cyclical and the cyclically-adjusted budget balance reveals that micro-based estimates
can provide more precise information about the degree of household income stabilization.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we analyze how the automatic
stabilization capacities of tax and transfer systems in the EU27 have changed since the
beginning of the financial and economic crisis in 2007. We extend the analysis of Dolls et al.
(2012), who assess the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers for 19 EU countries and the
United States, by using more recent data and a larger set of countries and policy years.4
Second, we shed light on the short-term effects of policy changes on household income
stabilization. This analysis shows to what extent automatic stabilizers could operate
freely over the period under consideration. Third, our paper provides new evidence on
the relationship between our micro-based estimates of automatic stabilizers and more
conventional macro measures which are used in the EU fiscal governance framework
(Deroose et al., 2008; Mourre et al., 2014). We show that micro-based estimates provide
complementary information to the macroeconomic indicators.
We proceed as follows. Section 1.2 presents the theoretical framework. In section 1.3
we discuss the data and our empirical approach. Section 1.4 presents the results and
section 1.5 concludes.
1.2. Framework
In this section we describe the framework used to measure automatic stabilizers.
1.2.1. Income Stabilization
Household income stabilization provided by tax-benefit systems is measured by a co-
efficient showing how household disposable income varies with respect to changes in
gross income. We use the measure of the tax system’s built-in flexibility, also denoted
as normalized tax change, proposed by Pechman (1973) and employed by Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000), Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) and extended by Dolls et al. (2012) to
account for social insurance contributions and benefits in addition to direct taxes. It is
denoted as income stabilization coefficient and measures the ratio of changes in disposable
4Callan et al. (2018) and Paulus and Tasseva (2018) analyze the automatic stabilization effect of
tax-benefit systems on the income distribution for a subset of countries we focus on.
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income to changes in gross income.56
The mechanism behind the stabilizers is as follows. Consider a household that has to
pay a proportional tax of 30 percent and faces a decline in gross income of 100 Euros.
Then 30 percent of the shock would be absorbed by the proportional tax, leaving a
decline of 70 Euros of disposable income. For a progressive tax system, as is in place
in the majority of the European countries, the stabilizing effect would be larger (Dolls
et al., 2012). Let the aforementioned household be subject to progressive taxation, and
after the initial shock, her marginal tax rate drop to 25 percent. Then this provides an
additional cushioning of the decline in disposable income.
Market income which is equal to gross income in our context is defined as
YMi = Y Ei + Y
Q
i + Y Ii + Y Pi + Y Oi , (1.2.1)
where Y Ei denotes labor income, Y
Q
i business income, Y Ii capital income, Y Pi property
income, and Y Oi other income. Disposable income is equal to market income minus net
government intervention, which consists of direct taxes T (YMit , Xi, χt), social insurance
contributions S(YMit , Xi, χt) and social benefits B(YMit , Xi, χt), for example unemploy-
ment benefits. We define tax payments, social insurance contributions and benefit
payments to be functions of market income YMi ,7 household characteristics Xi (e.g.
number of children, marital status, age) and parameters of the tax-benefit system χt
(e.g. tax rate, bracket thresholds, deduction). Defining net government intervention as
G(YMit , Xi, χt) = T (YMit , Xi, χt) +S(YMit , Xi, χt)−B(YMit , Xi, χt), disposable income can
5Dolls et al. (2012) also estimate a stabilization effect on the demand for goods and services (demand
stabilization coefficient). It depends on how households adjust consumption expenditure to fluctuations
in disposable income. However, McKay and Reis (2016) find the demand stabilization effect to be
small over the business cycle, and the income stabilization effect to be quantitatively more important.
Therefore, in this paper we focus on the income stabilization coefficient only.
6An alternative measure is the elasticity of taxes with respect to income changes (see Auerbach and
Feenberg, 2000), with a proportional tax system having an elasticity of one, and progressive taxes
having an elasticity greater than one. The magnitude of this elasticity serves as a measure of the
degree of progressivity of the tax system. The drawback of using it as an indicator of the stabilizing
effect is its definition as a relative measure, relating the percent change of taxes to a one-percent
change in income. The elasticity neglects information on the share of income to be payed as taxes.
This information, however, is important, as a large share of taxes relative to aggregate income means
that taxes can serve as a more effective automatic stabilizer.
7Note that, for simplicity of notation, we write a dependence on market income YMi only and not
a dependence on each of its components (see equation (1.2.1)), although our simulations based on
EUROMOD respect the different income types (see section 1.3.1).
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be written as
Y D(YMit , Xi, χt) = YMi −G(YMit , Xi, χt) (1.2.2)
= YMi −
(
T (YMit , Xi, χt) + S(YMit , Xi, χt)−B(YMit , Xi, χt)
)
. (1.2.3)
The income stabilization coefficient is denoted by τ I and measures how changes in
market income ∆YM translate into changes in households’ disposable income ∆Y D.
In the empirical analysis, we will follow Dolls et al. (2012) and consider two stylized
scenarios where gross incomes are reduced by 5% (cf. section 1.3):
∑
i
∆Y Di =
∑
i
(
Y D(0.95YMit , Xi, χt)− Y D(YMit , Xi, χt)
)
=
(
1− τ I
)∑
i
∆YM
The income stabilization coefficient can be written as
∑
i
∆Y Di = (1− τ I)
∑
i
∆YMi
⇔ τ I = 1−
∑
i ∆Y Di∑
i ∆YMi
.
τ I can be interpreted as the fraction of a shock that is absorbed by the tax-benefit
system.
Using (1.2.2), it is possible to decompose the income stabilization coefficient into the
stabilizing effects provided by taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits:
τ I = τ IT + τ IS + τ IB =
∑
i ∆Ti∑
i ∆YMi
+
∑
i ∆Si∑
i ∆YMi
−
∑
i ∆Bi∑
i ∆YMi
. (1.2.4)
Throughout the paper, we will make the assumption that all taxes and transfers are
borne by employees and that employers have to bear their share of the social insurance
contributions. Hence, employers’ social insurance contributions are assumed not to be
shifted to employees, so that they will not affect employees’ wages. The stabilizing
effects of social insurance contributions will thus only reflect employees’ social insurance
contributions.8
8Dolls et al. (2012) calculate income stabilization coefficients with and without social insurance contri-
butions by employers and find that the inclusion of employers’ social insurance contributions does
change the country ranking only slightly. Results including employers’ social insurance contributions
are available upon request.
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1.2.2. Short-Term Effects of Discretionary Policy Changes
The income stabilization coefficient presented above measures the cushioning effect of the
tax-benefit system under the assumption of constant policy, i.e., it relates the change in
taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits following the shock to market income
to the change in market income. It does not take into account the additional effect on
household disposable incomes that may occur when the income shock coincides with
changes in the tax and transfer system.
Consider as an illustration a tax hike which is introduced as a fiscal consolidation
measure in an economic downturn with declining market incomes. The income stabiliza-
tion coefficient estimated after the policy change has been implemented would indicate
an increase in the automatic stabilization capacity of the tax system. If the tax hike
coincides with the decline in market incomes, however, the overall fiscal impulse is less
counter-cyclical than the effect of automatic stabilizers alone.9 Arguably, the income
stabilization coefficient can be interpreted as measuring the long-term (‘steady state’)
stabilization capacity of a tax and transfer system.
In the short-run, discretionary fiscal policy might constrain the ability of the tax system
to act as an automatic stabilizer. We therefore complement the income stabilization
coefficient by a new measure that takes into account that taxes, social insurance contri-
butions and benefits might change at the same time as market incomes. More precisely,
we calculate the difference in disposable incomes for household i when subject to tax
policy in period t (before the change in market income) and when subject to tax policy
in period t+ 1 (after the change in market income). Again, let T (YMit , Xi, χt) be the tax
function. We can write the short-term stabilization coefficient as
θI,Tt+1 =
∑
i
(
T (0.95YMi , Xi, χt+1)− T (YMi , Xi, χt)
)
∑
i ∆YMi
(1.2.5)
=
∑
i
(
T (0.95YMi , Xi, χt+1)− T (YMi , Xi, χt)
)
∑
i 0.05YMi
(1.2.6)
9See for example Deroose et al. (2008) or Fatás and Mihov (2009) for a discussion how the overall fiscal
impulse can be decomposed into discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers.
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Using shorthand notation for the equations above, we can write:
θIt+1 =
∑
i(T 1i,t+1 − T 0i,t) +
∑
i(S1i,t+1 − S0i,t)−
∑
i(B1i,t+1 −B0i,t)∑
i ∆YMi,t
(1.2.7)
=
∑
i
(
T 1i,t+1 + S1i,t+1 −B1i,t+1
)
−∑i (T 0t + S0t −B0t )∑
i
(
YM1i,t − YM0i,t
)
=
∑
i
(
YM1i,t+1 − Y D1i,t+1
)
−∑i (YM0i,t − Y D0i,t )∑
i
(
YM1i,t − YM0i,t
)
=
∑
i
(
YM1i,t+1 − YM0i,t
)
−∑i (Y D1i,t+1 − Y D0i,t )∑
i
(
YM1i,t − YM0i,t
)
Analogously to the decomposition of the income stabilization coefficient, we decompose
the short-term stabilization coefficient θIt into its components:
θIi,t+1 =
∑
i(T 1i,t+1 − T 0i,t) +
∑
i(S1i,t+1 − S0i,t)−
∑
i(B1i,t+1 −B0i,t)∑
i ∆YMi,t
= θTi,t+1 + θSi,t+1 − θBi,t+1 (1.2.8)
The short-term stabilization coefficient reflects how discretionary policy changes affect the
cushioning effect of the tax-benefit system, or in other words, to what extent automatic
stabilizers can operate freely. In an economic downturn, the following stylized scenarios
can be differentiated (symmetrically in an economic upturn).
Automatic stabilizers operate freely. If there is no policy change from one year to
the other, the government allows for intertemporal stabilization by incurring debt. The
automatic stabilizers of the tax-benefit system typically lead to a reduction in tax revenue
if taxable income declines or to an increase in benefit expenditure if unemployment
goes up (T 1t+1 < T 0t or B1t+1 > B0t ). In such a situation, the short-term stabilization
coefficient equals the income stabilization coefficient: θTt+1 = τTt . If governments pursue
expansionary fiscal policy, for example by cutting taxes or raising benefits, the short-term
stabilization coefficient will exceed the income stabilization coefficient: θTt+1 > τTt .
Automatic stabilization channel constrained or shut down. If governments
pursue contractionary fiscal policy, but still allow for a reduction in tax revenue or an
increase in benefit expenditure from one year to the other, the short-term stabilization
coefficient will be larger than zero, but smaller than the income stabilization coefficient:
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0 < θTt+1 < τTt . If governments are credit-constrained and have to keep tax revenue
or benefit expenditure constant from one year to the other (T 1t+1 = T 0t or B1t+1 = B0t ),
the automatic stabilization channel is shut down through discretionary policy changes:
θTt+1 = 0. In the most severe scenario of contractionary fiscal policy, discretionary policy
changes lead to an increase in revenue or a decrease in benefit expenditure even though
the economy experiences a slump (T 1t+1 > T 0t or B1t+1 < B0t ). It can be seen that in this
case θTt+1 < 0.
1.3. Data and Empirical Approach
In the empirical analysis, we analyze the workings of automatic stabilizers in the EU27
over the period 2007–2014 and how they were affected by discretionary changes in
tax-benefit systems. Our analysis is based on EU-SILC household micro data and the
European microsimulation model EUROMOD.
1.3.1. EUROMOD
In our simulations, we use EUROMOD (version G4.0) in order to calculate household
disposable incomes (see Sutherland and Figari, 2013; Sutherland, 2018). EUROMOD
contains the tax and benefit rules present in the EU27 for different years and takes EU-
SILC household micro data as input. EU-SILC is a harmonized, cross-sectional household
micro dataset for the EU member states provided by Eurostat (2012). In addition, we
construct an unemployment benefit calculator that incorporates all important policy rules
such as replacement rates, eligibility criteria and maximum benefit durations.10 EU-SILC
data contain rich information about the different income sources (e.g. employment income,
capital income, income from self-employment) and household demographics that may
influence tax and transfer policies (for instance marital status, number of children or
age).
The microsimulation approach allows us to separate the dataset containing market
incomes and demographics from the rules of the tax and transfer systems. We use
EU-SILC household data with an income reference period of 2007 for the whole analysis,
and simulate income taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits following the
10The EUROMOD version used in this paper does not simulate unemployment benefits, but takes
unemployment benefits from the input data. As explained below, we aim at simulating counterfactual
disposable incomes for different years and therefore need to make use of an unemployment benefit
calculator. Detailed policy rules are collected from country chapters of the OECD series “Benefits
and Wages” (http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm) and from the EU’s MISSOC-
Comparative Tables Database (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=815).
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tax-benefit policy parameters of the years 2007–2014.11 That is, we hold household
characteristics Xi and market income YMi constant (through the use of the same baseline
dataset), and only vary the parameters of the tax-benefit system χt over time, yielding
counterfactual disposable incomes that would have prevailed if household demographics
and market incomes would not have changed over time.12 This approach provides us–for
each EU27 country–with a sample of repeated cross-sections reflecting market incomes
and household demographics from 2007 and disposable incomes based on tax-benefit
policies of the period 2007–2014.
Keeping market incomes and demographics constant at their pre-crisis level allows
us to isolate the effect of policy changes on the automatic stabilization effect of tax-
benefit systems.13 If both input data and tax-benefit policies were changed at the same
time, it would not be possible to disentangle the effect of changing market incomes and
demographics from the effect of changing tax-benefit policy parameters.
1.3.2. Scenarios
Following Dolls et al. (2012), we simulate two stylized shocks: First, a proportional decline
of household gross incomes by 5% affecting all households equally (income shock), and
second, an idiosyncratic shock affecting only some individuals who lose their job. This
unemployment shock is calibrated such that total household income decreases by 5% as well.
Thereby, the severity of the two shock scenarios is comparable in terms of the aggregate
income loss. Both shocks are simulated on the same (pre-crisis) household micro datasets
reflecting market incomes and household demographics as of 2007, but with tax-benefit
policies spanning the period 2007–2014 (see section 1.3.1). The unemployment shock is
modeled by increasing (decreasing) the weight of unemployed (employed) individuals in
our sample, while the aggregate counts of individual and household characteristics are kept
constant (Immervoll et al., 2006). The implicit assumption behind this approach is that
the socio-demographic characteristics of the newly unemployed correspond to the existing
pool of unemployed. This is done on purpose to avoid capturing changes in unemployment
benefit eligibility over time which are induced by changes in the characteristics of the
unemployed, for example a larger share of long-term unemployed in some countries in
11The EUROMOD version used in this paper allows for some countries the simulation of tax-benefit
systems up until 2015. For France and Malta, the 2006 and 2008 EU-SILC versions are used,
respectively. Croatia is excluded from the analysis as no pre-crisis data have been available to us.
12Changes in tax-benefit systems include both structural changes and uprating of monetary parameters
according to the rules in each country (Paulus et al., 2019).
13See e.g. Bargain and Callan (2010), Bargain et al. (2015) or Paulus et al. (2017) who use similar
simulation techniques to estimate distributional effects of changes in tax-benefit systems.
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the more recent years of the simulation period. Instead, our results solely reflect changes
in tax-benefit policy parameters over time.
Note that we do not strive to replicate actual changes in income and unemployment as
observed over the simulation period. Economic conditions are endogenous to the overall
fiscal impulse (discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers). The aim of the
paper is to explore how effective built-in automatic stabilizers are to cushion (stylized
and exogenous) income and unemployment shocks that are comparable across countries
and to assess to what extent discretionary policy changes have had an impact on the
workings of automatic stabilizers.
1.4. Results
We first present income stabilization coefficients for the period 2007–2014 and then show
how discretionary changes in tax-benefit parameters have affected the degree to which
automatic stabilizers could operate over this period.
1.4.1. Income Stabilization Coefficients
Income shock. Figure 1.1 depicts the change in the income stabilization coefficient
from 2007 to 2014 on the x-axis and its 2007 level on the y-axis. Focusing first on
the levels of the income stabilization coefficients in 2007, we find strong differences
across countries with coefficients ranging from 0.22 in Cyprus to 0.54 in Belgium. The
(population-weighted) average EA19 (EU27) income stabilization coefficient amounts
to 0.38 (0.39) as shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Generally, coefficients tend to
be higher in Western European and Nordic countries and lower in Baltic, Eastern and
Southern European countries, with Hungary being a notable exception.
The largest change occurred in Hungary with a reduction in the income stabilization
coefficient of 0.16 percentage points from 2007 to 2014. Hungary adopted a flat tax which
reduced the stabilizing effect of the income tax considerably from 0.34 in 2007 to 0.16 in
2014 (cf. Table A.1). On the other side of the spectrum, countries such as Ireland, Greece,
Portugal and Cyprus raised taxes and/or social insurance contributions which led to an
increase in the income stabilization coefficient.14 The negative slope of the regression
line in Figure 1.1 indicates that the dispersion of income stabilization coefficients across
countries has become more compressed, that is, countries with a relatively low (high)
14The European Commission’s LABREF database provides an overview of tax-benefit reforms undertaken
in the period under consideration (see also Turrini et al., 2015, for an overview).
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Figure 1.1.: Change in τ (Income Shock Scenario): 2014 vs. 2007
Notes: The graph shows the level of the income stabilization coefficient in 2007 following a proportional
income shock on the vertical axis and the change from 2007 to 2014 on the horizontal axis. The dashed
line indicates fitted values of a linear regression of the variable on the vertical axis on the variable on the
horizontal axis. Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.
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stabilization coefficient in 2007 have been more likely to raise (reduce) taxes and social
insurance contributions.
Next, we decompose the overall change in the income stabilization coefficient into its
components. As can be seen in Figure 1.2, in particular changes in income taxes and to
a smaller extent in social insurance contributions have affected the stabilizing potential
of tax-benefit systems. Benefits are of minor importance in the case of an (intensive
margin) income shock.
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(c) Benefits
Figure 1.2.: Change in τ by Component (Income Shock Scenario): 2014 vs. 2007
Notes: The graph shows the level of the income stabilization coefficient by component in 2007 following a
proportional income shock on the vertical axis and the change from 2007 to 2014 on the horizontal axis.
The dashed line indicates fitted values of a linear regression of the variable on the vertical axis on the
variable on the horizontal axis. Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.
Unemployment shock. Figure 1.3 shows the relation between the income stabilization
coefficient in 2007 and its change from 2007 to 2014 for the unemployment shock. Income
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stabilization coefficients in 2007 range from 0.17 in Cyprus to 0.65 in Belgium. The
(population-weighted) average EA19 (EU27) income stabilization coefficient amounts
to 0.42 (0.44) (cf. Table A.2 in the Appendix). As in the income shock scenario, we
find highest (lowest) coefficients in Nordic and Western European (Baltic, Southern and
Eastern European countries) and a negative relation between the income stabilization
coefficient in 2007 and its change from 2007 to 2014.
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Figure 1.3.: Change in τ (Unemployment Shock Scenario): 2014 vs. 2007
Notes: The graph shows the level of the stabilization coefficient after an unemployment shock on the
vertical axis and the change from 2007 to 2014 on the horizontal axis. Source: Own calculations using
EUROMOD.
Figure 1.4 plots levels and changes in each component of the tax and transfer system.
While income taxes and social insurance contributions play a key role in smoothing
intensive margin income shocks (Figure 1.2), unemployment benefits are much more
important in the case of extensive margin unemployment shocks (Dolls et al., 2012;
Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016). While our results suggest a compression in the dispersion
of income stabilization coefficients for income taxes and social insurance contributions, we
find a positive correlation between the level and the change of the stabilization potential
through benefits, in particular unemployment benefits. Countries with initially stronger
automatic stabilizers in their unemployment insurance system tend to have made them
more countercyclical compared to countries with initially weaker automatic stabilizers.
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Figure 1.4.: Change in τ by Component (Unemployment Shock Scenario): 2014 vs. 2007
Notes: The graph shows the level of the stabilization coefficient after an unemployment shock by the
respective component of net government intervention on the vertical axis and the change from 2007 to
2014 on the horizontal axis. Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.
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1.4.2. The Effect of Discretionary Policy Changes on the Workings of
Automatic Stabilizers
This section first correlates income and short-term stabilization coefficients for the years
2008–2014 in order to show how discretionary policy changes have affected the cushioning
effects of tax-benefit systems in the EU27. In the subsequent analysis, we study the
relationship between our micro-based estimates of fiscal stabilization and conventional
measures based on macroeconomic variables. For the latter, we consider year-on-year
changes in the cyclical and the cyclically-adjusted budget balance which are often used
to decompose the overall fiscal impulse into its components, in particular to assess the
size of automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy measures (Deroose et al., 2008;
Mourre et al., 2014).
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Figure 1.5.: Income vs. Short-Term Stabilization Coefficient: Income Shock
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Income vs. Short-Term Stabilization Coefficient: Income Shock
Notes: The figure plots short-term stabilization coefficients on the x-axis and income stabilization
coefficients on the y-axis. Short-term stabilization coefficients for year t capture policy changes from
t − 1 to t. Short-term stabilization coefficients to the right (left) of the dashed 45 degree line imply
expansionary (contractionary) discretionary changes in the tax-benefit system. Source: Own calculations
using EUROMOD.
Income vs. short-term stabilization coefficients. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 plot the
stabilization coefficient against the short-term adjustment coefficient by year for the
income shock and the unemployment shock, respectively. Countries to the right (left)
of the dashed 45 degree line imply that the short-term adjustment coefficient is larger
(smaller) than the stabilization coefficient, pointing to expansionary (contractionary)
discretionary changes in the tax-benefit system. Panel (a) shows that in 2008, most
countries are relatively close to and, in the majority of cases, to the right of the dashed line.
The dispersion is somewhat larger in the unemployment shock scenario. Discretionary
changes in tax-benefit policies have been expansionary in the early phase of the crisis
(European Central Bank, 2010).
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This is confirmed in panel (b), showing that at the height of the economic crisis in 2009,
more short-term stabilization coefficients moved further right of the dashed line. Notable
exceptions are Ireland, Estonia, Cyprus and Poland. Starting in 2010, the short-term
stabilization coefficient becomes smaller than the income stabilization coefficient in a
larger number of countries, hinting at contractionary discretionary policy changes. In
some countries, the short-term stabilization coefficient even turns negative, for example
in Greece in 2010 and 2011, in Latvia in 2010, in Ireland in 2011 and in Portugal in 2013
(both in the income and unemployment shock scenarios), indicating that the workings of
automatic stabilizers have been heavily constrained in those years. In more recent years,
short-term stabilization coefficients are again close to the dashed 45 degree line.
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Figure 1.6.: Income vs. Short-Term Stabilization Coefficient: Unemployment Shock
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Income vs. Short-Term Stabilization Coefficient: Unemployment Shock
Notes: The figure plots short-term stabilization coefficients on the x-axis and income stabilization
coefficients on the y-axis. Short-term stabilization coefficients for year t capture policy changes from
t − 1 to t. Short-term stabilization coefficients to the right (left) of the dashed 45 degree line imply
expansionary (contractionary) discretionary changes in the tax-benefit system. Source: Own calculations
using EUROMOD.
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Micro vs. macro estimates of fiscal stabilization. Figure 1.7 sheds light on the
question of how our estimates of fiscal stabilization (for the income shock scenario)
based on household micro data compare to the overall fiscal impulse. We derive a micro
estimate of the degree of fiscal stabilization through changes in the tax-benefit system
by calculating the difference between the short-term stabilization coefficient, θTt , and
the income stabilization coefficient, τTt .15 As described in section 1.2.2, the short-term
stabilization coefficient equals the income stabilization coefficient if there are no changes
in the tax-benefit system from year t− 1 to t. In this case, the difference between the
two measures is zero and the fiscal impulse stemming from changes in tax-benefit policies
can be characterized as being neutral. The short-term stabilization coefficient is larger
(smaller) than the income stabilization coefficient and hence the difference between the
two is positive (negative) if there are expansionary (contractionary) policy changes in
the tax-benefit system.
For the aggregate fiscal impulse, we consider its two subcomponents: automatic stabi-
lizers measured by the year-on-year change in cyclical net borrowing16 and discretionary
fiscal policy expressed as the year-on-year change in cyclically-adjusted net borrowing.17
In Figure 1.7 the difference between the short-term and the income stabilization
coefficient is depicted on the y-axis, the change in cyclical and cyclically-adjusted net
borrowing from year t − 1 to t on the x-axis, respectively. If both the micro and the
macro measure point to expansionary (contractionary) changes in fiscal policy, countries
will find themselves in the upper right (lower left) quadrant. If the micro and the macro
estimates indicate opposite effects of fiscal policy, country dots will be in the upper left
or lower right quadrant.
Panels (a) and (b) show that in 2008 and 2009 the fiscal impulse was expansionary
in the majority of member states, exemplified by an increase in both the cyclical and
the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit. Our micro-based estimates of fiscal stabilization
point in the same direction so that in panels (a) and (b) most countries are in the upper
right quadrant. The correlation between the micro and the two macro measures of fiscal
stabilization is positive in these two years.
15Note that θTt reflects the effect of changes in the tax-benefit system on income stabilization from year
t− 1 to t.
16The cyclical balance, CC, shows the extent to which budgetary revenues and expenditures react to
the economic cycle. Formally, CC can be written as ε ∗OG, where ε stands for the semi-elasticity
of the overall budget with respect to changes in output and OG = Y−Y p
Y p
denotes the output gap.
Semi-elasticities are estimated for specific time-periods and are assumed to be time-invariant over this
period.
17The cyclically-adjusted budget can be derived from the following expression: CAB = (B/Y )− CC
where B denotes net borrowing and Y is output.
32
1. Crisis, Austerity and Automatic Stabilization
Ireland stands out as a notable exception being in the lower right quadrant both in
the left and right figure of panel (b). We find a short-term stabilization coefficient of
−0.2 in 2009 and a resulting negative difference between the short-term stabilization
coefficient and the income stabilization coefficient of −0.65. While our micro measure of
fiscal stabilization suggests for Ireland a fiscal tightening in 2009, changes in the budget
balance point to a significant fiscal loosening. From 2008 to 2009, Ireland’s cyclical and
cyclically-adjusted budget deficit increased by 2.4 and 4.4 percentage points of GDP,
respectively.
How can these seemingly contrasting results be reconciled? At the height of the
financial crisis, Ireland experienced the burst of a property bubble and recapitalized its
banking system in response. This accounts for a large part of the increase in the budget
deficit in the years 2008–2010. While Ireland’s budget was balanced in 2007, its deficit
had risen to an unprecedented level of 32% of GDP in 2010. At the same time, Ireland
started a process of fiscal consolidation in 2009 which lasted until 2013 and included
measures such as hikes in income taxes and social insurance contributions as well as
cuts in unemployment benefits (Alesina et al., 2015; Devries et al., 2011; Turrini et al.,
2015). These fiscal consolidation measures had an adverse impact on household income
stabilization explaining why our micro-based results point in the opposite direction
compared to the two macro measures.
Other interesting examples are Estonia in 2009 and Greece in 2011. Focus first on
Estonia in 2009. While cyclical net borrowing rose by 6.5 percentage points of GDP
in 2009, the cyclically-adjusted balance improved by 7 percentage points of GDP so
that the overall fiscal impulse was contractionary. This contractionary effect is mirrored
by a negative short-term stabilization coefficient in 2009. As a consequence, Estonia is
displayed in the lower left quadrant in the right figure of panel (b), but in the lower right
quadrant in the left figure of panel (b).
A similar picture emerges for Greece. In 2011, Greece was still in a recession, with its
cyclical deficit rising from −1.8% to −5%. At the same time, its structural deficit improved
from −9.4% to −5.2% so that the overall fiscal impulse was contractionary. In line with the
contractionary fiscal stance, our micro-based short-term stabilization coefficient amounts
to −0.7 in 2011 (and the difference between the short-term stabilization coefficient and
the income stabilization coefficient to −1). It follows that as in the Estonian case in
2009, Greece shows up in the lower left quadrant in the right figure of panel (d), but in
the lower right in the left figure. These two examples indicate that automatic stabilizers
in Greece (2011) and Estonia (2009) could only operate along the consolidation path.
Overall, for the years 2010–2013 we find positive (negative) correlations between our
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micro-measure of fiscal stabilization and discretionary fiscal policy changes (automatic
stabilizers). One interpretation of these correlations is that the workings of automatic
stabilizers has been constrained in those years.
Our results suggest that micro-based estimates of household income stabilization
provide valuable and complementary information to conventional macro measures of
fiscal stabilization. If one wants to estimate the cushioning effect of (changes in) tax-
benefit systems, a sole focus on time-invariant semi-elasticities and changes in the budget
balance may provide an incomplete picture. It should be noted, however, that the above
comparison of micro and macro-based estimates of fiscal stabilization should be taken
with a grain of salt given their conceptual differences, in particular with regard to the
limited number of revenue and spending categories included in our simulations.
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Figure 1.7.: Micro vs. Macro Estimates of Fiscal Stabilization: Income Shock
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Micro vs. Macro Estimates of Fiscal Stabilization: Income Shock
Notes: The figure plots the difference between income and short-term stabilization coefficients on the
y-axis and changes in cyclical and cyclically-adjusted net borrowing on the x-axis. Short-term stabilization
coefficients for year t capture policy changes from t− 1 to t. Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.
Data on cyclical and cyclically-adjusted net borrowing are from the AMECO database.
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1.5. Conclusion
We analyze how reforms of tax-benefit systems in the period 2007–2014 have affected
the automatic stabilizers in the EU27. Based on harmonized European micro data and
counterfactual simulation techniques, we isolate the automatic cushioning effect from
discretionary fiscal policy measures as well as behavioral responses of households. In
our simulations, we hold constant pre-crisis household income data and demographic
characteristics, but apply the tax and benefit rules in place during 2007–2014.
We find that the size of automatic stabilizers varies significantly across countries.
Income stabilization coefficients range from 20-30 percent in some Eastern and Southern
European countries to around 60 percent in Belgium, Germany, and Denmark. We
further analyze to what extent EU countries let their automatic stabilizers work during
the crisis and its aftermath. Our results suggest that automatic stabilizers could operate
freely until 2009, but have been constrained in some countries in subsequent years.
A comparison of our estimates of automatic stabilizers inherent in tax-benefit systems
with macro measures such as changes in the cyclical and the cyclically-adjusted budget
balance reveals that micro-based estimates can provide more precise information about
the degree of household income stabilization and should be used as complements to the
macro measures.
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Table A.1.: Income Stabilization Coefficients – Income Shock.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AT
τTAX 0.334 0.336 0.326 0.324 0.327 0.330 0.331 0.332 0.332
τSIC 0.135 0.139 0.140 0.141 0.142 0.140 0.143 0.143 0.145
τBEN+UI 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008
τ 0.476 0.481 0.472 0.471 0.478 0.477 0.481 0.482 0.485
BE
τTAX 0.392 0.394 0.386 0.390 0.391 0.391 0.388 0.389 0.408
τSIC 0.142 0.142 0.145 0.142 0.142 0.141 0.144 0.143 0.138
τBEN+UI 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
τ 0.536 0.537 0.534 0.534 0.535 0.534 0.535 0.537 0.550
BG
τTAX 0.186 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.087
τSIC 0.105 0.116 0.114 0.105 0.112 0.111 0.113 0.116 0.118
τBEN+UI 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.015
τ 0.300 0.214 0.214 0.205 0.211 0.211 0.214 0.217 0.219
CY
τTAX 0.168 0.167 0.166 0.169 0.180 0.196 0.199 0.200 0.197
τSIC 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.056 0.056
τBEN+UI 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.015
τ 0.216 0.214 0.218 0.224 0.233 0.254 0.257 0.270 0.268
CZ
τTAX 0.189 0.164 0.163 0.164 0.168 0.165 0.172 0.170 0.169
τSIC 0.128 0.132 0.118 0.121 0.122 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.120
τBEN+UI 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026
τ 0.335 0.318 0.304 0.309 0.313 0.310 0.318 0.315 0.315
DE
τTAX 0.331 0.343 0.339 0.318 0.312 0.314 0.315 0.316 0.316
τSIC 0.128 0.134 0.132 0.134 0.130 0.128 0.126 0.124 0.126
τBEN+UI 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.022
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τ 0.490 0.507 0.500 0.474 0.465 0.464 0.461 0.462 0.463
DK
τTAX 0.420 0.414 0.393 0.353 0.349 0.349 0.344 0.338 0.339
τSIC 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
τBEN+UI 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
τ 0.508 0.502 0.481 0.444 0.440 0.440 0.436 0.430 0.431
EE
τTAX 0.213 0.202 0.203 0.200 0.200 0.199 0.201 0.201 0.192
τSIC 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.031 0.031 0.027
τBEN+UI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005
τ 0.231 0.220 0.222 0.233 0.236 0.238 0.232 0.234 0.223
EL
τTAX 0.232 0.226 0.215 0.268 0.299 0.300 0.284 0.283 0.278
τSIC 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.093 0.095 0.103 0.103 0.099
τBEN+UI 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.014 0.009
τ 0.327 0.320 0.312 0.360 0.394 0.395 0.393 0.401 0.387
ES
τTAX 0.245 0.236 0.233 0.251 0.257 0.278 0.279 0.280 0.265
τSIC 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.047
τBEN+UI 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
τ 0.293 0.283 0.283 0.302 0.305 0.325 0.327 0.329 0.314
FI
τTAX 0.361 0.363 0.353 0.349 0.348 0.348 0.355 0.356 0.358
τSIC 0.063 0.059 0.059 0.065 0.068 0.072 0.071 0.077 0.078
τBEN+UI 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011
τ 0.436 0.434 0.426 0.427 0.428 0.433 0.438 0.444 0.448
FR
τTAX 0.168 0.169 0.168 0.170 0.173 0.179 0.181 0.183 0.180
τSIC 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.134 0.136 0.139 0.140
τBEN+UI 0.037 0.040 0.053 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.053 0.056
τ 0.339 0.342 0.355 0.355 0.357 0.362 0.368 0.374 0.377
HU
τTAX 0.335 0.339 0.311 0.271 0.225 0.209 0.161 0.161 .
τSIC 0.191 0.196 0.190 0.195 0.191 0.204 0.203 0.203 .
τBEN+UI 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 .
τ 0.533 0.542 0.506 0.471 0.420 0.418 0.370 0.369 .
IE
τTAX 0.316 0.314 0.330 0.327 0.384 0.388 0.388 0.389 .
τSIC 0.065 0.065 0.102 0.101 0.067 0.067 0.070 0.071 .
τBEN+UI 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.020 .
τ 0.399 0.401 0.451 0.452 0.468 0.474 0.478 0.480 .
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IT
τTAX 0.319 0.322 0.322 0.323 0.329 0.331 0.334 0.349 .
τSIC 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.109 0.110 0.111 .
τBEN+UI 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 .
τ 0.432 0.436 0.436 0.437 0.443 0.447 0.450 0.466 .
LT
τTAX 0.251 0.226 0.163 0.162 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.163 .
τSIC 0.039 0.037 0.087 0.088 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 .
τBEN+UI -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 .
τ 0.284 0.252 0.244 0.243 0.249 0.250 0.249 0.251 .
LU
τTAX 0.276 0.280 0.271 0.275 0.297 0.295 0.309 0.309 .
τSIC 0.106 0.105 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.105 0.104 0.105 .
τBEN+UI 0.019 0.018 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 .
τ 0.400 0.403 0.405 0.407 0.426 0.419 0.434 0.435 .
LV
τTAX 0.227 0.222 0.202 0.235 0.220 0.221 0.212 0.212 .
τSIC 0.084 0.081 0.088 0.087 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.098 .
τBEN+UI 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 .
τ 0.312 0.305 0.293 0.326 0.332 0.331 0.322 0.313 .
MT
τTAX 0.230 0.216 0.213 0.217 0.220 0.222 0.213 0.205 .
τSIC 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.040 0.041 0.045 0.046 .
τBEN+UI 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011 .
τ 0.286 0.263 0.262 0.266 0.271 0.272 0.266 0.262 .
NL
τTAX 0.308 0.313 0.314 0.312 0.314 0.323 0.312 0.313 .
τSIC 0.111 0.105 0.089 0.091 0.090 0.089 0.099 0.106 .
τBEN+UI 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.031 0.023 .
τ 0.435 0.440 0.432 0.433 0.435 0.442 0.442 0.442 .
PL
τTAX 0.179 0.191 0.165 0.166 0.167 0.168 0.169 0.168 .
τSIC 0.141 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.106 .
τBEN+UI 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 .
τ 0.333 0.307 0.278 0.281 0.281 0.283 0.284 0.286 .
PT
τTAX 0.211 0.210 0.204 0.211 0.237 0.218 0.277 0.276 0.273
τSIC 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.096 0.093 0.108 0.110 0.110 0.109
τBEN+UI 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.009
τ 0.321 0.320 0.319 0.328 0.348 0.339 0.396 0.397 0.392
RO
τTAX 0.207 0.209 0.199 0.201 0.199 0.200 0.201 0.200 .
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τSIC 0.091 0.088 0.096 0.096 0.106 0.105 0.102 0.103 .
τBEN+UI 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.026 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.017 .
τ 0.322 0.318 0.322 0.323 0.323 0.320 0.318 0.321 .
SE
τTAX 0.360 0.354 0.332 0.331 0.328 0.321 0.317 0.309 .
τSIC 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.057 .
τBEN+UI 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.012 .
τ 0.421 0.415 0.396 0.393 0.390 0.386 0.384 0.378 .
SI
τTAX 0.200 0.206 0.204 0.197 0.207 0.209 0.203 0.201 .
τSIC 0.187 0.187 0.188 0.189 0.190 0.186 0.185 0.192 .
τBEN+UI 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.027 .
τ 0.409 0.415 0.415 0.410 0.420 0.422 0.414 0.420 .
SK
τTAX 0.147 0.147 0.136 0.136 0.147 0.148 0.143 0.141 0.139
τSIC 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.131 0.126 0.127 0.156 0.158 0.171
τBEN+UI 0.017 0.017 0.031 0.031 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.018
τ 0.293 0.296 0.297 0.298 0.297 0.294 0.318 0.319 0.327
UK
τTAX 0.259 0.249 0.243 0.255 0.263 0.265 0.266 0.266 0.265
τSIC 0.072 0.077 0.080 0.080 0.085 0.085 0.083 0.083 0.084
τBEN+UI 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.036 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.033
τ 0.370 0.367 0.366 0.377 0.383 0.384 0.381 0.381 0.381
EU
τTAX 0.264 0.263 0.256 0.256 0.260 0.263 0.264 0.266 0.262
τSIC 0.104 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.106 0.107
τBEN+UI 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.026
τ 0.388 0.386 0.383 0.383 0.385 0.388 0.389 0.393 0.395
EA
τTAX 0.259 0.258 0.256 0.262 0.270 0.276 0.278 0.282 0.245
τSIC 0.102 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.106 0.107 0.108
τBEN+UI 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.026
τ 0.377 0.377 0.380 0.386 0.391 0.398 0.403 0.409 0.379
Note: A missing value in the 2015 column indicates that the tax policy is not available
in EUROMOD G4.0. EU and EA averages are population weighted. Source: Own
calculations using EUROMOD.
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Table A.2.: Income Stabilization Coefficients – Unemployment Shock.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AT
τTAX 0.188 0.192 0.185 0.182 0.186 0.190 0.192 0.194 0.194
τSIC 0.164 0.165 0.166 0.166 0.167 0.166 0.169 0.169 0.170
τBEN+UI 0.159 0.155 0.156 0.154 0.159 0.157 0.157 0.156 0.156
τ 0.511 0.511 0.506 0.502 0.512 0.513 0.518 0.519 0.521
BE
τTAX 0.224 0.227 0.218 0.227 0.229 0.228 0.226 0.226 0.239
τSIC 0.132 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.134 0.135 0.129
τBEN+UI 0.293 0.299 0.307 0.305 0.301 0.322 0.321 0.321 0.318
τ 0.649 0.660 0.659 0.667 0.665 0.685 0.682 0.681 0.686
BG
τTAX 0.131 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
τSIC 0.125 0.133 0.130 0.120 0.128 0.128 0.129 0.131 0.132
τBEN+UI 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
τ 0.268 0.230 0.226 0.220 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.230 0.231
CY
τTAX 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.074 0.077 0.093 0.092 0.094 0.092
τSIC 0.057 0.057 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.068 0.069 0.079 0.080
τBEN+UI 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.054 0.054 0.070 0.070
τ 0.171 0.169 0.179 0.186 0.188 0.215 0.215 0.243 0.242
CZ
τTAX 0.111 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.094 0.092 0.099 0.095 0.095
τSIC 0.147 0.149 0.135 0.136 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136
τBEN+UI 0.082 0.086 0.084 0.083 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.079
τ 0.340 0.324 0.307 0.307 0.311 0.310 0.316 0.313 0.311
DE
τTAX 0.224 0.228 0.223 0.206 0.208 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.211
τSIC 0.165 0.164 0.162 0.163 0.165 0.164 0.161 0.161 0.161
τBEN+UI 0.227 0.225 0.223 0.210 0.209 0.210 0.211 0.212 0.213
τ 0.616 0.617 0.608 0.578 0.582 0.585 0.583 0.584 0.585
DK
τTAX 0.247 0.240 0.229 0.210 0.207 0.207 0.201 0.197 0.196
τSIC 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
τBEN+UI 0.256 0.259 0.263 0.268 0.270 0.272 0.276 0.275 0.280
τ 0.596 0.592 0.585 0.571 0.571 0.574 0.571 0.567 0.572
EE
τTAX 0.173 0.158 0.165 0.163 0.164 0.165 0.168 0.167 0.158
τSIC 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.037 0.037 0.033
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τBEN+UI -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.020
τ 0.180 0.164 0.172 0.183 0.189 0.192 0.188 0.189 0.171
EL
τTAX 0.128 0.125 0.119 0.152 0.196 0.198 0.198 0.197 0.191
τSIC 0.130 0.131 0.132 0.131 0.135 0.138 0.144 0.144 0.141
τBEN+UI 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.070 0.072
τ 0.281 0.280 0.277 0.307 0.354 0.360 0.365 0.411 0.404
ES
τTAX 0.143 0.132 0.129 0.144 0.148 0.163 0.166 0.165 0.153
τSIC 0.074 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.073
τBEN+UI 0.187 0.186 0.197 0.192 0.188 0.183 0.180 0.180 0.181
τ 0.403 0.391 0.401 0.410 0.410 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.406
FI
τTAX 0.230 0.232 0.218 0.215 0.214 0.208 0.213 0.214 0.216
τSIC 0.065 0.061 0.062 0.068 0.071 0.075 0.075 0.080 0.081
τBEN+UI 0.233 0.230 0.237 0.232 0.227 0.261 0.265 0.263 0.264
τ 0.528 0.523 0.517 0.515 0.511 0.545 0.553 0.557 0.561
FR
τTAX 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.108 0.109 0.109 0.107
τSIC 0.156 0.156 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.160 0.162 0.162
τBEN+UI 0.207 0.207 0.218 0.217 0.217 0.216 0.216 0.217 0.218
τ 0.466 0.466 0.478 0.477 0.479 0.481 0.485 0.488 0.487
HU
τTAX 0.229 0.233 0.218 0.194 0.177 0.187 0.160 0.160 .
τSIC 0.201 0.205 0.196 0.202 0.197 0.212 0.211 0.211 .
τBEN+UI 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.056 0.057 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 .
τ 0.485 0.494 0.473 0.452 0.431 0.390 0.363 0.362 .
IE
τTAX 0.192 0.191 0.206 0.203 0.255 0.259 0.259 0.259 .
τSIC 0.061 0.062 0.091 0.090 0.061 0.062 0.066 0.066 .
τBEN+UI 0.134 0.141 0.118 0.122 0.117 0.117 0.118 0.117 .
τ 0.388 0.394 0.415 0.416 0.433 0.437 0.442 0.443 .
IT
τTAX 0.232 0.235 0.236 0.238 0.244 0.247 0.247 0.242 .
τSIC 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.124 0.125 0.126 .
τBEN+UI -0.042 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 -0.033 -0.033 .
τ 0.310 0.319 0.319 0.321 0.328 0.333 0.339 0.335 .
LT
τTAX 0.230 0.211 0.146 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.148 0.145 .
τSIC 0.044 0.045 0.092 0.091 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 .
τBEN+UI -0.019 -0.027 -0.019 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 .
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τ 0.255 0.228 0.219 0.235 0.240 0.241 0.240 0.238 .
LU
τTAX 0.162 0.168 0.159 0.163 0.178 0.177 0.188 0.188 .
τSIC 0.114 0.114 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.114 0.113 0.113 .
τBEN+UI 0.092 0.087 0.090 0.090 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.097 .
τ 0.368 0.368 0.364 0.367 0.389 0.387 0.397 0.398 .
LV
τTAX 0.213 0.200 0.182 0.225 0.209 0.210 0.202 0.195 .
τSIC 0.086 0.086 0.088 0.087 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.101 .
τBEN+UI -0.035 -0.055 -0.047 -0.029 -0.029 -0.037 -0.035 -0.036 .
τ 0.264 0.231 0.223 0.283 0.287 0.280 0.273 0.260 .
MT
τTAX 0.117 0.109 0.107 0.110 0.112 0.113 0.111 0.107 .
τSIC 0.087 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.087 0.089 0.090 .
τBEN+UI 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.029 .
τ 0.237 0.225 0.223 0.226 0.230 0.230 0.228 0.225 .
NL
τTAX 0.086 0.090 0.090 0.088 0.090 0.096 0.085 0.085 .
τSIC 0.121 0.117 0.100 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.108 0.105 .
τBEN+UI 0.346 0.352 0.358 0.361 0.359 0.357 0.359 0.356 .
τ 0.553 0.560 0.548 0.550 0.550 0.554 0.551 0.546 .
PL
τTAX 0.149 0.161 0.147 0.146 0.147 0.151 0.152 0.151 .
τSIC 0.165 0.124 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.126 0.127 0.127 .
τBEN+UI -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 .
τ 0.308 0.283 0.268 0.270 0.272 0.276 0.280 0.278 .
PT
τTAX 0.144 0.143 0.138 0.143 0.161 0.145 0.195 0.194 0.189
τSIC 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.110 0.112 0.113 0.113 0.112
τBEN+UI 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.109 0.098 0.088 0.078 0.079 0.078
τ 0.358 0.355 0.352 0.360 0.369 0.346 0.386 0.386 0.379
RO
τTAX 0.155 0.158 0.148 0.151 0.161 0.163 0.164 0.164 .
τSIC 0.113 0.110 0.122 0.122 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 .
τBEN+UI 0.143 0.142 0.141 0.145 0.132 0.125 0.126 0.131 .
τ 0.411 0.411 0.410 0.418 0.400 0.396 0.397 0.402 .
SE
τTAX 0.251 0.243 0.227 0.222 0.221 0.217 0.216 0.207 .
τSIC 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 .
τBEN+UI 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.152 0.152 0.153 .
τ 0.467 0.458 0.443 0.436 0.435 0.433 0.433 0.425 .
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SI
τTAX 0.124 0.126 0.123 0.122 0.123 0.123 0.120 0.120 .
τSIC 0.205 0.206 0.206 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 .
τBEN+UI 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.057 0.058 0.043 0.043 0.042 .
τ 0.382 0.383 0.381 0.386 0.388 0.373 0.370 0.369 .
SK
τTAX 0.076 0.076 0.061 0.061 0.074 0.075 0.073 0.071 0.071
τSIC 0.150 0.152 0.151 0.152 0.149 0.149 0.174 0.176 0.175
τBEN+UI 0.097 0.094 0.099 0.102 0.098 0.094 0.092 0.091 0.091
τ 0.323 0.322 0.312 0.316 0.321 0.318 0.339 0.338 0.336
UK
τTAX 0.205 0.198 0.193 0.200 0.200 0.198 0.193 0.191 0.187
τSIC 0.085 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093
τBEN+UI 0.123 0.123 0.125 0.124 0.116 0.116 0.104 0.104 0.104
τ 0.413 0.408 0.408 0.415 0.409 0.408 0.390 0.388 0.383
EU
τTAX 0.177 0.176 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.178 0.177 0.176 0.168
τSIC 0.125 0.122 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.129
τBEN+UI 0.134 0.135 0.137 0.135 0.133 0.132 0.131 0.132 0.174
τ 0.436 0.432 0.430 0.429 0.431 0.433 0.433 0.433 0.471
EA
τTAX 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.160 0.167 0.172 0.173 0.172 0.146
τSIC 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.123 0.124 0.128
τBEN+UI 0.137 0.138 0.143 0.142 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.192
τ 0.415 0.415 0.419 0.424 0.429 0.434 0.438 0.439 0.466
Note: A missing value in the 2015 column indicates that the tax policy is not available
in EUROMOD G4.0. EU and EA averages are population weighted. Source: Own
calculations using EUROMOD.
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2. Labor Supply and Automatic
Stabilization1
2.1. Introduction
Tax and transfer systems redistribute incomes across households. They also serve as
automatic stabilizers providing insurance against income fluctuations over the business
cycle (Dolls et al., 2012). While there is still considerable disagreement about the benefits
of discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy, most economists agree that automatic
stabilizers are an important part of macroeconomic policy. This paper extends previous
research on automatic stabilizers and is the first to estimate the automatic stabilization
effect of tax and transfers systems through a marginal incentives channel for many
European countries: When income taxes are progressive, the tax rate that a household
faces falls following an income decline in a recession, thereby increasing work incentives
and hence labor supply (Christiano, 1984). This effect offsets part of the initial income
decline and thus further stabilizes aggregate income and output. The magnitude of the
effect depends on the change in the marginal tax rate after a change in gross income, as
well as the elasticity of labor supply with respect to a change in the after-tax wage.
McKay and Reis (2016) classify four channels through which the stabilizing power of
taxes and transfers can work: the disposable income channel, the marginal incentives
channel, the redistribution channel and the social insurance channel. The disposable
income channel works through a mechanical effect of the tax system to absorb fluctuations
in gross income, which stabilizes aggregate demand through the stabilizing effect on
disposable income (Pechman, 1973; Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Dolls et al., 2012). The
marginal incentives channel works through the change in the marginal tax rate when a
household is subject to an income shock: In a progressive tax and benefit system this will
lead to an increase in work incentives, which increases labor supply. The redistribution
channel takes into account that benefit recipients may have higher propensities to spend
their income, which leads to stabilization of aggregate demand. Through the social
1This paper is joint work and circulates as Dolls, Fuest, Peichl, and Wittneben (2019a).
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insurance channel, automatic stabilizers influence precautionary savings. In particular,
they may reduce the need for precautionary savings, which increases welfare from increased
consumption.
This paper focuses on the marginal incentives channel. We estimate labor supply
elasticities for households in the EU27 as well as the responsiveness of the tax and transfer
system. In particular, we estimate the change of the marginal tax rate with respect to a
percentage change in the gross income. The marginal tax itself gives an indication of the
tax system’s automatic stabilization capacity according to the disposable incomes channel
(Pechman, 1973; Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Dolls et al., 2012). When households
face a sudden and temporary income decline, they may temporarily be subject to a lower
marginal tax rate. This triggers an inter-temporal substitution of labor. The magnitude
of this effect is mainly driven by the change in the marginal tax rate that follows the
income shock, and the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage.
Our first contribution is the estimation of labor supply elasticities in a consistent
manner for a large set of European countries. Secondly, we contribute to the literature
that assesses the incentive effects of the tax system by providing estimates of effective
marginal tax rates and the progressivity of the tax and transfer system (see Auerbach
and Feenberg, 2000; Saez, 2002; Immervoll et al., 2007; Wallenius, 2013). Thirdly, we
contribute to the literature by estimating for the first time the automatic stabilization
effect that operates through the marginal incentives channel for many European countries.
We find between five and ten percent of stabilization through labor supply in Germany,
Italy, Hungary, Sweden, Spain, Slovenia, Portugal and Greece. Stabilization is largest
in Germany, where 25 percent of an initial income decline is dampened. For countries
with a very flat system, as many countries in eastern Europe, this effect is small or zero,
because marginal incentives do not change when income changes.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. Empirical micro studies on automatic
stabilizers (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Auerbach, 2009; Dolls et al., 2011, 2012, 2019b)
estimate their size in different countries.2 Using quantitative macro models, Oh and Reis
(2012) and Mattesini and Rossi (2012) analyze the stabilizing role of transfers and taxes,
respectively. Similarly, McKay and Reis (2016) analyze the effect of automatic stabilizers
on business cycle volatility in the US. In a follow-up paper, McKay and Reis (2017) solve
for the optimal automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance and tax progressivity),
taking into account aggregate volatility and the state of the labor market. Kniesner and
Ziliak (2002b,a) exploit variation from US tax reforms using household panel data to
estimate consumption smoothing effects. In the labor supply literature, Blundell and
2Macro-econometric studies (Fatás and Mihov, 2001) rely on correlations of aggregate variables.
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MaCurdy (1999), MaCurdy et al. (1990), Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), Bargain et al.
(2014) and Bargain and Peichl (2013) study questions of taxation and labor supply.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we explain our measure of supply
side stabilization. Section 2.3 presents the structural econometric model. In section 2.4,
we describe the datasets and preparation. Section 2.5 presents results and section 2.6
concludes.
2.2. Measuring Supply Side Stabilization
2.2.1. Theoretical Framework
The literature uses the “normalized tax change” (see Pechman, 1973, 1987) as a measure
of income stabilization (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Dolls et al., 2012). It is defined
as the ratio of how a household’s tax payment (or benefit receipt) and thus, disposable
income, varies with changes in the gross income and thus measures the stabilization (or
income insurance) provided by a given tax and benefit system.
In this paper, we provide an additional metric of stabilization through changes in labor
supply, i.e. the marginal incentives channel. For example, consider a household who has
to pay a 30 percent marginal tax rate. Suppose the household experiences a decline in
gross income and, because of the progressive tax system, her marginal tax rate drops to
25 percent after the shock. This increases work incentives at the margin and provides
an additional cushioning of the decline in disposable income. Contrary to the income
stabilization channel, for the marginal incentives channel to work in a stabilizing way,
the tax system must be progressive, because in a flat tax system, there is no change in
the marginal tax rate after a shock to household income.3
The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.1, with the initial labor market equilibrium
consisting of labor L and wage w at point A. Given that the shock is temporary and
employment is determined by aggregate labor supply, a decline in gross income will lead to
increased employment when the tax system is progressive. When the shock is temporary,
the change in the after-tax wage is small relative to life-time income, which emphasizes
the stabilization effect, because there is no income effect that would counteract the
outward shift in labor supply. After a negative productivity shock which reduces labor
demand, the resulting labor market equilibrium would be point B, if the marginal tax
3This income stabilization coefficient is closely related to the incentive measure, as it is very similar to an
average effective marginal tax rate (see Dolls et al., 2012) and the change in the effective marginal tax
rate is one significant driver of the marginal incentives channel, as we will see below. In a regressive
system, the effect would be destabilizing.
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Figure 2.1.: Labor Supply Stabilization Effect
Source: Auerbach and Feenberg (2000, p. 49)
rate could not adjust. But when the marginal tax rate declines, this makes the labor
supply curve steeper. The resulting equilibrium is at point C.
2.2.2. Income Concepts and Marginal Tax Rates
To estimate marginal tax rates, we simulate a shock to market income, which is defined
as
YMi = wh+ y = Y Ei︸︷︷︸
=w·h
+Y Qi + Y Ii + Y Pi + Y Oi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=y
, (2.2.1)
where Y Ei , Y
Q
i , Y
I
i , Y
P
i , Y
O
i , respectively denote labor income, business income, capital
income, property income, and other income.
We define tax payments, social insurance contributions and benefit payments to be
functions of market income4 YMi , of household demographic characteristics X that
determine taxes or transfers (for instance, number of children, marital status, age), as
well as the parameters of the tax and transfer system T (e.g. tax rate, bracket thresholds,
deduction). Disposable income is equal to the market income minus net government
intervention T (wmhm, wfhf , y;X), which consists of direct taxes and social insurance
4Note that, for simplicity of notation, we write a dependence on market income YMi only and not a
dependence on each component (see equation (2.2.1)),although our calculations using EUROMOD
respect the different income types.
51
2. Labor Supply and Automatic Stabilization
contributions minus social benefits. We perturb household market incomes YMi at the
observed and a hypothetical (five percent reduced) income to obtain two marginal tax
rates (one actual and one hypothetical, respectively) to be able to calculate also the
change in the marginal tax rate as the difference between these two marginal tax rates.
Figure 2.2 shows the effective marginal tax rates in the EU27, calculated as the change
in taxes, transfers, and social insurance contributions with respect to a change in gross
income, averaged over the population.
Figure 2.2.: Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Notes: Effective marginal tax rates are computed as the change in income taxes, social insurance
contributions and benefits divided by the change in gross income. Source: Own calculations using
EUROMOD.
2.2.3. Supply Side Stabilization
We now turn to the labor supply stabilization coefficient. We follow Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000) by deriving the measure for stabilization:
τS = −w · dT
′(wh, y;X)
dYM ·
wdh
d [wh− T (wh, y;X)] (2.2.2)
Equation (2.2.2) gives the general formula for the supply side stabilization coefficient τS .
T ′ denotes the marginal tax rate. The first part is the change in the after-tax wage with
respect to a change in income (keeping the before-tax wage fixed). The second part is
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the change in labor income with respect to a change in the after tax wage. This effect is
determined by the change in labor supply.
Equation (2.2.2) can be rearranged to yield an equation that consists of components
with a more intuitive interpretation:
τS = dT
′(YM ;X)
d lnYM︸ ︷︷ ︸
=T ′′(YM ;X)
Change in MTR
w.r.t. 1% change in Y
· α1− T ′(wh, y;X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor income share
over net of tax rate
·
dh
h
dw
w︸︷︷︸
Labor Supply
Elasticity
(2.2.3)
The first term is the change in the marginal tax rate with respect to a one percent change
in market income, the second term is the labor income share divided by the net of tax
rate and the third term is the labor supply elasticity (with respect to changes in the net
wage).
The resulting stabilization coefficient is interpreted as the fraction of the initial shock
that is absorbed by the labor supply shift induced by the change in the marginal tax
rate (see Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000).
2.3. Labor Supply Estimation
We estimate a discrete choice household labor supply model as in Aaberge et al. (1995);
van Soest (1995); Bargain et al. (2014) to analyze the behavioral response to changes
in wages (i.e., labor supply elasticities).5 We follow especially Bargain et al. (2014) and
update their results to more countries and more recent years. In particular, we employ a
random utility maximization model to estimate utility functions that yield a distribution
of choice probabilities (see McFadden, 1974). Utility consists of a deterministic part, which
is a function of observable variables, and an error term that reflects optimization errors,
measurement error, or unobserved characteristics. For the deterministic part, we specify a
utility function that depends on both household characteristics and characteristics of the
hours category (most notably the associated work and leisure times and the disposable
income from working the respective amount of time, but also fix costs of taking up work).
By letting household characteristics enter the utility function, we allow for heterogeneity
in household preferences. Household characteristics also influence how gross income
translates into disposable income through the tax-benefit function. In general, disposable
income is a function of household (labor) earnings, non-labor income, and household
5Other contributions include Blundell et al. (2000) for Europe and Hoynes (1996); Keane and Moffitt
(1998) for the US.
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demographics, like age, marital status, and the number of kids. We use the European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for household incomes
and demographics and the microsimulation model EUROMOD to calculate direct taxes,
social insurance contributions and received benefits to obtain disposable incomes.6
As is common in the literature, we estimate labor supply functions of single men,
single women, and couples separately, as their labor supply behavior differs significantly.
Our preferred specification is a choice set of seven individual choices (meaning 49 choice
categories for couples), but we check the robustness of results with a smaller choice set
of four choices. Married couples are assumed to maximize a joint utility function, which
means that each combination of the two parters’ hours is a distinct category (resulting in
49 categories for couples, compared to seven for singles).7 Blundell and Shephard (2012)
specify a set of six choices, with a particular focus on women in the UK. Estimating
the model with thirteen choices (for singles) is possible, but extremely time consuming,
because the choice set becomes very large for couples (169 categories).
Our hours specifications are as follows. Single households choose weekly hours of
work h from a finite set H = {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60}, which correspond to (empirical)
hours ranges 0− 4, 5− 14, 15− 24, 25− 34, 35− 44, 45− 54, 55+ in case of seven choices
respectively. In case of four choices, the set is H = {0, 20, 40, 60}, corresponding to the
ranges 0− 9, 10− 29, 30− 49, 50+. Couples, who maximize joint utility, choose from the
set H×H.
We impose a quadratic utility function with fixed costs of work as the deterministic
part of the utility function.8 The utility function for a couple household is
U(C, hm, hf ;X, ε) = αc(X, ε)C(h; T , y,X) + αccC(h; T , y,X)2 (2.3.1)
+ αhf (X)hf + αhm(X)hm + αhff (hf )2 + αhmm(hm)2 (2.3.2)
+ αchfC(h; T , y,X)hf + αchmC(h; T , y,X)hm + αhmhfhfhm (2.3.3)∑
s
(κs,f · 1(hf ∈ Ss) + κs,m · 1(hm ∈ Ss)) (2.3.4)
where C(·) denotes household consumption and hf and hm denote the partners’ hours
6Harmonized versions of EU-SILC are also provided by EUROMOD. For the UK, the Family Resources
Survey (FRS) is used instead of EU-SILC.
7Estimating the model with more discrete choices is much more time consuming, as the estimation takes
longer and more points of the budget set have to be evaluated. Bargain et al. (2014) estimate models
with four, seven, and thirteen discrete choices and find that the estimated elasticities do not differ
fundamentally.
8Other common specifications include log or translog utility. Löﬄer et al. (2018) show that the choice
of the functional form is not a significant driver of labor supply elasticities.
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of work. The last expression κs,. denotes dummies for subsets of the choice set.9 Let
J denote the number of choices for a couple. These choices (H×H) correspond to all
combinations of the spouses’ discrete hours (for singles, the model above simplifies to
only one hour term hi, and J is the number of discrete choice from H for this person, i.e.
seven or four).
As described earlier, we allow the coefficients on consumption and work hours to vary
(linearly) with household characteristics:
αc(X, ε) = α0c +X ′cαc + ε (2.3.5)
αhf (X) = α0hf +X
′
fαhf (2.3.6)
αhm(X) = α0hm +X
′
mαhm , (2.3.7)
These “taste-shifters” X include age, age squared, as well as dummies for dependent
children and the degree of education obtained by the household member. Further, we
include fixed costs of work into the model. These costs, denoted by κk for k = f,m, are
non-zero for positive hours choices. Introducing fixed costs of work, estimated as model
parameters as in Bargain et al. (2014), Callan et al. (2009) or Blundell et al. (2000),
improves the fit of the model.
In general, the approach is very flexible and allows to impose few constraints (see
Bargain et al., 2014; van Soest, 1995). One restriction sometimes imposed in the literature
is to require the utility function to be monotonically increasing in consumption, as it can
be seen as a minimum consistency requirement of the econometric model with economic
theory. When the fraction of observations with an implied negative marginal utility of
consumption is more than 5%, we impose positive marginal utility as a constraint in the
likelihood function.10
Wage imputation. Non-participation is included as a category (h0 = 0) in our choice
set, and individuals or households that are in principle labor supply flexible but choose
not to work are included in our estimation samples. As the wage for these individuals is
typically not observed, but still necessary for calculating disposable income in categories
with positive hours, we must make assumptions on how to obtain additional wage
information. Hence, in a first step, we obtain wage rates for individuals by dividing
9We include dummies for being in work, working part time or working full time, meaning we have
S0 = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60}, S1 = {10, 20, 30}, S2 = {40}. See also Aaberge and Colombino (2018).
10We increase the multiplier iteratively and choose the lowest multiplier that ensures at least 95% of the
observations with positive marginal utility of consumption through an iterative procedure. To speed
up estimation, we refrain from estimating the model with unobserved heterogeneity in these cases,
that is, we do not include an error term in the coefficient αci.
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earnings by working hours in the choice category. We choose to impute wages by
estimating a Heckman selection model, which controls for selection into the labor market.
Hourly wages for those who work are calculated by dividing monthly earnings by
“normalized” working hours. We normalize hours by rounding them to the nearest hours
category to reduce division bias, see Bargain et al. (2014). We use predicted wages for
all observations.11
It is common practice to first estimate wage rates and then use them in a labor supply
estimation (see Creedy and Kalb, 2005, 2006; Bargain et al., 2014; Löﬄer et al., 2018).
The results of the wage estimations are presented in appendix section B.
Disposable incomes and choice probabilities. For each hours choice, disposable
income is a function of household labor earnings, non-labor income yi and household
demographic characteristics X:
C(h; T , y,X) = wmhm + wfhf + y − T (wmhm, wfhf , y;X).
We denote disposable income by the letter C to stress its equivalence with consumption.12.
We simulate the tax-benefit function T (·) using the tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD,
which we present in the next section.
As the model is stochastic in nature, the full specification of the labor supply model is
given by including i.i.d. error terms Ô for each choice from H×H. That is, total utility
at each alternative is
V (c, hm, hf ;X, ε) = U(C, hm, hf ;X, ε) + Ô,
with the observable part of utility U(·) being defined as in equation (2.3.1). The
error terms can represent measurement errors or optimization errors of the household.
McFadden (1974) showed that, if errors follow an extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution,
the probability for each household of choosing an alternative j can be expressed as:13
Pj(X, ε) = Pr(h = hj | X, ε) = exp (U(C, hmj , hfj ;X, ε))∑J
k=1 exp (U(C, hmk, hfk;X, ε))
11Using predicted wages for all observations further reduces selection bias. See also (Borjas, 1980; Ziliak
and Kniesner, 1999) regarding the issue of division bias, MaCurdy et al. (1990) on imputing wages
for the whole or only parts of the sample, as well as Löﬄer et al. (2018) for a discussion of these
approaches in the context of discrete choice modeling.
12In this static setting, we do not model a savings decision of the household, and the elasticities we
estimate are hence Marshallian elasticities. Hicksian elasticities can be obtained by additionally
estimating income elasticities and using the Slutsky decomposition.
13See also Creedy and Kalb (2006); Blundell and Shephard (2012); Bargain et al. (2014)
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Identification. As the tax-benefit calculator accounts for a realistic description of
policies, we make use of the variation provided by nonlinearities and discontinuities
inherent in these policies, as well as tax policy changes over time. 2008–2014 saw
numerous changes in tax policies. Pooling the data allows us to use the variation in
after-tax earnings to identify the econometric model. Effective tax rates vary with
household characteristics (such as marital status, age, family composition, virtual income,
etc.). Although we include some of these characteristics in the estimated utility functions,
tax-benefit rules condition on a richer variety of household characteristics (for example,
detailed age of children, regional information or home-ownership status).
Elasticities. Labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically in this nonlinear
econometric model. However, using the estimated structural utility function, we can
calculate choice probabilities for varying simulated incomes. We calculate the elasticities
by simulating a marginal increase in the wage rate and predicting the probability
distribution over the choice categories for the increased wage rate. The wage elasticity
is defined as the change in expected working hours (that is, the probability-weighted
average of working hours) with respect to the change in the wage rate. Similarly, we
calculate expected incomes, benefits, and tax payments before and after the simulated
income change. Labor supply elasticities are then calculated as
η = ∆Ĥ
′
Ĥ
· w∆w′ , (2.3.8)
where Ĥ is the expected value of working hours (in other words, the probability-weighted
sum of hours categories) and ∆ denotes the difference of the variable from its simulated
counterpart.14
2.4. Data
In this study, we analyze the EU27.15 The datasets we use are based on EU-SILC, a
harmonized European household survey, and the FRS for the UK. They are provided by
Eurostat and have been further harmonized by the EUROMOD team to make income
types comparable and consistent with the legal definitions in each country, and converted
from annual to monthly incomes. EUROMOD is a European tax-benefit calculator that
14See also Blundell et al. (2013).
15The most recent EU member state Croatia has less datasets available, so we exclude it from the
analysis.
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provides a framework to simulate direct taxes16, social insurance contributions, and social
benefits and family transfers (see Sutherland and Figari, 2013).
2.4.1. Household Data and Estimation Samples
We use data with an income reference year of 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013, unless stated
otherwise, and use the tax-benefit system of that respective year for the simulation of
taxes and transfers. For the labor supply estimation, we pool the year datasets available
for each country. For each discrete choice hours category h and each household, disposable
income C(·) is calculated by aggregating all types of household income, adding received
benefits (family and social transfers), while subtracting direct taxes (on labor and capital
income) and social security contributions. We denote these tax-benefit calculations by
function T (·) as defined below. In practice, we use the tax-benefit model EUROMOD
for these calculations, based on the information on income and household demographic
characteristics Xi. We introduce EUROMOD in the next section.
For the purpose of the labor supply estimation, we divide the base sample into three
subsamples for each country, depending on the household type: couples, single men
and single women (the latter two including single parents) separately. We restrict each
estimation sample to adults aged between 18 and 60 that are available to take part flexibly
in the labor market, thereby excluding disabled or retired people, those in education,
self-employed, or farmers.17 Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in the tables
in section B.
2.4.2. Tax-Benefit Simulation and Hypothetical Incomes
For the discrete choice estimation, it is necessary to calculate the disposable incomes in
each hours category. To do this, we use the European microsimulation model EUROMOD
and the data based on the EU-SILC harmonized datasets of EU27 households that come
with it. Sutherland and Figari (2013) provide an overview of the recent version of
EUROMOD. In this paper, we use version G4.0+ of EUROMOD. It includes multi-year
datasets and the tax and benefit systems 2008–2014 for 28 countries of the European
Union. Using EUROMOD, we calculate the counterfactual disposable incomes that are
necessary for the structural econometric model (see section 2.3). EUROMOD applies the
appropriate tax rules to calculate household after-tax incomes and then simulate social
16There are recent attempts to reflect value added taxes to the project, see Decoster (2014).
17For the Heckman-corrected wage estimation, we apply the same restrictions on the sample, but estimate
the sample separately for women and men.
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insurance contributions as well as benefits and pensions the individual may be eligible
for.
2.5. Results
This section presents the estimated labor supply elasticities and the stabilization coeffi-
cient.
2.5.1. Labor Supply Elasticities
We estimate the labor supply elasticities separately for each country for single men, single
women, and couples. We aggregate the results at individual or household level to derive
an estimate for the whole population. The covariates in each estimation are the same
across countries. The fit is good even with only four choices.
Figure 2.3.: Own Wage Elasticity
Own Wage Elasticities. In figure 2.3 we present the results for own wage elasticities
for the European countries. Generally, the elasticities are in line with the literature,
ranging from 0 to around 0.6. The labor supply elasticities are small (below 0.2) in
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Luxembourg, Netherlands, Cyprus, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary and the UK. We find the
largest elasticities for Romania, Spain, Latvia, Belgium, Estonia, and Bulgaria (between
0.4 and 0.6).
Figure 2.4.: Own Wage Elasticity: Extensive vs. Intensive Margin
Intensive and Extensive Margin. We follow Bargain et al. (2014) in defining the
hours elasticity for participants as the intensive margin elasticity. The extensive margin
is expressed as the hours changes corresponding to participation responses in relation
to total hours, so the extensive and the intensive margin sum up to the total elasticity.
Figure 2.4 shows the results. We comment first on the general magnitude of the estimated
elasticities before going into country details.
Contrary to Bargain et al. (2014), who find intensive margin elasticities close to zero
for many countries, our estimates of intensive margin elasticities are relatively large, often
larger than the extensive margin. This results is consistent with findings in the literature.
For instance, in recent studies, Chetty et al. (2011) conclude from meta analyses that the
intensive margin Hicksian micro elasticity is 0.33, while its extensive margin counterpart
is 0.26. Similarly, Attanasio et al. (2018) find that the extensive margin makes up about
half of the response for younger women, but that share declines with age.
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There are several possible explanations that reconcile the different magnitudes of the
estimated intensive margin elasticities in Bargain et al. (2014) and this paper. The most
straightforward explanation could simply be our use of different data sources and the
newer datasets. Also, more availability of part-time work over the last decade could have
increased hours flexibility on the household side. Another reason may be the slightly
different approach in Bargain et al. (2014) regarding wage prediction. To increase the
variation in the distribution of predicted wage rates, Bargain et al. (2014) add a single
random error term to each wage. While this helps to increase the variance of the wage
distribution, it is ad hoc and the effect on the wage prediction remains unclear.18
Furthermore, we pool multiple years for each country. The reported pooled elasticities
in Bargain et al. (2014) are also lower than non-pooled (except for Ireland, see Bargain
et al., 2014).
In general, elasticities lie between 0.1 and 0.6, which is the usual range seen in other
studies. We find the lowest elasticities in Cyprus, Denmark, UK, Netherlands and Sweden
(all below 0.2). In these countries, the extensive hours elasticities are virtually zero.
Hungary and Romania also have elasticities below 0.2 but the extensive margin makes
up a larger share. Elasticities are particularly large in Belgium, Spain and Ireland (above
0.4). The other countries lie in between.
We also provide the disaggregated results from the elasticity estimations in figure 2.5.
Married men have the lowest overall elasticities, and they vary little at the extensive
margin. Married women have higher elasticities, but are still below values often seen in
the literature. Singles generally have a higher elasticity at the extensive margin, with
particularly high elasticities for single men.
Gross vs. net elasticities. So far, we have looked at gross wage elasticities. We also
estimate net wage elasticities as the change in expected hours divided by the change in
the net wage. Because a fraction of the change in the gross wage is dampened by the tax
and transfer system, the change in the net wage will generally be less than the change in
the gross wage, which is why net elasticities normally are larger than their gross wage
counterparts. Figure 2.6 plots net wage elasticities against the gross wage elasticities.
The elasticities generally lie above the 45 degree line.
18Results in Löﬄer et al. (2014) indicate that this procedure can downward-bias elasticities significantly.
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Figure 2.5.: Labor Supply Elasticities by Household Type
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Figure 2.6.: Gross vs. Net Wage Elasticity
Notes: Plots net wage elasticity against gross wage elasticity. The net wage elasticities are calculated as
the change in expected hours divided by the change in the net wage. Because a fraction of the change in
the gross wage is dampened by the tax and transfer system, the net wage elasticity is larger than the
gross wage elasticity.
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2.5.2. Automatic Stabilizers
This section presents our main results, the estimates of the labor supply stabilization
coefficient. The supply side stabilization coefficient is largest in Germany, where 25
percent of an initial income decline is dampened. This strong stabilization effect is
induced by the large average labor supply elasticity (0.539), as well as the stark drop
in the marginal tax rate after an income change (0.413). While many tax systems
apply tax brackets, where marginal tax rates only change when income changes across
thresholds, the German tax system interpolates marginal rates between thresholds, so
that the marginal rate changes continuously as taxable income shifts. Regarding the rest
of Europe, Italy (0.116), Hungary (0.095), Sweden (0.08), Spain(0.073), Slovenia (0.072),
Portugal (0.06), Greece (0.051) and Ireland (0.05) have high stabilizers (larger than 0.05).
Countries with a high second derivative of the tax function are Denmark (0.228), Greece
(0.168), Italy (0.328) and Sweden (0.185). In the other countries, the overall labor supply
stabilization effect is rather modest, ranging from 0 to 0.05.
Bulgaria and Luxembourg have a negative stabilizer, meaning that the tax and transfer
system overall is actually a de-stabilizer. This is the case because the tax rates in both
countries are regressive when taxes benefits and social security contributions are combined.
France and UK are also slightly de-stabilizing, but the coefficient is near zero. While
Bulgaria is regressive at the top, in Luxembourg, France and UK, benefit withdrawal
causes the tax system to be regressive.19
Accounting for the state of the labor market. One might argue that households
are not free to choose hours at their will during recessions, the time when we are
especially interested in automatic stabilizers. In times of recessions, unemployment
typically increases and the labor market becomes more slack and less tight.20 This means
that the cost of vacancies go down and firms find it easier to hire workers, while the
converse is true for households, who have a harder time finding jobs.
Two points support our interpretation of the results. First, our simulated income
shock can be interpreted as happening at the extensive margin, because for the marginal
incentives channel to play a role, we only require a shock to taxable income, which
19We provide illustrations of the progressivity of the tax systems in the appendix (graph B.1 in section
B), by plotting marginal tax rates against gross incomes.
20It can also be argued that what matters is not only the unemployment rate, as conventionally measured,
but “Rather, assessments of the employment gap should reflect the incidence of underemployment
(that is, people working part time who want a full-time job) and the extent of hidden unemployment
(that is, people who are not actively searching but who would rejoin the workforce if the job market
were stronger)” (see Blanchflower and Levin, 2015).
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Table 2.1.: Supply Side Stabilization Coefficients
Components
α (1− τ) dτlnY ηl,w˜ Result
AT 0.731 0.628 0.062 0.373 -0.027
BE 0.638 0.501 0.040 0.869 -0.044
BG 0.849 0.737 -0.281 0.281 0.091
CY 0.868 0.838 0.160 0.110 -0.018
CZ 0.878 0.718 0.076 0.318 -0.029
DE 0.593 0.516 0.413 0.539 -0.256
DK 0.714 0.491 0.228 0.135 -0.045
EE 0.814 0.774 0.029 0.309 -0.009
EL 0.869 0.764 0.168 0.265 -0.051
ES 0.718 0.768 0.134 0.585 -0.073
FI 0.723 0.614 0.105 0.304 -0.037
FR 0.622 0.713 -0.075 0.391 0.026
HU 0.929 0.541 0.185 0.300 -0.095
IE 0.697 0.662 0.085 0.557 -0.050
IT 0.685 0.633 0.328 0.327 -0.116
LT 0.900 0.729 -0.006 0.232 0.002
LU 0.763 0.663 -0.276 0.290 0.092
LV 0.928 0.689 0.008 0.333 -0.004
MT 0.438 0.788 0.070 0.221 -0.009
NL 0.704 0.589 0.060 0.178 -0.013
PL 0.958 0.709 0.019 0.283 -0.007
PT 0.845 0.772 0.139 0.395 -0.060
RO 0.916 0.685 -0.011 0.192 0.003
SE 0.614 0.620 0.185 0.439 -0.080
SI 0.836 0.615 0.137 0.387 -0.072
SK 0.924 0.731 0.026 0.355 -0.012
UK 0.582 0.655 -0.080 0.218 0.016
Notes: Negative stabilizer value in the last column indicates stabilization. It is the
fraction of the shock that is absorbed. From left to right, the variables are labor
share, net-of-tax rate, tax elasticity, net wage elasticity. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 2.7.: Labor Supply Stabilization Coefficients
Notes: Labor supply stabilization coefficients. Interpreted as the fraction of the initial shock that is offset
through labor supply. Negative value indicates stabilization. See Table 2.1. Source: Own calculations.
could come from working less than the desired hours. Second, our inclusion of choice-
specific dummies (cost of work) in our estimations can be interpreted as representing the
availability of a specific choice or job opportunities, and hence can be seen as accounting
for labor market tightness. Aaberge et al. (1999); Aaberge and Colombino (2018) show
that the dummy-specification is equivalent to a random utility job choice model when
systematic utility is weighted by the frequency of jobs available.
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2.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate discrete choice models of household labor supply and use the
microsimulation model EUROMOD to estimate the marginal incentives channel of the
automatic stabilization effect of tax and transfer systems of the EU27. We calculate the
changes in the effective marginal tax rates and combine them with the estimated labor
supply elasticities to quantify how much of the initial decline in output is absorbed by
automatic stabilization through labor supply.
Our results confirm the back-of-the-envelope calculations in Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000), that roughly 10 percent of a decline can be offset by labor supply stabilization.
The automatic stabilization effect of the marginal incentive channel is heterogeneous
across countries. Countries with flat tax systems exhibit hardly any stabilization, while
Germany has a large supply side stabilizer (0.25), in part because of its marginal tax
rates adjusting continuously to taxable income.
In future work, we will analyze the change in elasticities and tax-benefit policies over
time by estimating utility functions for each year separately instead of pooling together
all data years. While pooling allows us to exploit more variation in income and hours
caused by tax policy changes, it would be interesting to see how preferences for labor
supply changed over time and how this affected labor supply stabilization.
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This appendix collects descriptive statistics and results of the regressions. Sample de-
scriptives on demographics, regressors, and sample size are provided in tables B.1 and
B.2. These tables also show mean and standard deviation of our wage rate imputations,
obtained by Heckman estimations. The estimations and coefficients themselves, differen-
tiated by gender, can be found in this section in tables B.3 and B.4. Figure B.1 plots
empirical effective marginal tax rates in 2008 for our estimation samples to illustrate the
progressivity of the tax systems (for 2008 policy years).1 The graphs show the median
marginal tax rate for each gross income bin of the actual income distribution. Tables
B.5, B.6 and B.7 show the results of the labor supply estimations for single women, single
men and couples, respectively.
Table B.1.: Wage Subsample: Women – 7 choices
Education Imputed Wage
Age H HH>0 LFP high medium predicted (sd) actual (sd) N
AT 2008 38.95 33.26 34.54 0.96 0.18 0.66 14.07 (3.54) 13.51 (16.00) 2,422
AT 2010 39.64 33.15 34.20 0.97 0.18 0.64 15.66 (3.43) 14.44 (13.39) 2,617
AT 2012 39.84 32.79 34.00 0.96 0.17 0.66 17.74 (4.00) 14.40 (13.08) 2,685
AT 2014 40.32 31.73 33.39 0.95 0.30 0.53 18.34 (4.32) 16.25 (12.18) 2,500
BE 2008 39.25 30.04 33.27 0.90 0.44 0.35 16.72 (3.05) 15.37 (7.55) 2,894
BE 2010 39.72 32.07 35.22 0.91 0.45 0.35 16.64 (3.25) 16.91 (8.08) 2,744
BE 2012 40.00 31.59 34.13 0.93 0.48 0.35 17.69 (3.81) 17.90 (13.28) 2,585
BG 2008 39.47 36.77 41.27 0.89 0.23 0.56 1.31 (0.28) 1.25 (1.10) 2,437
BG 2010 40.17 35.95 39.87 0.90 0.30 0.53 1.77 (0.41) 1.70 (1.29) 3,325
BG 2012 40.88 36.38 40.41 0.90 0.33 0.53 1.79 (0.33) 1.68 (1.10) 2,933
BG 2014 41.02 36.31 39.96 0.91 0.33 0.51 2.38 (0.44) 1.94 (1.37) 2,482
CY 2008 37.78 38.08 38.96 0.98 0.44 0.41 9.57 (3.56) 8.87 (6.10) 1,781
CY 2010 37.63 37.39 38.80 0.96 0.42 0.39 8.72 (4.11) 9.06 (7.38) 2,127
CY 2012 37.45 35.34 37.97 0.93 0.45 0.38 8.90 (4.18) 9.68 (8.01) 2,866
CY 2014 37.45 33.40 37.72 0.89 0.48 0.39 8.40 (3.81) 9.63 (7.53) 2,444
1To save space, we don’t provide the scatter plots for the more recent years, but results are available on
request.
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CZ 2008 40.05 36.38 40.20 0.91 0.13 0.76 3.78 (0.73) 3.77 (1.74) 4,867
CZ 2010 40.31 36.36 40.01 0.91 0.16 0.75 4.25 (0.76) 4.12 (2.34) 3,904
CZ 2012 40.35 36.05 39.73 0.91 0.18 0.74 4.69 (0.88) 4.17 (2.64) 3,672
DE 2008 40.69 30.80 33.81 0.91 0.37 0.53 14.97 (3.96) 12.90 (7.59) 5,743
DE 2010 41.03 31.50 34.00 0.93 0.34 0.54 15.40 (4.13) 13.05 (8.10) 5,829
DE 2012 41.33 31.63 33.79 0.94 0.35 0.56 15.61 (3.63) 13.42 (8.07) 5,823
DK 2008 41.03 36.13 37.14 0.97 0.36 0.42 20.84 (3.63) 19.58 (8.43) 3,208
DK 2012 41.53 35.64 37.16 0.96 0.44 0.42 23.85 (4.22) 23.20 (12.51) 2,842
EE 2008 40.89 39.52 39.87 0.99 0.43 0.51 3.26 (0.70) 3.42 (2.06) 2,660
EE 2010 40.87 36.01 38.57 0.93 0.45 0.48 3.75 (0.78) 3.83 (2.83) 2,759
EE 2012 40.87 36.93 39.18 0.94 0.46 0.46 4.02 (0.80) 3.96 (2.49) 2,799
EL 2008 36.63 32.69 36.85 0.89 0.36 0.42 8.57 (3.30) 8.79 (6.29) 2,184
EL 2010 37.39 31.87 35.75 0.89 0.40 0.44 10.61 (2.84) 9.59 (6.74) 2,327
EL 2012 37.81 24.26 33.63 0.72 0.38 0.43 12.29 (2.15) 11.25 (12.04) 1,805
EL 2014 37.89 24.02 37.12 0.65 0.40 0.46 9.55 (1.72) 6.89 (4.17) 2,957
ES 2008 37.50 34.20 36.46 0.94 0.40 0.26 8.86 (2.48) 9.03 (5.54) 6,180
ES 2010 38.20 31.41 35.95 0.87 0.38 0.28 9.22 (2.87) 9.52 (6.30) 6,999
ES 2012 39.29 28.23 34.95 0.81 0.40 0.26 9.10 (2.48) 9.40 (5.24) 6,169
ES 2014 40.05 28.71 34.90 0.82 0.44 0.21 9.69 (3.36) 10.08 (6.80) 6,157
FI 2008 41.29 35.86 37.26 0.96 0.40 0.46 13.93 (2.91) 13.78 (6.50) 4,888
FI 2010 41.83 36.09 37.97 0.95 0.46 0.43 15.62 (2.86) 15.52 (6.43) 4,909
FI 2012 41.71 35.86 37.99 0.94 0.50 0.41 16.50 (3.15) 16.61 (7.06) 4,478
FI 2014 41.27 35.23 37.26 0.95 0.51 0.42 17.48 (3.36) 17.84 (8.51) 4,830
FR 2007 39.27 33.78 35.80 0.94 0.34 0.42 11.39 (2.77) 11.25 (6.22) 5,048
FR 2010 39.57 34.46 35.91 0.96 0.37 0.43 12.68 (2.93) 12.22 (7.16) 5,229
FR 2012 39.96 34.65 35.92 0.96 0.39 0.46 13.31 (3.01) 13.12 (9.83) 5,686
HR 2014 39.18 29.85 39.18 0.76 0.24 0.62 5.41 (1.11) 4.19 (2.62) 2,558
HU 2008 39.85 37.32 39.81 0.94 0.24 0.59 2.90 (1.04) 3.08 (2.21) 3,825
HU 2010 41.04 38.13 40.83 0.93 0.26 0.57 2.64 (0.34) 2.75 (1.28) 4,458
HU 2012 41.29 35.17 38.09 0.92 0.28 0.57 3.17 (0.87) 3.10 (2.02) 5,466
IE 2008 37.55 30.39 31.67 0.96 0.43 0.37 18.42 (5.56) 18.15 (15.87) 1,869
IE 2010 38.26 27.45 30.09 0.91 0.48 0.36 21.74 (5.17) 20.13 (13.44) 1,696
IE 2012 38.39 27.64 30.95 0.89 0.51 0.35 18.74 (4.97) 19.49 (15.01) 1,862
IT 2008 38.86 32.58 35.54 0.92 0.22 0.48 12.37 (2.63) 11.95 (6.32) 7,355
IT 2010 39.60 32.88 36.03 0.91 0.22 0.48 14.83 (2.86) 11.75 (7.54) 7,026
IT 2012 40.60 33.10 35.31 0.94 0.24 0.50 14.92 (2.64) 11.79 (7.06) 7,055
IT 2014 41.46 31.99 35.07 0.91 0.26 0.50 15.53 (2.45) 12.09 (7.18) 7,321
LT 2008 39.82 38.38 39.40 0.97 0.42 0.53 2.94 (0.85) 2.82 (1.88) 2,367
LT 2010 39.61 34.56 38.52 0.90 0.45 0.50 3.98 (1.13) 3.09 (2.72) 2,756
LT 2012 40.94 35.84 39.00 0.92 0.45 0.50 3.47 (0.93) 3.27 (2.30) 2,628
LT 2014 41.51 35.61 38.41 0.93 0.45 0.51 3.87 (0.91) 3.47 (2.28) 2,435
LU 2008 38.08 33.34 34.18 0.98 0.28 0.38 19.85 (6.07) 19.14 (11.11) 1,715
LU 2010 38.46 33.50 34.79 0.96 0.30 0.35 22.61 (7.65) 20.83 (12.67) 2,150
LU 2012 38.81 33.24 34.88 0.95 0.30 0.36 24.30 (8.17) 22.08 (13.95) 2,763
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LV 2008 39.90 39.35 40.55 0.97 0.31 0.58 2.47 (0.79) 2.37 (1.93) 2,707
LV 2010 39.94 34.58 39.03 0.89 0.35 0.55 2.17 (0.81) 2.44 (1.91) 3,218
LV 2012 41.01 34.23 38.72 0.88 0.39 0.53 2.90 (0.75) 2.50 (2.09) 3,238
LV 2015 41.36 37.27 38.95 0.96 0.42 0.48 4.49 (1.15) 4.37 (3.48) 2,781
MT 2009 34.41 34.46 36.51 0.94 0.26 0.30 7.16 (1.93) 6.83 (3.81) 1,241
MT 2010 34.58 36.22 37.40 0.97 0.28 0.28 7.90 (2.28) 7.88 (5.57) 1,194
MT 2012 35.31 35.93 36.89 0.97 0.30 0.35 8.41 (2.19) 8.33 (4.05) 1,548
MT 2014 36.33 35.87 36.37 0.99 0.35 0.32 9.19 (2.24) 9.05 (5.20) 1,650
NL 2008 39.40 27.47 27.79 0.99 0.34 0.45 18.06 (4.11) 17.19 (11.29) 4,990
NL 2010 39.76 27.51 27.98 0.98 0.37 0.44 19.33 (4.54) 18.62 (12.87) 4,874
NL 2012 40.06 27.26 27.70 0.98 0.39 0.43 20.10 (4.49) 18.68 (11.10) 5,025
PL 2008 37.33 35.10 38.53 0.91 0.30 0.65 3.48 (1.24) 3.74 (3.58) 6,119
PL 2010 38.09 35.85 39.02 0.92 0.34 0.60 3.57 (1.30) 3.80 (2.94) 5,497
PL 2012 38.34 34.42 38.46 0.89 0.34 0.55 3.71 (1.18) 3.91 (2.83) 6,208
PL 2014 38.82 34.74 39.13 0.89 0.37 0.52 3.70 (1.14) 4.12 (2.96) 6,089
PT 2008 38.18 36.17 38.98 0.93 0.21 0.19 5.69 (3.01) 5.94 (5.94) 1,988
PT 2010 38.44 34.26 38.33 0.89 0.21 0.21 5.84 (2.96) 6.70 (7.30) 2,395
PT 2012 39.08 33.99 39.65 0.86 0.24 0.25 5.79 (2.66) 6.36 (6.14) 3,123
PT 2014 40.04 32.95 40.43 0.81 0.27 0.25 5.56 (2.37) 6.05 (4.95) 3,532
RO 2008 38.22 40.05 41.58 0.96 0.23 0.63 1.54 (0.52) 1.53 (1.07) 2,395
RO 2010 38.48 39.93 41.87 0.95 0.26 0.62 1.66 (0.49) 1.64 (1.00) 2,324
RO 2012 38.77 39.45 41.42 0.95 0.30 0.60 1.66 (0.43) 1.60 (0.88) 2,169
RO 2014 39.44 39.52 41.47 0.95 0.23 0.62 1.82 (0.38) 1.76 (0.96) 2,226
SE 2008 40.24 32.46 33.27 0.98 0.39 0.53 15.82 (3.82) 14.92 (11.61) 3,997
SE 2010 40.56 33.01 33.89 0.97 0.42 0.51 17.50 (4.29) 16.53 (13.53) 3,716
SE 2012 40.64 34.40 35.58 0.97 0.46 0.48 23.18 (4.59) 18.77 (18.09) 3,392
SI 2008 39.40 36.50 39.81 0.92 0.28 0.55 8.18 (2.41) 7.58 (4.55) 6,156
SI 2010 39.86 35.22 38.73 0.91 0.31 0.55 9.68 (2.69) 8.33 (5.01) 6,237
SI 2012 40.10 34.22 38.24 0.89 0.35 0.52 10.88 (2.77) 8.83 (5.21) 6,000
SI 2014 40.32 34.56 39.50 0.87 0.39 0.50 10.96 (2.30) 8.75 (5.12) 5,803
SK 2008 39.52 37.60 40.40 0.93 0.20 0.74 3.13 (0.44) 2.89 (1.29) 3,667
SK 2010 40.36 36.04 40.06 0.90 0.24 0.70 3.51 (0.48) 3.35 (1.66) 3,608
SK 2012 40.61 35.81 40.07 0.89 0.27 0.68 4.03 (0.64) 3.81 (1.82) 3,538
SK 2014 40.59 35.27 39.99 0.88 0.29 0.65 3.95 (0.68) 3.77 (3.23) 3,468
UK 2008 38.60 31.90 33.88 0.94 0.24 0.26 13.82 (3.61) 13.40 (10.17) 9,878
UK 2009 38.95 31.20 33.52 0.93 0.24 0.26 12.80 (3.25) 12.21 (8.08) 9,962
UK 2012 38.95 30.80 33.71 0.91 0.27 0.28 14.64 (3.64) 14.51 (13.46) 8,051
UK 2013 38.96 31.23 33.65 0.93 0.29 0.28 14.12 (3.44) 13.69 (10.43) 8,050
Notes: Summary statistics of the wage estimation subsample. Variables: Mean age,
mean working hours, mean working hours conditional on hours being positive, labor force
participation rate, fraction of highly and medium educated, predicted wage (standard
deviation), observed wage (standard deviation), sample size. Nominal variables are
denominated in Euro. Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC.
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Table B.2.: Wage Subsample: Men – 7 choices
Education Imputed Wage
Age H HH>0 LFP high medium predicted (sd) actual (sd) N
AT 2008 38.77 40.77 42.55 0.96 0.19 0.68 17.50 (3.99) 16.35 (11.26) 2,799
AT 2010 38.94 40.32 41.97 0.96 0.20 0.66 18.42 (4.40) 17.67 (12.60) 2,922
AT 2012 39.29 40.87 42.22 0.97 0.21 0.67 21.37 (5.79) 17.80 (13.66) 2,890
AT 2014 39.60 39.44 41.21 0.96 0.29 0.58 22.41 (6.00) 19.68 (12.33) 2,699
BE 2008 39.36 38.51 41.15 0.94 0.35 0.40 17.96 (3.75) 16.87 (8.77) 2,996
BE 2010 39.84 39.44 42.57 0.93 0.36 0.38 18.79 (3.90) 17.89 (8.29) 2,884
BE 2012 40.02 38.03 41.50 0.92 0.39 0.39 19.00 (4.27) 19.14 (11.70) 2,624
BG 2008 38.36 39.71 42.65 0.93 0.13 0.63 1.83 (0.28) 1.56 (1.08) 2,582
BG 2010 38.62 38.19 41.27 0.93 0.16 0.64 2.18 (0.45) 2.00 (1.50) 3,499
BG 2012 39.25 36.81 41.27 0.89 0.18 0.65 2.27 (0.36) 2.08 (1.65) 3,069
BG 2014 39.74 37.00 40.99 0.90 0.19 0.61 2.92 (0.49) 2.36 (2.47) 2,509
CY 2008 39.32 43.03 43.60 0.99 0.34 0.44 11.79 (3.12) 11.57 (7.43) 1,846
CY 2010 38.25 41.77 42.78 0.98 0.32 0.44 13.13 (3.61) 11.82 (7.43) 2,056
CY 2012 38.28 39.62 41.70 0.95 0.33 0.46 14.30 (4.39) 12.94 (11.51) 2,674
CY 2014 38.61 36.77 40.62 0.91 0.34 0.46 14.03 (4.24) 11.56 (9.78) 2,404
CZ 2008 38.80 40.76 43.66 0.93 0.15 0.78 4.87 (0.98) 4.92 (2.56) 5,526
CZ 2010 38.95 40.24 43.06 0.93 0.16 0.78 5.36 (1.04) 5.24 (2.87) 4,334
CZ 2012 38.98 40.05 42.73 0.94 0.18 0.76 5.80 (1.32) 5.48 (3.30) 3,978
DE 2008 40.80 40.08 43.58 0.92 0.41 0.50 18.08 (5.73) 16.68 (10.98) 5,781
DE 2010 40.78 40.34 43.27 0.93 0.40 0.50 18.29 (6.00) 16.72 (10.76) 5,901
DE 2012 41.11 40.40 43.02 0.94 0.39 0.52 18.89 (5.78) 17.52 (10.59) 5,761
DK 2008 40.07 40.44 40.99 0.99 0.28 0.49 23.74 (5.61) 22.41 (12.63) 3,046
DK 2012 40.59 40.04 41.31 0.97 0.33 0.48 25.94 (6.79) 25.16 (23.14) 2,669
EE 2008 38.05 40.18 41.37 0.97 0.23 0.62 4.88 (0.84) 4.84 (2.92) 2,688
EE 2010 38.36 36.54 40.93 0.89 0.25 0.60 5.26 (0.93) 5.24 (4.91) 2,765
EE 2012 38.40 39.12 41.52 0.94 0.26 0.60 5.89 (0.93) 5.53 (3.52) 2,848
EL 2008 38.50 40.26 42.83 0.94 0.26 0.45 10.71 (3.52) 9.75 (7.12) 2,602
EL 2010 38.81 35.68 39.51 0.90 0.28 0.47 11.31 (3.48) 11.33 (9.23) 2,685
EL 2012 38.77 29.52 38.84 0.76 0.28 0.48 9.87 (2.72) 11.09 (10.49) 2,038
EL 2014 39.36 30.25 41.14 0.74 0.32 0.47 9.54 (2.23) 8.02 (5.89) 3,356
ES 2008 38.16 40.66 42.33 0.96 0.32 0.23 11.21 (2.36) 10.41 (5.85) 7,112
ES 2010 38.76 35.98 40.99 0.88 0.30 0.26 12.71 (2.52) 10.54 (6.69) 7,628
ES 2012 39.63 32.63 39.52 0.83 0.31 0.25 13.39 (2.17) 10.60 (5.93) 6,846
ES 2014 40.34 33.65 39.90 0.84 0.33 0.23 11.59 (3.77) 11.58 (8.12) 6,417
FI 2008 40.00 38.26 40.37 0.95 0.32 0.51 18.79 (4.79) 16.99 (9.16) 4,657
FI 2010 40.08 37.33 40.24 0.93 0.32 0.52 19.77 (4.97) 18.92 (10.98) 4,673
FI 2012 40.18 37.32 40.31 0.93 0.36 0.50 21.22 (4.94) 19.68 (9.88) 4,348
FI 2014 40.18 36.21 40.02 0.90 0.37 0.49 22.44 (5.45) 21.24 (21.14) 4,618
FR 2007 37.94 39.56 41.65 0.95 0.27 0.50 12.88 (3.27) 13.03 (12.96) 5,192
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FR 2010 38.67 39.03 40.70 0.96 0.29 0.49 14.25 (3.53) 14.54 (13.30) 5,429
FR 2012 38.97 39.38 41.00 0.96 0.31 0.52 15.11 (3.64) 15.05 (10.55) 5,843
HR 2014 39.01 34.23 40.92 0.84 0.14 0.74 5.60 (1.02) 4.79 (3.16) 2,810
HU 2008 37.44 39.23 41.09 0.95 0.16 0.68 3.19 (1.25) 3.39 (2.58) 4,213
HU 2010 38.97 40.38 42.91 0.94 0.15 0.69 2.76 (0.50) 2.95 (1.52) 4,638
HU 2012 39.56 36.82 39.50 0.93 0.16 0.69 3.57 (1.01) 3.43 (2.41) 5,578
IE 2008 37.12 34.85 39.29 0.89 0.30 0.36 22.17 (6.56) 20.70 (16.09) 1,972
IE 2010 37.86 28.09 36.65 0.77 0.38 0.32 20.76 (6.28) 21.83 (14.06) 1,912
IE 2012 38.42 27.49 37.69 0.73 0.45 0.31 18.22 (5.99) 21.47 (14.25) 2,036
IT 2008 39.12 39.23 41.89 0.94 0.13 0.44 12.86 (3.07) 12.73 (6.91) 8,888
IT 2010 39.43 38.81 41.56 0.93 0.13 0.45 14.97 (3.34) 12.51 (7.98) 8,408
IT 2012 39.97 36.90 40.34 0.91 0.13 0.46 15.81 (3.26) 13.03 (11.11) 8,440
IT 2014 40.80 35.71 39.87 0.90 0.18 0.45 16.64 (3.26) 13.72 (9.75) 8,394
LT 2008 38.89 39.53 41.39 0.95 0.24 0.67 3.91 (0.93) 3.81 (2.73) 2,325
LT 2010 38.46 33.11 39.69 0.83 0.27 0.58 5.02 (1.03) 3.47 (3.15) 2,577
LT 2012 39.43 35.73 39.88 0.90 0.28 0.59 4.10 (0.76) 3.65 (2.25) 2,418
LT 2014 39.44 37.31 39.68 0.94 0.30 0.61 4.31 (0.86) 4.21 (3.24) 2,233
LU 2008 39.13 41.31 42.28 0.98 0.24 0.42 23.01 (7.71) 24.52 (15.61) 2,251
LU 2010 39.40 40.11 41.76 0.96 0.24 0.42 25.20 (8.86) 24.65 (16.54) 2,672
LU 2012 39.00 39.71 41.39 0.96 0.27 0.41 25.86 (9.11) 24.95 (17.06) 3,278
LV 2008 37.86 40.81 42.34 0.96 0.17 0.59 3.19 (0.86) 2.84 (2.61) 2,580
LV 2010 38.15 33.53 40.67 0.82 0.19 0.59 2.64 (0.96) 2.87 (2.37) 2,995
LV 2012 39.07 33.46 40.18 0.83 0.20 0.61 3.76 (0.69) 2.96 (2.85) 2,888
LV 2015 39.30 37.79 40.28 0.94 0.22 0.60 5.67 (1.28) 5.16 (3.80) 2,623
MT 2009 38.31 39.41 41.99 0.94 0.17 0.29 7.80 (2.20) 7.55 (4.09) 2,138
MT 2010 38.45 39.76 42.08 0.94 0.17 0.28 8.27 (2.13) 8.25 (4.53) 2,043
MT 2012 38.67 40.24 42.27 0.95 0.19 0.34 9.05 (2.51) 9.17 (5.35) 2,444
MT 2014 38.94 39.49 41.82 0.94 0.22 0.26 10.28 (3.08) 10.53 (7.12) 2,522
NL 2008 40.23 38.24 38.73 0.99 0.34 0.42 21.22 (6.98) 21.02 (19.60) 5,517
NL 2010 40.29 37.66 38.25 0.98 0.34 0.41 22.06 (7.11) 21.06 (14.40) 5,182
NL 2012 40.52 37.51 38.27 0.98 0.37 0.39 22.63 (7.36) 21.62 (15.92) 5,219
PL 2008 37.28 40.63 42.64 0.95 0.17 0.76 3.90 (1.14) 4.06 (3.62) 6,880
PL 2010 38.09 40.30 43.54 0.93 0.20 0.71 3.84 (1.14) 3.99 (2.89) 5,945
PL 2012 37.91 38.55 41.70 0.92 0.19 0.62 4.60 (1.04) 4.25 (3.11) 6,833
PL 2014 38.01 38.97 42.59 0.92 0.20 0.60 4.18 (1.19) 4.50 (3.48) 6,585
PT 2008 38.16 40.58 42.92 0.95 0.10 0.16 6.79 (2.68) 6.89 (7.08) 2,218
PT 2010 38.55 37.85 41.53 0.91 0.11 0.19 6.54 (2.59) 7.45 (6.34) 2,458
PT 2012 39.27 37.08 42.38 0.87 0.13 0.22 6.35 (2.65) 7.36 (7.97) 3,037
PT 2014 39.75 36.09 43.30 0.83 0.16 0.24 6.39 (2.49) 7.18 (5.85) 3,341
RO 2008 37.63 40.26 43.18 0.93 0.15 0.73 1.72 (0.55) 1.76 (1.32) 3,230
RO 2010 38.26 39.99 43.05 0.93 0.17 0.70 1.87 (0.51) 1.85 (0.98) 3,104
RO 2012 39.13 39.50 42.52 0.93 0.21 0.67 1.85 (0.47) 1.83 (0.97) 2,922
RO 2014 39.62 39.45 42.50 0.93 0.14 0.67 2.09 (0.38) 1.99 (1.11) 2,886
SE 2008 39.33 37.65 38.91 0.97 0.27 0.60 18.94 (4.45) 16.22 (11.78) 3,910
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SE 2010 39.60 37.43 38.51 0.97 0.30 0.60 21.38 (5.05) 18.29 (12.96) 3,630
SE 2012 40.14 36.40 37.43 0.97 0.31 0.59 28.02 (5.99) 23.34 (21.31) 3,201
SI 2008 39.73 38.45 41.19 0.93 0.17 0.64 8.70 (2.50) 7.96 (9.59) 6,774
SI 2010 39.99 37.22 40.14 0.93 0.18 0.66 10.34 (3.06) 8.77 (6.05) 6,642
SI 2012 40.11 36.06 39.53 0.91 0.20 0.65 11.42 (2.87) 9.21 (5.77) 6,238
SI 2014 40.25 37.63 40.98 0.92 0.23 0.64 11.59 (2.64) 9.29 (6.09) 6,116
SK 2008 38.60 41.06 42.90 0.96 0.18 0.77 3.82 (0.63) 3.59 (1.86) 3,669
SK 2010 38.87 37.72 42.09 0.90 0.21 0.74 4.19 (0.70) 4.18 (4.53) 3,626
SK 2012 38.76 37.77 42.08 0.90 0.21 0.74 4.91 (0.72) 4.60 (2.42) 3,435
SK 2014 39.33 37.16 41.92 0.89 0.20 0.74 4.97 (0.78) 4.52 (2.86) 3,362
UK 2008 38.14 38.36 41.85 0.92 0.25 0.23 18.01 (4.73) 17.01 (12.14) 9,731
UK 2009 38.17 36.54 41.46 0.88 0.24 0.23 16.54 (4.44) 15.52 (11.55) 9,556
UK 2012 38.58 36.23 41.18 0.88 0.25 0.25 18.44 (4.80) 17.45 (13.30) 7,688
UK 2013 38.55 37.69 41.51 0.91 0.28 0.25 17.84 (4.86) 16.92 (13.18) 7,559
Notes: Summary statistics of the wage estimation subsample. Variables: Mean age,
mean working hours, mean working hours conditional on hours being positive, labor force
participation rate, fraction of highly and medium educated, predicted wage (standard
deviation), observed wage (standard deviation), sample size. Nominal variables are
denominated in Euro. Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC.
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Figure B.1.: Observed Marginal Tax Rates
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B. Additional Results
Table B.7.: Labor Supply Estimation: Couples
AT (pooled) BE (pooled) BG (pooled) CY (pooled) CZ (pooled) DE (pooled) DK (pooled)
Cx
Agem -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2m 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agef 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2
f
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly 0.002 0.005 0.021∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant 0.005 0.038∗∗∗ -0.002 0.018∗∗∗ -0.000 0.018∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
CxC
Constant 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL1
Constant 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL2
Constant 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1x
Agef 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.005∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Age2
f
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.008∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Elderly 0.172∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.035)
Constant 0.192∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.042) (0.046) (0.055) (0.028) (0.077)
L1xL1
Constant -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2x
Agem -0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.003∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Age2m 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Elderly 0.048∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.025) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.037)
Constant 0.582∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.065) (0.049) (0.055) (0.068) (0.034) (0.086)
L2xL2
Constant -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1xL2
Constant 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IND
H > 0 -21.432∗∗∗ -16.650∗∗∗ -22.514∗∗∗ -15.258∗∗∗ -26.343∗∗∗ -19.109∗∗∗ -21.802∗∗∗
(0.580) (0.492) (0.603) (0.487) (0.739) (0.412) (0.713)
H > 0 -4.236∗∗∗ -6.088∗∗∗ -20.414∗∗∗ -10.982∗∗∗ -20.989∗∗∗ -2.179∗∗∗ -6.140∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.259) (0.548) (0.367) (0.459) (0.136) (0.398)
Parttime (m) 6.470∗∗∗ 5.007∗∗∗ 7.221∗∗∗ 4.692∗∗∗ 7.650∗∗∗ 5.062∗∗∗ 6.629∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.210) (0.248) (0.215) (0.317) (0.172) (0.299)
Parttime (f) 2.871∗∗∗ 2.764∗∗∗ 6.572∗∗∗ 4.421∗∗∗ 6.829∗∗∗ 1.731∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.137) (0.222) (0.157) (0.180) (0.097) (0.151)
Fulltime (m) 2.352∗∗∗ 2.226∗∗∗ 2.681∗∗∗ 2.378∗∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 1.208∗∗∗ 2.386∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.075) (0.083) (0.076) (0.070) (0.048) (0.086)
Fulltime (f) 1.968∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗∗ 2.768∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗ 2.959∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.105) (0.097) (0.116) (0.087) (0.073) (0.115)
Kids dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dU/dC < 0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
λ 0.10 0.10 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 4876 4358 4833 4243 6296 8992 3849
Notes: Stars denote significance levels at 5%, 1% and 0.1%. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and EU-SILC.
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Labor Supply Estimation: Couples – Continued
EE (pooled) EL (pooled) ES (pooled) FI (pooled) FR (pooled) HU (pooled) IE (pooled)
Cx
Agem 0.001 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2m -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agef 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2
f
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly 0.034∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant 0.016 -0.014∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.000 0.012∗
(0.018) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005)
CxC
Constant -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL1
Constant 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL2
Constant -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1x
Agef -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.000 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age2
f
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 0.008∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Elderly 0.171∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.013 0.110∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006) (0.032)
Constant 0.496∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.027) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.070)
L1xL1
Constant -0.006∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2x
Agem 0.003 -0.005∗ -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age2m -0.006 0.006
∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗ 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Elderly 0.174∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.023 0.139∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.020) (0.016) (0.006) (0.028)
Constant 0.546∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.056) (0.035) (0.044) (0.037) (0.040) (0.070)
L2xL2
Constant -0.009∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1xL2
Constant -0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IND
H > 0 -22.964∗∗∗ -14.087∗∗∗ -17.030∗∗∗ -20.251∗∗∗ -16.121∗∗∗ -12.121∗∗∗ -13.978∗∗∗
(0.686) (0.462) (0.293) (0.376) (0.346) (0.365) (0.571)
H > 0 -17.237∗∗∗ -10.652∗∗∗ -8.183∗∗∗ -13.449∗∗∗ -5.691∗∗∗ -10.472∗∗∗ -5.906∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.361) (0.160) (0.275) (0.182) (0.302) (0.302)
Parttime (m) 7.978∗∗∗ 4.136∗∗∗ 5.220∗∗∗ 6.869∗∗∗ 5.001∗∗∗ 5.167∗∗∗ 5.076∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.192) (0.124) (0.156) (0.145) (0.159) (0.241)
Parttime (f) 6.661∗∗∗ 4.175∗∗∗ 4.322∗∗∗ 5.482∗∗∗ 2.991∗∗∗ 4.798∗∗∗ 4.008∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.173) (0.097) (0.110) (0.094) (0.140) (0.222)
Fulltime (m) 3.254∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗ 2.217∗∗∗ 2.974∗∗∗ 2.057∗∗∗ 2.973∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.083) (0.048) (0.058) (0.049) (0.073) (0.119)
Fulltime (f) 3.489∗∗∗ 2.312∗∗∗ 3.105∗∗∗ 3.387∗∗∗ 2.402∗∗∗ 3.125∗∗∗ 2.745∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.120) (0.075) (0.080) (0.069) (0.086) (0.178)
Kids dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dU/dC < 0 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
λ 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 4113 3654 12090 9933 9309 6092 2281
Notes: Stars denote significance levels at 5%, 1% and 0.1%. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and EU-SILC.
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Labor Supply Estimation: Couples – Continued
IT (pooled) LT (pooled) LU (pooled) LV (pooled) MT (pooled) NL (pooled) PL (pooled)
Cx
Agem -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2m -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001
∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agef 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2
f
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elderly 0.003∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Constant -0.006 -0.003 0.009∗ 0.024∗ 0.009 -0.008 0.004
(0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.002)
CxC
Constant 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL1
Constant 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL2
Constant 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1x
Agef 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.011∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Age2
f
-0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.001 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Elderly 0.123∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.016 0.129∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.026) (0.040) (0.005)
Constant 0.237∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.054) (0.050) (0.039) (0.076) (0.062) (0.026)
L1xL1
Constant -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2x
Agem -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004∗ 0.007∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Age2m 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.005
∗∗ -0.008∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Elderly 0.086∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.066 0.097∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.023) (0.042) (0.005)
Constant 0.554∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.154∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.062) (0.060) (0.043) (0.081) (0.069) (0.029)
L2xL2
Constant -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1xL2
Constant 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IND
H > 0 -20.058∗∗∗ -21.892∗∗∗ -25.212∗∗∗ -18.343∗∗∗ -21.164∗∗∗ -13.116∗∗∗ -18.681∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.561) (0.787) (0.511) (0.850) (0.353) (0.346)
H > 0 -8.810∗∗∗ -18.899∗∗∗ -7.253∗∗∗ -15.759∗∗∗ -6.772∗∗∗ -3.782∗∗∗ -16.194∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.496) (0.267) (0.444) (0.374) (0.203) (0.286)
Parttime (m) 5.675∗∗∗ 8.325∗∗∗ 8.101∗∗∗ 6.789∗∗∗ 6.291∗∗∗ 5.574∗∗∗ 5.146∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.229) (0.318) (0.214) (0.380) (0.130) (0.150)
Parttime (f) 3.668∗∗∗ 7.995∗∗∗ 3.769∗∗∗ 6.683∗∗∗ 3.216∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗ 5.496∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.205) (0.150) (0.191) (0.188) (0.162) (0.115)
Fulltime (m) 1.984∗∗∗ 3.786∗∗∗ 2.463∗∗∗ 3.242∗∗∗ 2.772∗∗∗ 4.051∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.101) (0.089) (0.090) (0.109) (0.100) (0.046)
Fulltime (f) 2.325∗∗∗ 4.186∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗ 3.696∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗ 2.563∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.124) (0.110) (0.115) (0.148) (0.149) (0.063)
Kids dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dU/dC < 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
λ 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 11636 5061 3924 4756 2428 9315 11204
Notes: Stars denote significance levels at 5%, 1% and 0.1%. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and EU-SILC.
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PT (pooled) RO (pooled) SE (pooled) SI (pooled) SK (pooled) UK (pooled)
Cx
Agem -0.000 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2m 0.000 -0.001
∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Agef 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2
f
-0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Elderly 0.002 0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant 0.012 -0.012 0.000 -0.016∗ 0.024 0.007∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.000) (0.007) (0.020) (0.002)
CxC
Constant -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL1
Constant -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CxL2
Constant -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1x
Agef 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2
f
-0.001 -0.003 0.007∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Elderly 0.087∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.239∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.103) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant 0.318∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.062) (0.062) (0.038) (0.054) (0.018)
L1xL1
Constant -0.005∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2x
Agem 0.002 0.007∗ -0.003 -0.005∗∗ -0.001 -0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2m -0.001 -0.010
∗∗ 0.004 0.006∗∗ -0.001 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Elderly 0.060∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.163 0.077∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.105) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant 0.440∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.071) (0.064) (0.041) (0.058) (0.020)
L2xL2
Constant -0.007∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1xL2
Constant -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IND
H > 0 -19.656∗∗∗ -34.912∗∗∗ -30.776∗∗∗ -24.659∗∗∗ -28.026∗∗∗ -22.545∗∗∗
(0.535) (1.238) (0.807) (0.399) (0.724) (0.295)
H > 0 -14.938∗∗∗ -35.071∗∗∗ -24.424∗∗∗ -23.445∗∗∗ -25.377∗∗∗ -7.781∗∗∗
(0.388) (1.176) (0.619) (0.373) (0.569) (0.115)
Parttime (m) 5.542∗∗∗ 9.684∗∗∗ 14.063∗∗∗ 8.505∗∗∗ 7.915∗∗∗ 6.354∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.559) (0.320) (0.162) (0.312) (0.124)
Parttime (f) 5.351∗∗∗ 10.273∗∗∗ 13.545∗∗∗ 8.590∗∗∗ 8.088∗∗∗ 4.202∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.506) (0.279) (0.146) (0.222) (0.074)
Fulltime (m) 2.466∗∗∗ 3.400∗∗∗ 6.041∗∗∗ 3.274∗∗∗ 2.695∗∗∗ 2.258∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.107) (0.159) (0.057) (0.075) (0.038)
Fulltime (f) 2.978∗∗∗ 3.650∗∗∗ 6.516∗∗∗ 3.600∗∗∗ 3.423∗∗∗ 2.842∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.115) (0.227) (0.071) (0.103) (0.059)
Kids dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dU/dC < 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
λ 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 5392 4893 6882 13185 6363 19699
Notes: Stars denote significance levels at 5%, 1% and 0.1%. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD
and EU-SILC.
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3. Dynamic Scoring of Tax Reforms in
the European Union1
3.1. Introduction
Assessing the revenue, behavioral and macroeconomic effects of tax reform proposals
before their introduction provides important information to feed the political and public
debate. The interaction between tax reforms and the induced changes in the economy
are multi-faceted. Hence, it is necessary to capture not only the reaction of economic
agents to the tax reforms (in particular labor adjustment effects), but also the overall
economic effect, including on factor and product markets. An evaluation of tax reforms
that accounts for individual behavioral effects and general equilibrium macroeconomic
feedback effects is known as dynamic scoring.2 In the U.S., dynamic scoring analyses are
now well established and legally required before significant changes in tax legislation are
implemented.3
In contrast to the U.S., dynamic scoring has not been applied in the fiscal governance
framework in the European Union (EU) yet. However, such analysis would allow an
in-depth evaluation of discretionary tax measures and a better assessment of the true
fiscal policy stance, which remain important issues in the EU (Buti and Van den Noord,
2004). Moreover, in a policy context where the European Commission analyses the fiscal
and structural reform policies of every Member State—providing recommendations, and
1This paper is joint work and published as Barrios, Dolls, Maftei, Peichl, Riscado, Varga, and Wittneben
(2019)
2Dynamic scoring is distinct from static scoring, which focuses on the “morning-after” effect of a policy
reform and does not account for behavioral responses and macroeconomic feedback effects. See Adam
and Bozio (2009) for a comprehensive assessment of the dynamic scoring exercise.
3In the U.S., dynamic scoring analyses are conducted by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The JCT has been responsible for a macroeconomic impact
analysis of changes in tax law since 2003. In addition, the CBO has incorporated these macroeconomic
feedback effects into their estimates of fiscal effects if revenue effects exceeded $5 billion in any fiscal
year. Since 2015, the JCT and the CBO are obliged to provide precise estimates for output and
revenue feedback effects of major tax and mandatory spending changes (for more details, see Altshuler
et al., 2005; Auerbach, 2005; Auerbach and Grinberg, 2017; Furman, 2006; Gravelle, 2014, 2015;
Holtz-Eakin, 2015).
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monitoring their implementation according to an annual round of policy dialogue (the
so-called European Semester)—the analysis of how fiscal and structural reforms can
affect national budgets as well as Member States’ economic performance is required.4
Accounting for macroeconomic feedback effects of tax reforms is also crucial for the
determination of the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance, which plays a key role in the
European fiscal framework (see in particular Larch and Turrini, 2010).
In this paper, we develop the first dynamic scoring framework for modelling and
analyzing tax and benefit reforms for all EU countries. A key feature of our dynamic
scoring approach is to combine EUROMOD, the microsimulation model for all European
Union Member States, with QUEST, the European Commission’s dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model used for the analysis of structural reforms (including
fiscal ones).5 By doing so, we are able to precisely model actual tax reforms since
EUROMOD contains all relevant rules of the tax-benefit systems in the EU Member
States and allows for the simulation of direct taxes, social insurance contributions
and benefits according to actual legislation and hypothetical reform scenarios. This is
usually not possible using aggregated macroeconomic models alone, that only differentiate
between capital and labor taxes (see Leeper and Yang, 2008; Mankiw and Weinzierl,
2006; Strulik and Trimborn, 2012; Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011).
On the other hand, microsimulation models do not take into account agents’ reactions
to policy changes, and hence ignore how tax reforms endogenously affect prices and
quantities as well as monetary and fiscal variables in the economy that can lead to non-
negligible second-round effects on tax-revenues. By linking QUEST with EUROMOD,
these effects are also included in our analysis. In order to do so, we follow Bargain et al.
(2014) and estimate country specific labor supply elasticities using a discrete choice labor
supply model based on the EUROMOD micro-data and feed them into the QUEST
model.
We illustrate our dynamic scoring approach with an analysis of two hypothetical reforms
of the Belgian social insurance system: a reduction of the social insurance contributions
paid by employees and employers, respectively.6 We provide various robustness checks
4For example, recently the European Commission has also started to collect data on estimates of the
impact of discretionary tax measures relying on the Member States’ own assessment and providing
information at a more disaggregated level (see in particular Barrios and Fargnoli, 2010).
5See Sutherland (2001) and Sutherland and Figari (2013) for a description of the EUROMOD microsim-
ulation model and Ratto et al. (2009) for details on the QUEST III model. Decoster et al. (2010)
simulate a tax shift between labor and consumption taxes using EUROMOD. In contrast to our paper,
their analysis abstracts from labor supply responses and general equilibrium effects.
6We also examine reform proposals made for Italy’s and Poland’s tax system (see Appendix A). All
reform scenarios can be precisely simulated in EUROMOD, and are straightforward examples of
reforms affecting personal income taxes or social insurance contributions.
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in order to assess the sensitivity of the macroeconomic effects of the tax reform to the
assumptions of the QUEST model. In addition to the analysis of the macroeconomic and
fiscal effects of these tax reforms, we provide insights into the distributional effects of
the reform scenarios under consideration, which is novel to the previous dynamic scoring
literature.7
Our results indicate that accounting for labor supply responses and the macroeconomic
feedback to tax policy changes is essential for a comprehensive assessment of the fiscal
and distributional effects of tax reforms. We find only weak self-financing effects for tax
reforms lowering the employees’ tax burden. After three (five) years, the self-financing
effect amounts to 6 percent (13 percent), measured as the percentage change of labor tax
revenues upon the tax shock. The reform generates responses of wages and employment of
opposite sign, with an expansion of labor supply leading to higher employment, but lower
wages. These counteracting effects explain why first-round tax revenue effects derived
from the microsimulation model and second-round effects reflecting behavioral responses
and the macroeconomic trajectories derived from the macroeconomic model QUEST
differ only slightly. In contrast, we find much larger self-financing effects amounting to
roughly 49 percent (50 percent) after three (five) years resulting from cuts in employers’
social insurance contributions. In this case, both wages and employment evolve positively
because of the expansionary labor demand effect generated by the tax cut. In terms of
distributional implications, we show that both reductions in social insurance contributions
have regressive effects with increasing gains along the income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents our modelling
choices and describes in detail the models used in the dynamic scoring exercise. The
third section illustrates our approach for hypothetical tax reforms in Belgium. The fourth
section concludes.
3.2. Modelling Second-round Effects of Tax Reforms
In this section, we first describe the different models used followed by an overview of the
methodological steps of the dynamic scoring analysis.
7Note that in a different literature microsimulation models are combined with Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models (see Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013; Cockburn et al., 2014; Peichl, 2009,
2016). While many of these micro-macro linkages are static, there are some approaches that introduce
dynamics through projections into the model. However, these models don’t feature labor market
dynamics from optimizing firms as in our analysis using QUEST.
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3.2.1. The Microsimulation Model EUROMOD
EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model covering all 28 member states of
the European Union. The model is a static tax and benefit calculator that makes use
of representative micro-data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) survey to simulate individual tax liabilities and social benefit entitlements
according to the rules in place in each member state.8 Starting from gross incomes
contained in the micro-data, EUROMOD simulates most of the (direct) tax liabilities and
(non-contributory) benefit entitlements, and calculates household disposable incomes.9
The model is unique in its area as it integrates taxes, social contributions and benefits in
a consistent framework, thus accounting for interactions between the tax and benefits
systems, which—in the European case—can have a non-negligible impact in terms of
tax revenues, disposable income distribution and also in terms of work incentives (see
in particular Barrios et al., 2018). However, EUROMOD is static and only delivers
the first-round effects of the simulations. It does not take into account the behavioral
response of individuals to a given policy change. General equilibrium macroeconomic
feedback effects are also not addressed with this model.
EUROMOD uses the latest available EU-SILC data. However, since the frequency of
the releases of the survey data does not coincide with each of the fiscal years included in
the model, whenever the policy year does not match the one of the dataset, EUROMOD
uses index variables to inflate or deflate monetary values to the year of the simulated
tax-benefit system. These index variables are called uprating factors and are usually
taken from Eurostat (the European statistics agency) or national statistical offices.10 In
the context of this analysis, uprating factors will be used for including general equilibrium
effects in EUROMOD.
8We use the latest available version G3.0+ of EUROMOD together with the datasets based on the
2012 version of EU-SILC. For the simulation of the tax reforms, we choose 2013 tax-benefit rules
as the baseline. This is the most recent policy year that can be simulated with EUROMOD at
the time of writing this paper. Uprating factors are used to inflate the non-simulated income
components to 2013. The micro-data include information on personal and household characteristics,
several types of income (e.g., market income, pensions or social transfers), certain expenditures (e.g.,
housing costs or life insurance payments), and other variables related to living conditions. The
validity of the simulated aggregates is ensured by comparison with the corresponding macroeconomic
estimates provided by national tax authorities or by statistical institutes. Validation tables are
offered in the EUROMOD country reports for the EU28 Member States, which can be found at
https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports.
9Note that some contributory benefits (e.g., pensions as well as unemployment or disability benefits)
are not simulated but taken directly from the EU-SILC data, given the lack of individual contribution
histories that would be needed to simulate them.
10Examples of uprating factors are consumer price indices and evolution of earnings and statutory
adjustment rules for certain benefits.
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3.2.2. The Labor Supply Discrete Choice Model
In order to account for behavioral responses at the micro level, we estimate a labor supply
model. We follow standard practice and in particular Bargain et al. (2014) to estimate
a random utility discrete choice model.11 The random utility framework (McFadden,
1974) is based on the assumption that households maximize utility and thereby face
the standard consumption-leisure trade-off. In this setting, agents face a discrete set
of alternatives in terms of working hours. Individuals can choose to work zero hours,
part-time (20 hours), full-time (40 hours) or over-time (60 hours) so that the choice covers
both the extensive and intensive margin. The labor supply discrete choice model provides
us with parameters that are fed into the macro model (among these the elasticities of
labor supply).
Econometrically, our methodology entails the specification and estimation of con-
sumption-leisure preferences, and the evaluation of utility at each discrete alternative.12
Utility consists of a deterministic part, which is a function of observable variables, and
an error term, which can reflect optimization errors of the household, measurement
errors concerning the explanatory variables, or unobserved preference characteristics. For
the deterministic part, we specify a utility function that depends on both household
characteristics (such as age, number and age of children, allowing for heterogeneity in
preferences) and characteristics of the specific category (leisure time, disposable income
as well as fixed costs of taking up work). Household characteristics also influence how
gross income translates into disposable income as effective tax rates vary with household
characteristics (such as marital status, age, family composition).
For identification, we exploit the resulting variation created by nonlinearities and
discontinuities inherent in the tax-benefit system and how they reflect on households’ and
individuals’ consumption.13 Although we include some of the household characteristics
in the estimated utility functions, tax-benefit rules condition on a richer variety of
household characteristics (for example, detailed age of children, regional information or
home-ownership status). Hence, the data provide variation in disposable income (as a
11Discrete choice models have their theoretical roots in the Random Utility Model of McFadden (1974).
They have become increasingly popular in the labor supply literature (see Aaberge et al., 1995;
Dagvisk, 1994; Hoynes, 1996; Van Soest, 1995, for early contributions).
12In contrast to the classical labor supply model where households choose from a continuous set of
working hours (Hausman, 1985), it is not necessary to impose tangency conditions, and in principle
the model is very general. In practice, a functional form for the utility function has to be explicitly
specified. However, the choice of functional form has no major influence on the estimated elasticities
(see Löﬄer et al., 2014).
13This is the usual source of variation for models estimated on cross-sectional data that cannot rely on
variation over time.
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proxy of consumption) that allows identifying the parameters of the econometric model.
The disposable income is calculated for each discrete hour category and each household
by aggregating all sources of household income, adding benefits (family and social
transfers), and subtracting direct taxes (on labor and capital income) and social insurance
contributions using EUROMOD.14 Appendix B provides detailed information on the
discrete choice model and its underlying assumptions.
3.2.3. The Macroeconomic DSGE Model QUEST III
The macroeconomic model used in this analysis is an extension of the European Commis-
sion’s New-Keynesian model, QUEST (to be precise, version QUEST III, see Ratto et al.,
2009), to include workers with different skill levels. The QUEST model is the standard
model used by the European Commission to analyze the impact of fiscal scenarios and
structural reforms in the EU Member States (see, for instance, in ’t Veld, 2013; Varga
and in ’t Veld, 2014; Vogel, 2012). As a fully forward-looking DSGE model, QUEST can
capture the behavioral responses of major macroeconomic variables in an open economy
context, going beyond the direct, static impact of specific tax reforms measured by
EUROMOD. The labor market modelled in QUEST is strongly based on microeconomic
theory and sufficiently general to adapt to the different labor market institutions of the
EU countries.
More specifically, the model-version used for this exercise is a three-region open-
economy model, calibrated for the country of interest (Belgium), the (rest of) euro
area and the rest of the world. For each region, the model economy is populated by
households and final goods producing firms. There is a monetary and a fiscal authority,
both following rule-based stabilization policies. The domestic and foreign firms produce
a continuum of differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. In order to measure
the distributional consequences of policies we introduce three skill groups—high, medium
and low—into the model earning different wages.15 Appendix C explains in detail the
14In practical terms, the link between EUROMOD and the labor supply model is implemented according
to the following methodological steps. First, we estimate the hourly wage rate using a Heckman
selection model. Next, we calculate gross earnings for each hypothetical hours choice. For instance, for
a single (couple) household, we obtain four (16) different gross labor incomes (describing all possible
combinations of hours that can be chosen by the two partners). The key assumption here is that the
predicted hourly wage rate does not depend on the number of hours supplied in the labor market. This
is a standard assumption in discrete choice labor supply models, Aaberge et al. (see 2009); Bargain
et al. (see 2014); Blundell et al. (see 2000); Creedy and G. Kalb (see 2005); Van Soest (see 1995).
Allowing wages to vary across choices would lead to complications when estimating the likelihood
function, which are beyond the scope of this paper (see the discussion in Löﬄer et al., 2014).
15By using the ISCED education classification, we define the share of population with up to lower
secondary education (ISCED 0-2) as low-skilled, with up to upper secondary, non-tertiary education
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main blocks of our macro model: households, firms, policies and trade.
In our dynamic scoring exercise, one of the links between EUROMOD and QUEST is
the labor market. In the following, we describe the workings and main driving forces of
this market in QUEST. Although the general equilibrium effects influence the numerical
results—since output, consumption, capital utilization and prices are fully endogenous
in the model—the partial equilibrium analysis of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 can illustrate the
basic wage setting mechanism in the QUEST model. These figures also highlight the role
played by tax incidence after the different policy shocks are introduced in QUEST (third
section).
Figure 3.1.: Employer Reform
In the figures, LS denotes labor supply and LD is labor demand.16 Let us consider
two reforms to illustrate the wage setting mechanism in the labor market. The first
reduces the tax burden of employers (Figure 3.1), the second the tax burden of employees
(Figure 3.2). When employee-paid labor taxes decrease (Figure 3.2), workers are willing
to offer more labor services at all levels of the gross wage, and LS rotates down to the
right to LS1. In this case, the tax-cut has two opposing effects on the tax-base: in the
new equilibrium, gross wages are lower and firms are willing to hire more labor. The
tax-base in Figure 3.2 transforms from the shaded OL0E0W0 rectangle to the OL1E1W1
rectangle with stripes. Due to these two opposing effects, the tax-base may not even
(ISCED 3-4) as medium skilled and the rest of the population as high-skilled.
16Equations (E.1.17) and E.1.26 in Appendix E, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that all other
variables are constant, except real gross wages and labor, and there are no adjustment costs.
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Figure 3.2.: Employee Reform
change significantly in the short-run and scoring exercises with or without endogenous
wage and labor response might give similar results in the short-run.
When employer-paid labor taxes decrease (Figure 3.1), firms are willing to hire more
labor services at all levels of the gross wage and LD rotates up to LD1. In the new
equilibrium gross wages are higher and firms are willing to hire more labor at the new
wage rate. As both wages and employment rise, the tax-cut unambiguously increases the
tax-base (from the shaded OL0E0W0 rectangle to the OL1E1W1 rectangle with stripes).
Notice that this effect would be completely missed in a simple static scoring framework
where wages and employment are kept exogenous.
In the long-run, the capital stock will gradually increase to its new steady-state level,
which will lead to higher labor demand (e.g. LD-long in Figure 3.1 and 3.2), higher wages
and a larger tax-base. Consequently, along the transition path, the difference between
the static and dynamic scoring revenue estimates will increase.17
3.2.4. Methodological Framework
We combine the three models described in the previous sections as shown in Figure 3.3.
The first step of our analysis consists in running EUROMOD for the actual tax-benefit
17It is important to stress that the Invariance of Incidence Proposition (IIP) does hold in the model over
the medium to long-run: a shift of taxation from employers to employees, which leaves overall labor
tax revenues constant, or only changes the composition of the tax-wedge but not its size, does not
affect employment and GDP (Goerke, 2000).
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system and the reform scenario for the year of interest, using the household micro-data
for Belgium. This step provides us with the change in the effective tax burden on labor
income for employees and employers, i.e. an aggregate indicator of the change in the
tax burden resulting from the tax reform implemented in the microsimulation set-up.
This tax burden is calculated as the ratio of taxes and social insurance contributions on
labor income to the total compensation of employees and payroll taxes (see European
Commission, 2013).
Figure 3.3.: Methodological Steps
Next, we estimate the discrete choice labor supply model. From this we obtain estimates
for parameters such as the non-participation rate, i.e. the expected number of individuals
offering zero labor hours, and the labor supply elasticities, i.e. the percentage change in
labor supply, given a one percentage change in gross wages.
After having estimated the labor supply model, the change in the tax burden resulting
from the tax reform is introduced in QUEST as policy shocks and labor market parameters
such as the level of gross wages (obtained from the household micro-data), the non-
participation rates and labor supply elasticities (obtained from the discrete choice labor
supply model)—each obtained for three skill levels—feed into the calibration of QUEST.18
18QUEST is calibrated so that the model matches the observed empirical data from Eurostat in terms of
labor productivity, investment, consumption to GDP ratios, the wage share, the employment rate, a
given set of structural indicators describing market frictions in goods and labor markets, tax wedges
and skill endowments. Most of the variables and parameters are taken from available statistical or
empirical sources from the literature. Supplementary data associated with the calibration of the
QUEST III model can be found in the online version of Ratto et al. (2009) at http://publications.
jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC46465. In this paper, we focus only on the calibration of
selected parameters, which are directly related to the labor market. The remaining parameters are
pinned down by the mathematical relationships of the model equilibrium conditions, i.e. all agents are
maximizing their utility given their budget constraints, and the feasibility conditions of the economy
are met.
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By calibrating the main labor market parameters in QUEST with the micro-econometric
estimates obtained from the labor supply model, we ensure consistency between the labor
markets in QUEST and the discrete choice model.19
The second step of our analysis consists in running QUEST in order to obtain the
three-year macroeconomic trajectories for the endogenous variables of the model. We
are mainly interested in the trajectories for the price level, employment and gross wages,
since these variables are fed back into the EUROMOD model.
In the third step, we analyze the fiscal and distributional effects of the tax reforms by
feeding the macroeconomic trajectories obtained in the second step into EUROMOD.
This is done by uprating prices and wages for the three-year period after the reform.20
In addition, we simulate the employment trajectory by adjusting the sample weights in
our household micro-data.
3.3. Illustration: Hypothetical Social Insurance
Contributions Cuts in Belgium
In this section, we focus on two hypothetical tax reforms in Belgium. The first reform
reduces the social insurance contributions (SIC) paid by employees, the second those
paid by employers. In both scenarios, the total statutory tax rate of the social insurance
contributions paid by employees and employers is cut by approximately 30 percent, i.e.
the tax cuts granted to employees and employers in these scenarios have a comparable
magnitude. More precisely, we implement the 30 percent tax rate cut by simulating:
(1) a reduction of the social insurance contributions rate paid by employees from 13.07
percent to 9.07 percent (by cutting the rate for public pensions by 3 percentage points
and the one for public health insurance by 1 percentage point); (2) a reduction of the
standard social insurance contributions21 rate paid by employers from 25.36 percent to
17.75 percent (by cutting the rate for public pensions by 5 percentage points and the one
for public health insurance by 2.6 percentage points).
19Appendix D provides information on the aggregation issues that arise from linking the two models. It
compares the worker’s optimization problem and derives the labor supply elasticities in both models.
It is shown that the labor supply elasticity estimated from the discrete choice model can be consistently
used to calibrate the parameter guiding this elasticity in QUEST.
20Recall that EUROMOD inflates or deflates monetary variables using uprating factors whenever the
year of the simulated tax-benefit system does not coincide with the reference year of the survey data.
21These standard social insurance contributions include contributions for pensions, healthcare, disabilities,
unemployment, family allowances, accidents at work (standard and special), work-related illness
(standard and asbestos fund), educational leave, integration and guidance programs for youth, daycare
provision and (re)employment of vulnerable groups. As of 2016, the referred contributions have been
substituted by the “global social insurance contribution”.
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Note that these two specific reforms are just illustrative and have neither been proposed
nor implemented in the policy process. However, in the policy debate in Belgium and
many other EU countries in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the Euro crisis,
fiscal shifts away from labor taxation were heavily discussed (see Mathé, Nicodeme &
Rua, 2015 for an overview) and the two reform proposals are meant to be illustrative
of such potential reforms. They are insofar comparable as the two reforms imply the
same percentage rebate in the social insurance contribution rates. In both cases, the
contribution rates for public pensions and public health insurance are reduced. In the
third section, we consider sensitivity checks, including a scenario where the reduction in
labor tax revenues obtained with the reform of employers’ contributions is applied to
employees’ contributions.
3.3.1. First Step: Policy Shocks and Labor Market Characterization
As explained in the previous section, the micro-macro interaction involves calculating
the change in the effective labor tax burden for each reform using EUROMOD, and
introducing it in QUEST as a policy shock. Furthermore, it involves calibrating QUEST
labor supply elasticity parameters and the expected voluntary unemployment rate using
the estimates of the discrete choice model described before.
3.3.1.1. Policy Shocks
For the calculation of the policy shock, we simulate each reform in EUROMOD and
compute the pre- and post-reform effective tax rates on labor income. We follow European
Commission (2013) and define the average effective tax rate on labor as the ratio between
total taxes paid on labor income over total compensation.22 For each reform, the average
effective tax rate on labor income is computed for employees and employers, and for three
skill groups, respectively. The next step is to establish the correspondence between these
average effective tax rates computed using EUROMOD with the statutory tax rates on
labor income in QUEST, levied on workers and firms. These statutory rates are defined
22More formally, the average effective tax rate on labor is defined as the ratio
∑
i
wi∗PITi+SICEE+SICER
Gross Wages+SICER
,
where PITi is the personal income tax liability of individual i, and SICEE and SICER are the social
insurance contributions paid by employees and employers, respectively. wi is the ratio of wages relative
to the total taxable income of taxpayer i, and is defined as wi = Gross wagesiTotal Taxable Incomei . Note that this
ratio does not change after the reform, because it is calculated only from the microsimulation set-up
and does not include behavioral effects. We can further derive the average effective tax rates for
employees and employers as
∑
i
.wi∗PITi+SICEE
Gross Wages+SICER
and SICER
Gross Wages+SICER
, respectively.
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in terms of gross wages and can be obtained with a simple algebraic relationship.23 The
difference between the pre- and post-reform statutory rates will be introduced as the
policy shock in QUEST. Importantly, at this stage these changes are the morning-after
effects and do not include any behavioral responses, neither from workers nor from firms.
Table 3.1 shows statutory tax rates for the baseline and the two reform scenarios as well
as the policy shocks, which are introduced in QUEST.
Table 3.1.: Tax Rates and Policy Shocks for the Belgium Reforms.
Table 3.1 shows that both reforms reduce the tax rates and that the size of the policy
shock is larger in case of the reduction of employers’ contributions, ranging from -3.7
percentage points for high-skilled to -5.5 percentage points for low-skilled workers.
3.3.1.2. Labor Supply Elasticities and Non-participation Rates
In the next step of the analysis, labor supply elasticities and non-participation rates by
skill level are estimated using the discrete labor supply model described in the second
23Let tw,s and ter,s be the tax rates levied on employees and employers for skill group s, respectively.
In QUEST, the tax burden of workers and firms is defined, respectively, as tw,s ∗Gross Wages and
ter,s ∗Gross Wages (see also Appendix D for a description of the tax incidence mechanism in QUEST).
Then, statutory tax rates in QUEST and average effective tax rates in EUROMOD are related as
follows: let tw,s,EUROMOD and ter,s, EUROMOD be the average effective tax rates of employees and
employers for skill group s derived from EUROMOD, then:
tw,s ∗Gross Wages =
(∑
i
wi ∗ PITi + SICEE
)
= tw,s,EUROMOD ∗ (Gross Wages) + SICER)
and,
ter,s ∗Gross Wages = SICER = ter,s, EUROMOD ∗ (Gross Wages+ SICER)
It follows that, ter,s = ter,s, EUROMOD1−ter,s, EUROMOD and tw,s =
tw,s,EUROMOD
1−ter,s, EUROMOD . These are the rates
presented in Table 3.1.
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section. The estimation is based on the EU-SILC micro-data. Results are shown in
Table 3.2. In line with the literature, we find that labor-supply elasticities as well as
non-participation rates are highest for the low-skilled (see e.g. Bargain et al., 2014). Labor
supply elasticities are used to calibrate the Frisch elasticity in QUEST.24 The expected
number of voluntary unemployed is based on the estimated probability of supplying zero
hours in the labor market.25
Table 3.2.: Calibration of Labor Supply Elasticity Parameter and Non-participation Rates
in QUEST, by Skill Level.
3.3.2. Second Step: The Macroeconomic Impact
We have calibrated QUEST for the Belgian economy, the rest of the euro area and the
rest of the world. As explained in the previous section, the parameters representing the
Frisch elasticity and the non-participation rate are based on the elasticities and predicted
labor supply responses obtained from the discrete choice microeconometric model.
Moreover, the changes in the average effective tax rates on labor paid by employees
and employers are introduced in QUEST through the statutory tax rates. Importantly,
we temporarily set off the debt-stabilization rule26 for the first fifteen years in order
to analyze the direct budgetary effect of the reforms, thereby generating a government
budget deficit in that period relative to the baseline. Note that different ways to tackle
the government deficit generated by the reforms may have different second-round effects
and that our results have to be interpreted in the light of this simplifying assumption.27
24Explained in detail in Appendix F, equations (F.2.1) to (F.2.19).
25See equation F.1.28 derived in Appendix F.
26See equation E.1.33 in Appendix E.
27We assume that after 15 years, our simulated tax-reforms are reversed and the pre-reform level of
government debt is gradually restored through labor taxation (see Appendix G.). Alternatively, the
QUEST model offers a wide range of closure rules, which could be based on the revenue or expenditure
items of the government’s budget constraint. Exploring the long-run implications of these various
alternative fiscal closure rules goes beyond the scope of the paper.
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3.3.2.1. Impulse Responses and Tax Incidence
The introduction of the shocks for each of the reforms in QUEST generates impulse
responses for the endogenous variables of the model. Impulse responses show how these
variables react to the changes in the tax rates and, at the same time, how they evolve
together with the other endogenous variables. Impulse responses are informative as they
shed light on the dynamics of the model: we can observe from the trajectories of the
endogenous variables how these variables evolve simultaneously over time towards the
new equilibrium. The impulse response functions generated by the policy shocks for the
main labor market variables—net real wages,28 total compensation of employees,29 gross
real wages, and employment—are presented in Appendix E (graphs G.1 to G.8).
Graphs G.1 to G.4 show the impulse response functions for the reform of employees’
contributions. In line with the simplified partial equilibrium analysis of Figure 3.2 (see
second section), we observe a decrease (an increase) in gross wages (employment) as
shown in Graph G.3 (Graph G.4). This is due to the fact that employees are willing to
work more at higher net-real wage due to the cut in contributions (Graph G.1). The
total compensation of employees (Graph G.2) falls for all skill groups, but in a smoother
way, because the tax rate paid by employers remains constant in our simulations and the
changes only stem from the smooth decrease (increase) in gross wages (employment).
Graphs G.5 to G.8 show the impulse response functions for the reform of employers’
contributions. As shown in the partial equilibrium analysis of Figure 3.1, firms are
willing to offer higher gross wages to their employees due to the reduced tax burden.
Employment increases over the simulation period (Graph G.8) as well as gross (and
net) wages (Graphs G.5 and G.7). The total compensation of employees (Graph G.6.)
immediately drops for all skill groups after the tax cut is introduced, and then smoothly
recovers over the period of analysis due to the increase in gross wages along the transition
path.
These results are also consistent with the partial equilibrium analysis of tax incidence.30
3.3.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
We have performed a sensitivity analysis showing to what extent our results depend on
the type of shocks and on the selected QUEST parameters and variables. More precisely,
28Net real wages are defined as gross wages minus taxes paid by employees, as in expression (F.3.1) in
Appendix D.
29Recall that total compensation of employees is defined as the sum of gross wages plus taxes paid by
employers on labor income, as in expression (F.3.2) in Appendix D.
30Described analytically in Appendix D.
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we compare the following three alternative scenarios with the reform of the employers’
contributions:
1. SIC-Employee (ee) equivalent dynamic scoring: We replicate the policy shocks
of the employers’ contributions reform as an equivalent reform on the employees’
contributions, leaving unchanged the baseline social insurance contributions rate
paid by employers. This means that under static scoring and without accounting for
any behavioral effect, the reduction in labor tax revenues resulting from this reform
equals the reduction resulting from the previous reform of employers’ contributions;
2. Low elasticity dynamic scoring: We consider a new baseline with half of the Frisch
elasticities of the original estimates for each skill group, and apply the policy shocks
derived from the employers’ contributions reform;
3. Low nominal frictions dynamic scoring: We start from a new baseline with half of
the nominal wage and price adjustment costs and apply the policy shocks derived
from the employers’ contributions reform.
Figures 3.4 to 3.6 below show the impulse responses for selected variables—labor tax
revenues, total gross wages and total employment—obtained for each of the three scenarios
described above and for the baseline reform of employers’ contributions (denoted by
SIC-er reform dynamic scoring). Besides these four scenarios, Figures 3.4 to 3.6 also plot
the static scoring scenario, which only reflects the mechanical cut of the employers’ and
the equivalent cut of employees’ social insurance contributions without any endogenous
wage and employment response, i.e. neither workers nor firms are allowed to re-optimize
(denoted by SIC reform static scoring).
Figure 3.4 shows that, as expected, labor tax revenues decrease after the policy shock
in all scenarios upon impact. While in the SIC reform static scoring case this impact
remains the same in the subsequent periods as agents do not re-optimize, the decrease in
the labor tax revenues shrinks over the three-year period in all dynamic scoring scenarios.
More precisely, we observe that the decrease in tax revenues almost halves over the period
of analysis when the employers’ social insurance contributions are cut, revealing that
these reforms are to some extent self-financing. The self-financing effect is substantially
smaller in the scenario where the tax cut is applied to employees’ contributions. In this
last scenario, the percent deviation from the steady-state scenario (baseline in QUEST)
goes from -8.0 percent at the beginning of the period to around -7.5 percent after three
years.
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Figure 3.4.: Labor Tax Revenues Impulse Responses
These differences in self-financing effects can be explained by the trajectories of wages
and employment: from Figures 5 and 6, we observe that both wages and employment have
increasing trajectories when the tax cut affects firms. This result is robust with respect
to the labor supply elasticity and the wage and price adjustment costs: the impulse
responses obtained for the Low elasticity and the Lower nominal frictions scenarios
closely follow the ones for the employers’ social insurance contribution reform. Figure
3.4 also shows that in the SIC-ee equivalent scenario—where exactly the same tax cuts
assigned before to employers are now granted to employees—labor tax revenues decrease
and only slightly recover over the period of analysis. This result can be explained by the
wage and employment trajectories shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6: when the tax cut affects
employees only, wage and employment effects cancel each other out. Consequently, we
obtain only modest self-financing effects that are close to the static, no-behavior situation.
This result is in line with the trajectories obtained for wages and employment for the
reform of employee’s social insurance contributions (see Table 3.3 below).
3.3.2.3. Feedback Effects
Following the standard practice in dynamic scoring exercises, we can also quantify the
behavioral feedback effects of the reforms. Table 3.3 shows the revenue feedback effect
for both tax reform scenarios, which is defined as the percentage difference of the revenue
effect produced by the macroeconomic model relative to the static revenue estimate
(see Joint Committee on Taxation, 2005). This measure allows us to quantify to which
extent the reforms are self-financing through economic growth and price changes. We
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Figure 3.5.: Total Gross Wages Impulse Responses
also decompose the revenue feedback effect into the endogenous feedback contribution
from wages and employment, respectively.
The reform implemented on the workers’ side generates lower feedback effects compared
to the reduction of firms’ tax burden. By the end of the three-year period, the combined
effect of wages and employment accounts for self-financing of about 6.4 percent of the
reduction in total labor tax revenues in case of the reform of employees’ social insurance
contributions.31 The self-financing effect amounts to almost 50 percent in case of the
employers’ social insurance contribution reform.
In line with the theoretical predictions (see second section, Figures 3.1 and 3.2), Table
3.3 illustrates that our result is due to the different behavioral effects of wages in the
two scenarios: decreasing the firms’ tax burden (Figure 3.1) induces an upward pressure
on wages and increases the tax-base. The corresponding self-financing rate amounts to
31Note that we find similar self-financing effects for the Italian and Polish reforms presented in Appendix
A, which have the same counteracting effects on wages and employment as the Belgian reform of
employees’ social insurance contributions.
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Figure 3.6.: Total Employment Impulse Responses
37.8 percent after five years. On the other hand, cutting the tax burden on employees
(Figure 3.2) has the opposite effect on the tax-base due to the downward pressure on
wages. The corresponding self-financing rate is 10 percentage points smaller compared to
the static estimate. Notice that the feedback effect from employment is positive in both
cases: higher employment increases the tax-base. After five years, the corresponding
self-financing rates amount to 23 (12.5) percentage points in the case of the employee
(employer) tax-cut.
The magnitude of these feedback effects is close to the dynamic scoring results of
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006). These authors find that in a standard neoclassical model,
up to half of a capital tax cut can be self-financing. However, they obtain substantially
lower feedback effect from a labor tax cut, ranging from 0 percent to 17 percent depending
on the labor supply elasticity.32 Other dynamic scoring studies including Joint Committee
on Taxation (2005) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) report similar patterns for labor
and capital tax reform scenarios. Note, however, that our simulated reform of employer
social insurance contributions is distinctly different from the capital income tax cuts
considered by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and others. Therefore, our results are not
32In general, they find that independent of how labor supply is calibrated, “if capital and labor tax rates
start off at the same level, cuts in capital taxes have greater feedback effects in the steady state than
cuts in labor taxes” (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006, p. 1416).
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Table 3.3.: Decomposing the Revenue Feedback Effects of Tax Reform Scenarios in
Belgium (Percentage Changes Relative to Static Estimates Based on QUEST
Simulations).
Note that a positive percentage change indicates that the estimated revenue
loss is smaller when the macroeconomic feedback effects are taken into
account while a negative percentage change indicates a higher revenue
loss compared to the static estimate.
directly comparable for the following two reasons. First and most importantly, the large
feedback effect in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) is driven by the response of capital
accumulation to the capital income tax cut. By contrast, we consider cuts in social
insurance contributions that have no primary impact on capital accumulation. Second,
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) focus on steady state results, while our feedback effects are
limited to a five-year adjustment period.33
3.3.2.4. Macroeconomic Trajectories
The final annualized macroeconomic impact on the variables of interest, following the
policy shocks, is summarized in Table 3.4 below. The table shows the annualized
percentage deviations of prices, employment, gross wages and labor tax revenues from
the steady-state, which are caused by the policy shocks.34 The main difference between
33The steady state results depend on the budgetary rule, which ensures that government debt is sustainable
in the long-run. Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) assume that lump-sum transfers (or taxes) adjust
in response to the changes in tax rates, which offers a budget-neutral way to analyze the feedback
effect without influencing the behavior of economic agents. Although the same assumption could be
introduced in the QUEST model, the genuine concept of lump-sum transfers cannot be easily reconciled
with EUROMOD. Therefore, we opt for switching off the fiscal rule in the short to medium-run
leading to a temporary increase in debt and do not impose additional taxes, which could influence
agents’ behavior in the model. In the long-run, we use labor taxes to restore debt-sustainability, which
reverses both tax-reforms.
34The trajectories are the annualized version of quarterly impulse responses, i.e. changes in selected
endogenous variables of QUEST, given the policy shocks. Table 3.4 shows those QUEST variables,
which are relevant for feeding the policy response back into EUROMOD. Tables G.1 and G.2 in
Appendix G present the simulation results for other variables such as GDP and consumption for more
years towards the long-run steady state.
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the two reforms consists in the sign of the trajectories for wages: while the cut in the
social insurance contributions paid by workers generates downward trajectories for wages
for all skill-groups, the reduction in the employers’ contributions generates upward ones.
This has a direct impact on the trajectories of total labor tax revenues, i.e. the sum
of taxes on labor income and social insurance contributions paid by both employees
and employers in each of the reforms. We observe that the recovery of tax revenues is
modest in the case of the employees’ contributions rebate, with a tax revenue loss in
T + 3 just slightly below the initial drop in T + 1. Although employment increases, wages
decrease throughout the three-year period. These counterbalancing effects cause labor
tax revenues to remain relatively constant (there are more workers paying taxes, but
overall gross wages are lower). This is not the case if the tax cut is applied to employers’
contributions. This policy shock generates an increase in both employment and wages,
which pushes total labor tax revenues up (there are more workers and overall gross wages
are higher) and creates a strong self-financing effect.
Table 3.4.: Macro impact of the tax reforms on the variables of interest, based on QUEST
simulations (annualized percentage deviation from baseline).
Compared to the employer’s reform, the counteracting behavioral effects generated
in the context of the employees’ reform will result in smaller differences between the
no behavior and behavior scenarios considered in the last step of our analysis, which is
presented in the next section.
3.3.3. Third Step: Microsimulation Results
In the third step of our dynamic scoring exercise, we input the impulse responses for
employment, gross real wages and consumer price index generated by QUEST back into
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the microsimulation model EUROMOD in order to assess the medium-term projections
in tax revenues, social insurance contributions, and the distribution of disposable incomes.
In addition, we simulate a second scenario in which the second-round effects, i.e. the
macroeconomic feedback and behavioral response to the tax change, are disregarded.
We analyze both scenarios over the period t1 to t3 and compare the medium-term
projections against the baseline. More precisely, we apply the tax system of the baseline
policy year t0 to the subsequent three years, and assess the fiscal and distributional effects
of the tax reforms. We account for the second-round effects by amending the uprating
factors and the weights in the household micro-data according to the macroeconomic
feedback provided by the QUEST model (Table 3.4) for prices and wages.35 The trajectory
of employment is fed into the micro-data directly through adjustment of the sample
weights.
The exact procedure is as follows. First, we incorporate the macro impact of the
tax reforms by creating micro-datasets for each year of analysis (t1, t2, t3). For each
skill group, the weights of the employed are increased according to the corresponding
impulse response, while the weights of the unemployed are scaled down keeping the
total population constant. In this way, the employment effect estimated in QUEST is
implemented as an extensive margin effect in the household micro-data. Second, the
impulse response for the consumer price index is integrated in EUROMOD as a correction
of the correspondent uprating factor. Finally, for gross wages we apply the same approach
as for the consumer price index, with the only exception of having uprating factors for
each skill category.
We subsequently run the microsimulation model to quantify the overall budgetary and
distributional effects of the two reforms in the scenarios including/excluding second-round
effects. These results are presented in detail in Figures 3.7 to 3.10. Figures 3.7 and 3.8
present the impact on the two affected subcomponents of employee and employer social
insurance contributions—pension and health insurance contributions—while Figures 3.9
to 3.10 show the impact on broader categories of tax revenues (i.e. government revenue
from personal income taxes and social insurance contributions) as well as the impact on
household disposable income by income decile.
Figure 3.7 shows that employee social insurance contributions decrease both in the
presence and in the absence of second-round effects. In t1 and t2, the drop is larger in
the scenario accounting for second-round effects since the new equilibrium in the labor
35The input data files used here are based on EU-SILC 2012 survey data and hence do not correspond
with the baseline year 2013 for the simulation of the tax reforms in EUROMOD. Therefore, the
uprating factors allow for time consistency between the monetary variables of the survey and the tax
system under analysis.
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Figure 3.7.: Employee Contributions Impact in EUROMOD Incorporating Macro Feed-
back on Prices, Wages and Employment
market implies lower gross wages, and consequently lower social insurance contributions.
However, we find that the positive employment effect counterbalances the negative wage
effect leading to a lower tax revenue loss in t3. Pension insurance contributions decrease
by around 40 percent, while health contributions decrease by 28 percent.
Figure 3.8.: Employer Contributions Impact in EUROMOD Incorporating Macro Feed-
back on Prices, Wages and Employment
Figure 3.8 shows that employer social insurance contributions decline at different rates,
depending on the affected tax category. In the scenario ignoring behavioral responses,
the loss in health (pension) insurance contributions amounts to roughly 40 percent (57
percent) in year t1. In the scenario accounting for second-round effects, the revenue losses
in t1 are marginally smaller (almost 1 percentage point). The gap gradually widens over
the period of analysis and reaches 2 percentage points in year t3. This is due to the labor
demand expansion that pushes wages and employment up.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the impact of the two tax reforms on broader tax categories
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(total net tax revenues36, personal income taxes and total social insurance contributions).
Figure 3.9 shows that the reduction in social insurance contributions paid by employees
leads to a fall in total net government revenues of almost 3.8 percent in t3 in both scenarios.
This drop is the result of two direct morning-after effects that evolve in opposite directions:
on the one hand, decreasing employees’ social insurance contributions, and, on the other,
increasing revenues from personal income taxation (as the taxable income, which is net
of social contributions, broadens).
Figure 3.9.: Impact of the Employee SIC Reform on Aggregate Tax Revenues
The evolution of total net tax revenues differs only slightly when we consider second-
round effects: in the first two years following the reform, total net tax revenues are lower
compared to the no-behavior scenario, but this reverses in year t3. The reason is that
the effect of lower gross wages pushing total tax revenues down dominates in t1 and
t2, while the positive employment effect outweighs the negative wage effect in year t3.
The positive employment effect also reduces unemployment benefit expenditures, which
contributes to the stronger increase in total net government revenues in the scenario
including behavioral reactions. As regards the social insurance contributions paid by
36By total net tax revenues we refer to the government revenues derived from simulated taxes and social
insurance contributions net of means-tested and non means-tested benefits (excluding pensions).
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employers, we observe that they shrink in the first year, but start to recover afterwards,
slightly exceeding the baseline level by the end of the analyzed period. This can be
explained by the simultaneous decrease in gross wages (and correspondent decrease in
contributions paid) and the increase in employment with the latter effect being stronger
at the end of the simulation period.
Figure 3.10 illustrates that the reduction in social insurance contributions paid by
employers leads to an immediate revenue loss in t1 amounting to 9.8 percent in the
non-behavior scenario. When we account for the macro feedback on prices, wages and
employment, we find that the revenue loss is smaller (7.2 percent) and shrinks to 3.9
percent by year t3, i.e. a reduction of roughly 60 percent (from 7.2 to 2.9 billion euros).
This is due to the positive effect on wages and employment, raising the revenues from
personal income taxes (employees’ social insurance contribution) by 5.2 percent (4.3
percent) in t3. In contrast to the previous reform, the positive employment effect is now
amplified by a positive wage effect (wage growth is up to 3.5 percent for the low-skilled
in t3). In addition, non-means tested benefits decline by 2.3 percent due to the decrease
in unemployment.
Figure 3.10.: Impact of the Employer SIC Reform on Aggregate Tax Revenues
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the effect of the reforms on equivalized disposable income
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across income deciles, in the no-behavior and behavior scenarios (compared with the
baseline or no reform scenario).
Table 3.5.: Impact of the employee SIC reform on disposable income, by income decile
(percentage deviation from baseline).
Table 3.6.: Impact of the employer SIC reform on disposable income, by income decile
(percentage deviation from baseline).
From Table 3.5, we observe that only the first decile is worse off at the end of the
simulation period in the scenario including behavioral reactions, with the negative wage
effect offsetting the positive morning-after effect of the employees’ contributions cut.
This can be explained by a phasing out of benefit entitlements caused by the increase in
disposable income. Overall, the reform has a regressive effect with lower deciles benefiting
less than the top of the distribution. The increase in disposable income for the bottom
(top) three deciles is smaller (larger) than 1 percent (2 percent) by year t3.
Table 3.6 shows that the reform of employers’ social insurance contributions raises
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household disposable income only in the behavior scenario, with the exception of the
first decile. As expected, the reform has no direct first-order distributive effects, because
it reduces contributions paid by employers and leaves households’ disposable income
unaffected in the static scenario. However, when we include behavioral effects, disposable
income increases, as the labor demand expansion leads to both higher wages and higher
employment. Nevertheless, this expansion has a regressive impact on the disposable
income distribution, with largest gains for the top deciles. In spite of improving labor
market conditions, the first decile still faces a loss in disposable income due to lower
benefit payments following the wage and employment increase.
3.4. Conclusion
Dynamic scoring analyses comprise the use of different models that allow quantifying
revenue, behavior and macroeconomic effects of policy reforms. In this paper, we propose
a dynamic scoring framework to analyze the impact of tax reforms in EU Member
States, taking into account individual behavioral effects and macroeconomic (general
equilibrium) feedback effects. For this purpose, we have combined a microsimulation
model, augmented with a microeconometric discrete choice labor supply model, with
a New-Keynesian DSGE model. We establish a coherent link between the micro and
macro models, in particular in terms of aggregation, by calibrating the macro-model with
parameters derived from the micro-data and by ensuring that labor supply elasticities
are consistent in both models. In order to illustrate our methodology, we have quantified
the fiscal and distributional effects of hypothetical tax cuts in Belgium implemented as
reductions in social insurance contribution rates paid by employees and employers.
Our results indicate that accounting for behavioral responses and macroeconomic
feedback effects is essential for a comprehensive evaluation of tax reforms. We find a sub-
stantial self-financing effect of a reduction of the employers’ social insurance contribution
rate in Belgium of roughly 50 percent. The self-financing effect is smaller in case of a
comparable reduction in employees’ social insurance contributions rate amounting to 13
percent. The larger effect for the social insurance reform affecting employers rather than
employees can be explained by the fact that the former increases both wages and em-
ployment, while the latter leads to higher employment, but lower wages in the short-run.
In addition to the self-financing effects, we pay special attention to the distributional
implications of the reforms. We show that both reforms have regressive effects.
Besides allowing for a very accurate and detailed implementation of real-life tax reforms,
our approach combines the analyses of first-order fiscal and distributional effects of tax
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reforms using microsimulation methods and of second-order general equilibrium effects
derived from a DSGE model. This opens up venues for future research and policy analysis
in the European Union context. Our analysis could be extended to account for other
types of behavioral adjustments to tax policy reforms, in particular consumption or
saving responses. Ongoing extensions of the EUROMOD model broadening the coverage
of EUROMOD to include consumption taxes (see Decoster et al., 2014) could be used for
this purpose. For instance, tax shifting between labor and consumption taxes aims at
reducing the distortionary effect of labor taxation, but is also likely to have an impact
on consumption and equity (Decoster et al., 2010; Mathé et al., 2015). Future work
could also analyze more sizeable tax reforms combined with structural reforms in order
to investigate possible complementarities between these different policy instruments.
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in Italy and Poland
We use the methodology illustrated in the previous sections to evaluate two additional
reforms: an already implemented refundable tax credit for workers in Italy and an
announced, but not legislated, increase in the universal tax credit in Poland.
More specifically, the Italian reform consists in the introduction of a refundable in-work
tax credit for low income earners. It was implemented in May 2014 and has been made
permanent as of 20151, resulting in a tax credit of EUR 960 per year. The maximum
amount (i.e. EUR 80 euro per month) is given to employees with a taxable income below
EUR 24.000 per year. Above this threshold, the tax credit is linearly decreasing up to
a maximum taxable income of EUR 26.000. In order to be eligible for the bonus, the
employees must earn at least 8.000 euro per year (below the limit, employees do not pay
income tax).
The proposed Polish reform consists in an increase in the income exempt from the
personal income tax from PLN 3,090 to PLN 8,000. The reform was planned to be
introduced by the recently appointed government on 1st January 2017 (though there has
been no official draft legislation). The increase in the tax-free amount implies that the
amount of the universal tax credit rises from PLN 556 up to PLN 1,440, due to the fact
that the tax base free of taxation is derived by dividing the universal tax credit2 to the
tax rate of the first tax bracket (18 percent).
A priori, both reforms increase incentives to participate in the labor market.3 The
labor supply elasticities and the non-participation rates computed for the calibration of
QUEST for each of the countries of interest are shown in Table C.1.
The correspondent policy shocks to be introduced in the QUEST model are presented
in Table C.2 below. As expected, the two reforms reduce tax rates paid by employees on
1With the Stability Law for 2015 (n.190 of 2014).
2The value of the universal tax credit in Poland is defined in The Natural Persons’ Income Tax Act
(PLN 556 per year).
3As for the Belgium reform, we use version G3.0 of the EUROMOD microsimulation model, together
with the datasets based on the 2012 release of EU-SILC for Italy and Poland. Moreover, the described
reforms are implemented in the 2013 tax-benefit systems of the two countries, as in the Belgian case.
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Table C.1.: Calibration of labor supply elasticity parameters and non-participation rates
in QUEST, by skill level.
labor income. Low-skilled workers benefit relatively more from the tax cuts, especially in
the case of Italy, where the reform has a stronger progressive nature.
Table C.2.: Effective tax rates, statutory tax rates and policy shocks for the Italian and
Polish reforms.
When introducing the shocks in QUEST, we obtain the three-year trajectories for the
price level, employment and gross wages as shown in Table C.3. These are then fed back
into the household micro-data.
Similarly to the Belgian cut in employees’ social insurance contributions, the tax cuts
implemented in the personal income tax systems of Italy and Poland generate negative
trajectories for wages, while employment increases over the period for all three skill levels.
The wage and employment trajectories determine the evolution of labor tax revenues
throughout the period and hence the magnitude of the feedback effect. Over a five-year
period, we obtain a total revenue feedback effect of 9 (8) percent in the Italian (Polish)
case, as shown in Table C.4 below. Our results are in line with estimates presented in
other studies (see e.g. Gravelle (2014) who finds income tax feedback effects ranging
between 3.3 to 10.5 percent for reasonable values of labor supply and capital stock
elasticities). The decomposition of the revenue feedback effects illustrates the positive
(negative) feedback effect of job creation (wages) on the tax-base (see Table C.4 below).
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Table C.3.: Macro impact of the tax reforms on the variables of interest based on QUEST
simulations in Italy and Poland (annualized percentage deviation from base-
line)
Table C.4.: Decomposing the revenue feedback effects of tax reform in Italy and Poland
(percent changes relative to static estimates).
Note: Positive percentage change indicates that the estimated revenue
loss is less when the macroeconomic effects are taken into account while
negative percentage change indicates higher revenue loss compared to the
static estimate.
Figures C.1 and C.2 show budgetary effects for the particular components of the
personal income tax system affected by the reforms.4
From Figure C.1, we observe that the change in expenditures for the Italian in-work
refundable tax credit is higher in the scenario including second-round effects. This results
from the increase in employment after the reform due to the positive reaction of labor
supply.5 More people take advantage of the tax credit and expenditures increase when
4Note that the numbers related with the Italian in-work tax credit are presented in absolute terms
because in the baseline pre-reform scenario this tax credit did not exist as a component of the personal
income tax system.
5Notice that the positive macroeconomic trajectories for employment derived from QUEST are introduced
in EUROMOD as changes in the weights of employed and unemployed in the micro-data used in the
microsimulation model.
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Figure C.1.: In-Work Refundable Tax Credit Impact in EUROMOD Incorporating Macro
Feedback on Prices, Wages and Employment in Italy
behavioral adjustments are taken into account. Figure A.2 indicates that in the Polish
case the positive labor supply effect does not change the direct costs of the universal tax
credit.
Figures C.3 and C.4 present the impact of the Italian and Polish reforms on the
aggregated tax revenues. These figures suggest modest self-financing effects of the reforms,
i.e. total tax revenues recover faster in the scenario including behavioral reactions, driven
by higher revenues from personal income taxes and social insurance contributions.
The redistributive effects of the Italian and Polish reforms are shown below. Table C.5
suggests that taxpayers in the 2nd to 6th decile benefit most from the introduction of
the in-work tax credit. In Poland, the effect is more progressive with taxpayers in the
bottom half of the distribution benefiting most as shown in Table C.6.
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Figure C.2.: Universal Tax Credit Impact in EUROMOD Incorporating Macro Feedback
on Prices, Wages and Employment in Poland
Figure C.3.: Impact of the Refundable Tax Credit Reform on Aggregate Tax Revenues
in Italy
142
C. Extensions: Evaluating Tax Reforms in Italy and Poland
Figure C.4.: Impact of the Universal Tax Credit Reform on Aggregate Tax Revenues in
Poland
Table C.5.: Impact of the refundable tax credit reform on disposable income in Italy, by
income decile (percentage deviation from baseline).
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Table C.6.: Impact of the universal tax credit reform on disposable income in Poland, by
income decile (percentage deviation from baseline).
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Model
We follow standard literature and especially Bargain et al. (2014) in setting up the labor
supply model by choosing a flexible discrete choice household labor supply model.1 In
our baseline, we specify consumption-leisure preferences using a quadratic utility function
with fixed costs.2 The deterministic part of utility of a couple i at each discrete choice
j = 1, ..., J can be written as:
Uij = αciCij + αccC2ij + αhf iH
f
ij + αhmiHmij + αhff(H
f
ij )2 + αhmm(Hmij )2 (D.0.1)
+ αchfCijH
f
ij + αchmCijHmij + αhmhfH
f
ijH
m
ij − ηfj · 1(Hfij > 0)− ηmj · 1(Hmij > 0)
(D.0.2)
with household consumption Cij and spouses’ work hours Hfij and Hmij . The J choices
for a couple correspond to all combinations of the spouses’ discrete hours (for singles,
the model above is simplified to only one hour term Hij, and J is simply the number of
discrete hour choices for this person). Coefficients on consumption and work hours are
specified as:
αci = α0c + Zciαc + ui (D.0.3)
αhf i = α0hf + Z
f
i αhf (D.0.4)
αhmi = α0hm + Z
m
i αhm , (D.0.5)
i.e. they vary linearly with observable taste-shifters Zi (including polynomial form of
age, presence of children or dependent elderly persons and dummies for education). The
1This model has been used in well-known contributions for Europe, like Van Soest (1995); Aaberge et al.
(1995); Blundell et al. (2000) or the U.S., like Hoynes (1996); Keane and Moffitt (1998).
2Other common specifications include Box-Cox or translog utility. However, the choice of the functional
form is not a significant driver of labor supply elasticities (Löﬄer et al., 2014).
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term αci can incorporate unobserved heterogeneity, in the form of a normally-distributed
error term ui, for the model to allow random taste variation and unrestricted substitution
patterns between alternatives.3 We include fixed costs of work into the model that help
explain that there are very few observations with a small positive number of hours worked.
These costs, denoted by ηkj for k = f,m, are non-zero for positive hours choices.4 In
general, the approach is flexible and allows imposing few constraints.5 One restriction
sometimes taken in the literature is to require the utility function to be monotonically
increasing in consumption, as this can be seen as a minimum consistency requirement of
the econometric model with economic theory. When the fraction of observations with
an implied negative marginal utility of consumption is more than 5 percent we impose
positive marginal utility as a constraint in the likelihood function.6 For each labor supply
choice j, disposable income is calculated as a function
Cij = d(wfi H
f
ij , w
m
i H
m
ij , yi, Xi) (D.0.6)
of female and male earnings, wfi H
f
ij , w
m
i H
m
ij , non-labor income yi and household charac-
teristics Xi. We denote disposable income by C to stress its equivalence with consumption.
In this static setting, we do not model a savings decision of the household. The elasticities
we estimate are hence Marshallian elasticities.7 We argue below that this elasticity
concept is appropriate to use for calibration of the elasticity in the macroeconomic
model. We simulate the tax-benefit function d in (D.3) using the tax-benefit calculator
EUROMOD. Disposable income needs to be calculated at the discrete set of choices, that
is, only certain points on the budget curve have to be evaluated. We obtain wage rates
for individuals by dividing earnings by working hours in the choice category.8 As our
sample includes individuals that are not observed to be working, we estimate a Heckman
3By unrestricted substitution patterns we mean that the model does not impose the “Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption that is implicit in the conditional or multinomial logit
model. Formally, this makes the model a mixed logit model, which can be estimated using maximum
simulated likelihood (Train, 2009). Moreover, Haan (2006) shows that the IIA assumption typically
does not matter for deriving labor supply elasticities in discrete choice models.
4Introducing fixed costs of work (estimated as model parameters as in Bargain et al., 2014; Callan et al.,
2009; Blundell et al., 2000, improves the fit of the model).
5See Bargain et al. (2014); Van Soest (1995).
6We choose the lowest multiplier that ensures at least 95 percent of the observations with positive
marginal utility of consumption through an iterative procedure. To speed up estimation, we refrain
from estimating the model with unobserved heterogeneity in these cases, that is, we do not include an
error term in the coefficientαci.
7Hicksian elasticities can be obtained by additionally estimating income elasticities and using the Slutsky
decomposition.
8We use hours normalized through rounding to the nearest hours category instead of actual hours to
reduce division bias, as in Bargain et al. (2014).
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selection model for wages and use predicted wages for all observations9. We assume that
the hourly wage rate does not depend on the number of hours supplied in the labor
market. As the model is stochastic in nature, the full specification of the labor supply
model is obtained after including i.i.d. error terms Ôij for each choice j = 1, ..., J . That is,
total utility at each alternative is
Vij = Uij + Ôij, (D.0.7)
with the observable part of utility Uij being defined as above in (D.0.1). The error
terms can represent measurement errors or optimization errors of the household. Under
the assumption that errors follow an extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, the
(conditional) probability for each household i of choosing a given alternative j has the
explicit analytical solution below:10
pij =
eUij∑J
k=1 e
Uik
. (D.0.8)
D.1. Labor Supply Effects from the Augmented
Microsimulation Model
We report labor supply responses to the three reforms evaluated. In Table D.1. We
present the labor supply responses to the employees’ social insurance reform in Belgium
in terms of aggregate weekly full time equivalent jobs11, separately for the intensive
and extensive margin.12 The predictions for the baseline and the employees’ social
insurance contribution reform are based on the estimated labor supply model described
above.13 We find particular large effects on the extensive margin. This is in line with the
literature and also confirmed by our findings of larger extensive than intensive margin
elasticities.14 Recall that we have considered two reforms in the Belgian case: a decrease
in social insurance contributions on the employee and the employer side. The labor
9Using predicted wages for all observations further reduces selection bias (see Bargain, Orsini & Peichl,
2014). It is common practice to first estimate wage rates and then use them in a labor supply
estimation, (see Creedy & Kalb, 2005; Creedy & Kalb, 2006; Löﬄer, Peichl, & Siegloch, 2014).
10See McFadden (1974); Creedy and G. Kalb (2005).
11We calculate full time equivalents by dividing aggregate expected weekly working hours by 40.
12The intensive margin is the hours effect on those observed to be working, while the extensive effect
is the change in hours for those observed to be not working (see Bargain et al., 2014). The total
effect is the average of intensive and extensive margin effects, weighted by their respective share of
the population.
13We only report results on aggregate hours. Additional detailed regression results of the discrete choice
model are available on request.
14See Chetty et al. (2012); Chetty (2012).
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supply effects reported in Table D.1 for Belgium are only the effects from the decrease in
the social insurance contributions paid by the employee, as the decrease on the employer
contributions does not affect household disposable incomes in the microeconometric
setup.15 The reform leads to an increase in aggregate labor supply of 1.24 percent.
Table D.1.: Employment effects from the Belgian employees reform (change in full time
equivalents).
In the same way, Table D.2 below shows results from the discrete choice labor supply
model on aggregate working hours for the Italian and Polish reforms. The in-work
tax credit in Italy increases hours at the extensive margin, as it makes working more
attractive relative to not working. However, for those already in work, the tax credit has
an income effect on consumption and leisure, so that it reduces working hours. The latter
effect is larger, so that the overall change in aggregate hours is negative. For Poland, we
find a positive effect on intensive and extensive margin hours because of the nature of
the reform. Again, the increase in participation is larger, as the extensive margin is in
general more sensitive to changes in incentives. Overall, we find that total labor supply
increases by 1 percent in Poland.
Table D.2.: Employment effects from the reforms in Italy and Poland (change in full time
equivalents).
15In principle, second-round effects can occur if the decrease in employer SIC is not fully born by
employers, but passed on to the workers. In our modelling framework, second-round effects are
considered in QUEST.
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D.2. Additional Selected Results
Tables D.3 to D.5 present the estimated parameters of equation (D.0.1) for the three
countries analyzed, for different sample groups: couples, single women and single man.
Table D.3.: Labor Supply Estimation: Couples
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
Cx
age_m -0.000209 -0.0000234 -0.00168*
(-0.57) (-0.09) (-2.29)
age2_m 0.000138 -0.0000835 0.00195*
(0.33) (-0.28) (2.28)
age_f 0.000488 0.0000618 0.000483
(1.43) (0.21) (0.81)
age2_f -0.000545 -0.000224 -0.000688
(-1.32) (-0.68) (-0.97)
pchild 0.000597 0.000312 -0.000167
(1.06) (0.85) (-0.17)
pold 0.00459 -0.000184 -0.00185
(0.73) (-0.08) (-0.40)
ed_ter_m 0.00125 0.000927* 0.0128***
(1.80) (1.96) (11.42)
ed_ter_f 0.00130 0.00157** 0.00567***
(1.77) (3.17) (4.61)
ed_up_m 0.00107 0.000545 0.0167***
(1.94) (1.88) (16.35)
ed_up_f 0.000664 0.00129*** 0.00773***
(1.11) (4.04) (7.00)
_cons 0.0150 0.00869 0.0363
(1.11) (1.00) (1.96)
CxC
_cons -0.00000289 -3.30e-08 -0.0000114
(-1.24) (-0.05) (-1.08)
CxL1
_cons -0.0000253 -0.00000659 -0.0000463
(-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.72)
CxL2
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Table D.3 – Continued from last page
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
_cons -0.0000173 0.000000272 0.0000490
(-0.32) (0.03) (0.64)
L1x
age_f -0.000650 0.00642 -0.00561**
(-0.16) (1.85) (-2.60)
age2_f 0.00333 -0.0108** 0.00667*
(0.65) (-2.64) (2.53)
pchild02 0.0223** 0.0103* 0.00776
(3.16) (2.04) (1.71)
pchild36 0.0171** -0.00150 0.00860*
(2.74) (-0.35) (2.26)
pchild712 0.0143* 0.00727 0.00439
(2.32) (1.96) (1.27)
pchild1317 0.00785 0.00129 0.00370
(1.19) (0.32) (1.04)
pold 0.174* 0.107*** 0.104***
(2.43) (4.09) (7.04)
_cons 0.427*** 0.412*** 0.507***
(3.86) (5.33) (10.06)
L1xL1
_cons -0.00349*** -0.00406*** -0.00308***
(-12.34) (-25.41) (-23.09)
L2x
age_m 0.00293 -0.00323 -0.00191
(0.62) (-0.97) (-0.70)
age2_m -0.00219 0.00192 0.00235
(-0.39) (0.51) (0.73)
pchild02 0.00641 -0.00470 -0.00350
(0.78) (-0.78) (-0.72)
pchild36 0.0104 0.00305 -0.00829*
(1.44) (0.60) (-2.02)
pchild712 0.00610 0.000826 -0.00307
(0.84) (0.19) (-0.86)
pchild1317 -0.00839 0.00182 -0.00517
(-1.08) (0.39) (-1.44)
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Table D.3 – Continued from last page
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
pold 0.149 0.0609** 0.0382*
(1.87) (2.74) (2.34)
_cons 0.287* 0.445*** 0.297***
(2.26) (6.10) (4.75)
L2xL2
_cons -0.00279*** -0.00311*** -0.00206***
(-8.18) (-33.58) (-13.20)
L1xL2
_cons 0.000690 0.0000994 -0.000181
(1.23) (0.60) (-0.71)
IND
d_parttime_m -2.460*** -2.748*** -1.786***
(-16.68) (-28.31) (-23.88)
d_parttime_f -0.955*** -1.697*** -2.063***
(-10.68) (-23.54) (-29.55)
N 21664 46288 45984
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table D.4.: Labor Supply Estimation: Single women
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
Cx
age_f -0.000798 -0.000702 -0.00346
(-0.84) (-0.55) (-1.40)
age2_f 0.00107 0.000710 0.00409
(0.95) (0.50) (1.42)
nchild -0.00201 -0.00158 -0.00273
(-1.79) (-1.32) (-1.18)
nold -0.00448** -0.00647*** -0.0182***
(-3.18) (-9.56) (-5.59)
_cons 0.0143 0.0330 0.0675
(0.70) (1.18) (1.28)
CxC
_cons 0.00000290 -0.000000821 0.0000481*
(1.17) (-1.46) (2.37)
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Table D.4 – Continued from last page
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
CxL1
_cons 0.0000758 -0.0000133 0.000411***
(1.39) (-1.40) (3.31)
L1x
age_f -0.00989 -0.00423 -0.00815
(-1.29) (-0.35) (-1.28)
age2_f 0.0134 0.00286 0.00907
(1.41) (0.21) (1.20)
nchild -0.0157 -0.0206 -0.00924
(-1.52) (-1.71) (-1.39)
pold -0.00893 -0.00326 -0.0151
(-0.61) (-0.42) (-1.50)
ed_ter_f -0.0420*** -0.0154* -0.0558***
(-4.57) (-1.96) (-5.77)
ed_up_f -0.0209*** -0.0232*** -0.0706***
(-3.41) (-5.23) (-9.83)
_cons 0.487** 0.641* 0.466***
(3.03) (2.45) (3.54)
L1xL1
_cons -0.00257*** -0.00338*** -0.00192***
(-7.32) (-24.85) (-8.51)
IND
d_parttime_f -1.213*** -2.253*** -2.157***
(-10.85) (-26.09) (-19.27)
N 3036 8028 4776
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table D.5.: Labor Supply Estimation: Single men
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
Cx
age_m -0.000332 0.0000636 -0.00544*
(-0.36) (0.07) (-2.24)
age2_m 0.000493 -0.000399 0.00715*
(0.46) (-0.38) (2.52)
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Table D.5 – Continued from last page
BE IT PL
choice choice choice
nchild -0.000292 0.00273** 0.00471**
(-0.54) (2.71) (2.64)
nold -0.00419*** -0.00729*** -0.0139***
(-3.49) (-11.83) (-6.58)
_cons -0.00135 0.0196 0.113*
(-0.07) (0.96) (2.07)
CxC
_cons 0.00000297 -0.000000174 0.0000101
(0.91) (-0.12) (0.44)
CxL1
_cons 0.000212 ** -0.00000340 0.000294
(3.02) (-0.14) (1.85)
L1x
age_m -0.00272 0.00600 -0.0113
(-0.36) (0.85) (-1.67)
age2_m 0.00483 -0.00869 0.0154
(0.53) (-1.05) (1.93)
pchild -0.0395 ** 0.0279* 0.00299
(-3.13) (2.04) (0.30)
pold -0.0520*** -0.0199 ** -0.0338***
(-3.42) (-2.88) (-4.05)
ed_ter_m -0.0291 ** -0.0131 -0.0590***
(-2.77) (-1.41) (-5.30)
ed_up_m -0.0268*** -0.00260 -0.0662***
(-4.09) (-0.56) (-6.22)
_cons 0.0597 0.279 0.403**
(0.38) (1.90) (2.78)
L1xL1
_cons -0.000403 -0.00255*** -0.00102***
(-0.98) (-17.53) (-3.34)
IND
d_parttime_m -2.760*** -2.645*** -1.704***
(-12.85) (-23.83) (-13.29)
N 2212 6616 3260
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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E.1. Model
The household sector consists of a continuum of households h[0, 1]. A share (1−Ô) of these
households is not liquidity constrained and indexed by i ∈ [0, 1− Ô]. They have access
to financial markets where they can buy and sell domestic assets (government bonds),
accumulate physical capital, which they rent out to the final goods sector. The remaining
share Ô of households is liquidity constrained and indexed by k ∈ [1 − Ô, 1]. These
households cannot trade in financial and physical assets and consume their disposable
income each period. We identify the liquidity constrained households as low-skilled and
the non-liquidity constrained households as medium- and high-skilled. For each skill group
we assume that households (liquidity and non-liquidity constrained) supply differentiated
labor services to unions, which act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive labor
markets. The unions pool wage income and distribute it in equal proportions among their
members. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that the households
face adjustment costs for changing wages. Non-liquidity constrained households maximize
an intertemporal utility function in consumption and leisure subject to a budget constraint.
These households make decisions about consumption (Ci,t), and labor supply (Li,z,t), the
purchases of investment good (Ji,t) and government bonds (Bi,t), the renting of physical
capital stock (Ki,t), and receive wage income (Ws,t), unemployment benefits (bWs,t),
transfer income from the government (TRi,t), and interest income on bonds and capital
(it, ). Hence, non-liquidity constrained households face the following Lagrangian
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max{
Ci,t,Li,s,t,Bi,t,
Ji,t,Ki,t
}∞
t=0
Vi,0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
U(Ci,t) +
∑
z
V (1− Li,z,t)
)
(E.1.1)
− E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,t
βt
Pt
((1 + tC,t)PC,tCi,t (E.1.2)
+Bi,t + PI,t(Ji,t + Γj(Ji,t))− (1 + it−1Bi,t−1) (E.1.3)
−
∑
z
(1− tw,z,t)Wz,tLi,z,t − bWz,t(1−NPARTi,z,t − Li,z,t)
(E.1.4)
− (1− tk)(iK,t−1 − rpK)PI,t−1Ki,t−1 − tKδKPI,t−1Ki,t−1 (E.1.5)
− TRi,t − PRfin,i,t) (E.1.6)
E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,tξi,tβ
t(Ki,t − Ji,t − (1− δK)Ki,t−1) (E.1.7)
where z is the index for the corresponding medium (M ) and high-skilled (H ) labor
type respectively (z ∈ {M,H}). The budget constraints are written in real terms with
the price for consumption and investment (PC,t, PI,t) and wages (Wz,t) divided by GDP
deflator (Pt). All firms of the economy are owned by non-liquidity constrained households
who share the total profit of the final good sector firms, PRfin,i,t. As shown by the
budget constraints, all households pay consumption taxes (tC,t), wage income taxes
(tW,z,t ) and capital income taxes (tK) less depreciation allowances (tKδK) after their
earnings on physical capital. When investing into tangible capital the household requires
premium in order to cover the increased risk on the return related to these assets. The
utility function is additively separable in consumption (Ci,t) and leisure (1-Li,z,t). We
assume log-utility for consumption and allow for habit persistence in consumption (with
parameter habc) as follows:
U(Ci,t) = (1− habc) log(Ci,t−habcCt−1) (E.1.8)
We assume CES preferences with common elasticity but a skill specific weight (ωs) on
leisure. This is necessary in order to capture differences in employment levels across skill
groups. Thus preferences for leisure are given by:
V (1− Li,s,t) = ωs1− κ(1− Li,s,t)
1−κ, s ∈ {L,M,H} (E.1.9)
with κ > 0. The investment decisions with respect to real capital are subject to convex
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adjustment costs, which are given by:
ΓJ(Ji,t) =
γK(Ji,t)2
2Ki,t−1
+ γI2 (∆Ji,t)
2. (E.1.10)
where γK and γI are parameters.
The first order conditions of the household with respect to consumption, financial and
real assets are given by the following equations:
∂V0
∂Ci,t
: UC,i,t − λi,t(1 + tC,t)PC,t
Pt
= 0 (E.1.11)
∂V0
∂Bi,t
: −λi,t + Et
(
λi,t+1β(1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
)
= 0 (E.1.12)
∂V0
∂Ki,t
: Et
(
λi,t+1
βPI , t
Pt+1
((1− tK)(iK,t − rpK) + tKδK)
)
(E.1.13)
− λi,tξi,t + Et(λi,t+1ξi,t+1β(1− δK)) = 0 (E.1.14)
∂V0
∂Ji,t
: −
(
1 + γk
(
Ji,t
Ki,t+1
)
+ γI∆Ji,t
)
(E.1.15)
+ Et
(
1
1 + it
PI,t+1
PI,t
γI∆Ji,t+1
)
+ ξi,t
Pt
Pi,t
= 0
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their current
income at each date. Real consumption of these households is thus determined by the
net wage income plus benefits and net transfers, as follows:
(1 + tC,t)Pc,tCL,t = (1− t− w,L, t)WL,tLL,t + bWL,t(1−NPARTL,t − LL,t) + TRL,t
(E.1.16)
Within each skill group a variety of labor services are supplied, which are imperfect
substitutes to each other. Thus, trade unions can charge a wage mark-up (1/νs, t) over
the reservation wage1. The reservation wage is given as the marginal utility of leisure
1The mark-up depends on the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor
services within each skill groups (σs) and fluctuations in the mark-up arise because of wage adjustment
costs and the fact that a fraction (1-sfw) of workers is indexing the growth rate of wagesto wage
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divided by the corresponding marginal utility of consumption. The relevant net real wage
to which the mark up adjusted reservation wage is equated is the gross wage adjusted for
labor taxes, consumption taxes and unemployment benefits, which act as a subsidy to
leisure. Thus, the wage equation is given as,2
V1−L,h,s,t
UC,h,s,t
1
ηs,t
= Ws,t(1− tw,s,t − b)
Pc,t(1 + tC,t)
for s ∈ {L,M,H}, (E.1.17)
where b is the benefit replacement rate. The aggregate of any household specific
variable Xh,t in per capita terms is given by
Xt =
∫ 1
0
Xh,tdh = (1− ε)Xi,t + εXk,t. (E.1.18)
Hence, aggregate consumption and employment are given by
Ct = (1− ε)Ci,t + εCk,t (E.1.19)
and
Lt = (1− ε)Li,t + εLk,t (E.1.20)
We assume that final goods producers work under monopolistic competition setting
and each firm produces a variety of the domestic good, which is an imperfect substitute
for varieties produced by other firms. Final output of firm j (Yj,t) is produced using
capital and a labor aggregate (lj , t) in a Cobb-Douglas technology, subject to a fixed cost
FCj , as follows:
Yj,t = (Lj,t − FCj,L)α(uj,tKj,t)1−α − FCj,Y (E.1.21)
with
inflation in the previous period .
2In order to find the wage equation, consider the problem of representative household i, of a subgroup s
of the population given by (E.1.1). Then, the first order conditions with respect to labor (Li, z,t) is
the following:
∂V0
∂Li,z,t
= 0⇔ V ′ (1− Li,z,t) = λi,tPt (1− tW,z,t − b)Wz,t
We can now combine the above condition with the first order condition with respect to consumption
to obtain the intra-temporal condition on the optimal household choices on consumption and labor:
V ′(1−Li,z,t)
U
′(Ci,t) =
(1−tW,z,t−b)Wz,t
Pc,t(1+tc,t)
We can recognize in the above condition equation (E.1.17), which determines the equilibrium
wage. In fact, and as mentioned before, since within each sub-group s the labor services supplied
are imperfect substitutes of each other, the trade unions can charge a wage mark-up ( 1
ηs,t
) over the
reservation wage, which is given by the ratio of the marginal utilities of leisure and consumption, i.e.
the left-hand side of the above equation.
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Lj,t =
(
Λ
1
µ
L (χLLj,L,t)
(µ−1)
µ + Λ
1
µ
M (χMLj,M,t)
(µ−1)
µ + Λ
1
µ
H(χHLj,H,t)
(µ−1)
µ
) (µ−1)
µ
, (E.1.22)
where LL, LM , and LH denote the employment of low, medium and high-skilled by
firm j respectively. Parameter Λs is the corresponding share parameter, χs is the efficiency
unit, and µ is the elasticity of substitution between different labor types. The term FCL
represents overhead labor and ut is the measure of capacity utilization. The objective of
the firm is to maximize the present discounted value of profits:
PRj,t = Pj,tYj,t −
∑
s
(1 + ter,s,t)Wj,s,tLj,s,t − iKt Pj,I,tKj,t (E.1.23)
−
(
Γp(Pj,t) + ΓL(Lj,L,t, Lj,M,t, Lj,H,t) + Γu(uj,t)
)
(E.1.24)
where iK denotes the rental rate of capital and ter,s,t stands for the tax rate on labor
levied on the employers. Following Ratto et al. (2009), we assume that firms face
technological constraints, which restrict their price setting, employment and capacity
utilization decisions. These constraints are captured by the corresponding adjustment
costs . It can be shown that in a symmetric equilibrium, when Pj,t = Pt,∀j, firms charge
a mark-up over the marginal cost of production (MC):
Pj,t =
1
ηj,t
MCj,t (E.1.25)
where ηj,t is the inverse price mark-up factor, which is defined as a function of the
elasticity of substitution (σd), changes in inflation (pi) and the mark-up shock (εmkp)3.
Skill-specific labor demand can be obtained from the first order condition with respect
to labor:
Pj,t
∂Yj,t
∂Lj,s,t
ηj,t = (1 + ter,s,t)Ws,t +
∂ΓL(Lj,L,t, Lj,M,t, Lj,H,t)
∂Lj,s,t
, (E.1.26)
s ∈ {L,M,H}, where the marginal product of labor, the corresponding adjustment
costs and the gross mark-up factor will jointly determine the optimally chosen level of
low-, medium- and high-skilled employment level. Similarly, the demand for capital is
3We follow Ratto et al. (2009) and allow for additional backward looking elements by assuming that a
fraction (1-sfp) of firms index price increases to inflation in t-1„ where is the corresponding adjustment
cost parameter.
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constrained by the corresponding first order condition:
(1− α)Pj,t ∂Yj,t
∂Kj,t
ηj,t = iK,tPj,I,t (E.1.27)
where is the price of investment goods while is the rental rate of capital. Finally, the
first order condition for capacity utilization is:
(1− α)Pj,t ∂Yj,t
∂Kj,tucapj,t
ηj,t = iK,tPj,I,t (E.1.28)
In this model we have a fiscal authority, which manages a public budget. On the
expenditure side we distinguish between government consumption (Gt), government
investment (IGt), government transfers (TRt) and unemployment benefits (BENt), where
BENt =
∑
s
bWs,t(1−NPARTs,t − Ls,t), s ∈ {L,M,H}. (E.1.29)
Government revenues are made up of taxes on consumption as well as capital and
labor income:
RGt = tc,tPC,tCi,t +
∑
s
(tw,s,t + ter,s,t)Ws,tLs,t + tKiK,t−1PI,t−1,KI,t−1 (E.1.30)
− tKδKPI,t−1Ki,t−1 (E.1.31)
Government debt (Bt) evolves according to
Bt = (1 + it)Bt−1 +Gt + IGt + TRt +BENt −RGt (E.1.32)
The labor tax (tw,t) is used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio, according to the
following rule:
∆tw,t = τB
(
Bt−1
Yt−1
− bT
)
+ τDEF∆
(
Bt
Yt
)
(E.1.33)
where captures the sensitivity with respect to deviations from , the government debt
target, and controls the sensitivity of the tax-rule with respect to changes in the debt to
output ratio. Note that this budget balanced rule is turned off when simulating the tax
reforms considered in this paper.
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some
smoothness of the interest rate response (it) to the inflation and output gap:
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it = γilagit−1(1− γilag)(rEQ + piTAR + γinf (piC,t − piTAR) + γygapyˆt). (E.1.34)
The central bank has a constant inflation target and it adjusts interest rates whenever
actual consumer price inflation deviates from the target and it also responds to the output
gap via the corresponding gammainf and gammaygap coefficients. There is also some
inertia in nominal interest rate setting over the equilibrium real interest rate determined
by gammailag. Output gap is defined as deviation of capital and labor utilization from
their long run trends. Note that in our multi-country setting, members of the euro area
do not have independent monetary policy. In this way, we assume that the European
Central Bank sets interest rate by taking into account the euro area wide aggregate
inflation and output gap changes in its Taylor-rule.
Finally, concerning the trading sector in order to facilitate aggregation, we assume
that households, the government and the final goods sector have identical preferences
across goods used for private consumption, investment and public expenditure. Let be
the demand of households, investors or the government as defined in the previous section.
Then their preferences are given by the following utility function:
Zt =
(
(1− ρ)1/σimZ(σim−1)/σimd,t + ρ1/σimZ(σim−1)/σimf,t
)σim/(σim−1) (E.1.35)
where ρ is the share parameter and σim is the elasticity of substitution between domestic
(Zd,t) and foreign produced goods (Zf,t).
E.2. Calibration
The following table gives an overview of the major structural parameters for our countries
of interest.
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Table E.1.: Calibration of main structural parameters in the QUEST model.
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F. Labor Market Modelling: Labor
Supply Function, Labor Supply
Elasticities and Tax Incidence
F.1. Labor Supply Function
The labor market plays the key role in linking the micro and macro models in our analysis.
Here we follow the analysis of Magnani and Mercenier (2009),1 which to some extent
can be seen as a simplified version of linking the micro and macro models we use in
our dynamic scoring analysis, in order to ensure consistency between our discrete choice
labor supply model and the labor supply modelling in QUEST. Our aim is to compare
the optimal labor supply produced in the micro and macroeconomic settings, in terms of
how the decision is modelled. We also derive the labor supply elasticities for both the
micro and macro models. Finally, we describe in detail how tax incidence works in the
labor market modelled in QUEST.
Let us focus first on the modelling of the labor supply side of the labor market from
the microeconomic perspective. We assume that each individual i faces alternatives of
working 0, 20, 40 or 60 hours per week such that her preferences can be described by the
following stochastic utility function:
Vij = Uij(Cij, Hij, .) + Ôij (F.1.1)
1These authors describe an exact aggregation of the results of a discrete choice model and a representative
agent macroeconomic model, with constant elasticity of substitution/transformation utility function.
They show that in order to ensure consistency between the micro and macro models , whereby both
models can be characterized by similar equilibrium/optimality conditions, the calibration of the macro
model labor parameters (labor elasticities and labor shares, fundamentally) must be tied to the
statistical parameters of the probability distribution of the micro-data. In Magnani and Mercenier
(2009), like in our case, the labor market decisions at the micro level are modelled as a discrete-choice
model, where choice probabilities are derived from a multinomial-logit distribution. They show that
the micro and macro optimality conditions are identical if the “deep” parameter of the macroeconomic
model—elasticity of substitution in the utility function—coincides with the dispersion parameter of
the multinomial logit population from the discrete choice model, and the shares of time spent in
leisure activities are matched to measures of the disutility of working (wage).
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where Ôij is an independent and identically distributed error term for the each of the
choice j, and follows an extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution. Then we can define the
probability of i choosing alternative j ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60} as follows:
Probij = prob [Vij ≥ Vik, ∀k ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60} , k Ó= j] (F.1.2)
= prob [Uij (Cij, Hij, .) + Ôij ≥ Uik (Cik, Hik, .) + Ôik, ∀k ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60} , k Ó= j]
(F.1.3)
= prob [Uij (Cij, Hij, .)− Uik (Cik, Hik, .) ≥ Ôik − Ôij, ∀k ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60} , k Ó= j]
(F.1.4)
= prob [Ôik − Ôij ≤ Uij (Cij, Hij, .)− Uik (Cik, Hik, .) , ∀k ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60} , k Ó= j]
(F.1.5)
= F (Ôik − Ôij) (F.1.6)
Since we have assumed that Ôij ∼ EV − I, then we can write the generalized extreme
value distribution function as follows:
F (Ôi0, Ôi20, Ôi40, Ôi60) = exp
[−H (e−Ôi0 , e−Ôi20 , e−Ôi40 , e−Ôi60)] (F.1.7)
Function H satisfies all the necessary conditions to ensure that F is a cumulative
distribution function. Following Magnani and Mercenier (2009), we assume that the
following functional form for Hf is:
Hf (Ôi0, Ôi20, Ôi40, Ôi60) =
∑
s∈{0,20,40,60}
Ô
1
µ
is (F.1.8)
Given the functional form of H, then the cumulative distribution F is equal to the
product of double exponential distributions that characterize the behavior of Vij for each
alternative of working hours such that:
Hf
(
e−Ôi0 , e−Ôi20 , e−Ôi40 , e−Ôi60
)
=
∑
s∈{0,20,40,60}
(
e−Ôis
) 1
µ =
∑
s∈{0,20,40,60}
e
−
(
Ôis
µ
)
(F.1.9)
and F assumes the following form:
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F (Ôi0, Ôi20, Ôi40, Ôi60) = exp
− ∑
s∈{0,20,40,60}
e
−
(
Ôis
µ
) = ∏
s∈{0,20,40,60}
exp
[
−e−
(
Ôis
µ
)]
(F.1.10)
Then, according to McFadden theorem, the probability of i choosing alternative j is
given by:
Probij = µ
∂lnH
(
eUi0 , eUi20 , eUi40 , eUi60
)
∂Uij
(F.1.11)
where µ is the dispersion parameter of the extreme value distribution. The probability
we are looking for can be obtained by substituting (F.1.9) into (F.1.11) to obtain:
Probij =
e
Uij
µ∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} e
Uis
µ
(F.1.12)
which, when µ = 1, is equivalent to :
Probij =
eUij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
. (F.1.13)
Then, the expected number of hours supplied by individual i will be given by:
Li =
∑
j∈{0,20,40,60}
Pij ∗ j =
∑
j∈{0,20,40,60}
(
eUij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
)
∗ j =
∑
j∈{0,20,40,60} j ∗ eUij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
(F.1.14)
Consider now that a given individual i belongs to a particular sub-population group
that share the same socio-economic characteristics, and that there are N statistically
identical and independent individuals in this sub-population group. Then, within this
group, the expected number of hours supplied will be given by:
L =
N∑
i=1
Li =
N∑
i
[∑
j∈{0,20,40,60} j ∗ eUij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
]
(F.1.15)
Note that equation (F.1.15) is a simplified analytical expression of the labor supply
function for a group of individuals sharing the same socio-economic characteristics. We
can also compute the expected number of individuals in this population subgroup that
will choose any of the working hours’ alternatives. For instance, the expected number of
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individuals supplying zero hours, i.e. individuals deciding not to participate in the labor
market, is equal to:
Lj=0 = Probi0 ∗N =
(
eUi0∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
)
∗N (F.1.16)
Similarly, the expected number of working individuals, i.e. individuals supplying
non-zero working hours, is equal to:
Lj Ó=0 = (1− Probi0) ∗N =
(
1− e
Ui0∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
)
∗N = N − Lj=0 (F.1.17)
In more general terms, the expected number of individuals choosing any alternative j
of the setting of alternatives is equal to:
Lj = Probij ∗N =
(
eUij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eUis
)
∗N (F.1.18)
We turn now to the macroeconomic setting. In QUEST the labor market is populated
by workers, and firms. The QUEST model therefore takes into account both the supply
and demand of labor. Focusing only on the partial equilibrium, this translates into a
system of equations that allows finding the equilibrium wage and working hours. In
this way, and abstracting from other general equilibrium effects, the referred system is
presented below:2
V1−L,h,s,t
UC,h,s,t
1
ηs,t
= Ws,t(1− tw,s,t − b)
PC,t(1 + tC,t)
(F.1.19)
Pj,t
∂Yj,t
∂Lj,s,t
ηj,t = (1 + ter,s,t)Ws,t +
ΓL(Lj,L,t, Lj,M,t, Lj,H,t)
∂Ljj,s,t
, fors ∈ {H,M,L}
(F.1.20)
where the first equation of the system3 results from the combination between the first
order conditions with respect to consumption and labor—the inter-temporal and the
intra-temporal optimality conditions, respectively—resulting from the household problem,
2Note that QUEST is characterized by the system of all the equilibrium conditions of economic agents,
laws of motion of state endogenous variables and shocks, and feasibility conditions, and as such the
solution of the model implies solving this system, and having all the (approximated) conditions met
simultaneously in the steady state.
3This corresponds to equation (E.1.17) in Appendix E.
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and the second equation of the system results from maximizing firms profits with respect
to labor.4 From the system in (F.1.19), we obtain the partial equilibrium pair of hours
worked and wage rate
(
L∗s,t,W ∗s,t
)
, s ∈ {H,M,L} . Notice that the decisions modelled
in the supply side of the labor market have similar aspects in both micro and macro
settings: both consider maximization of individual/household utilities, which depend on
consumption and leisure. However, in the macro setting, the number of hours worked in
equilibrium is derived from intersecting labor supply and labor demand functions, i.e.
QUEST take into account the demand of labor. This demand effect, which is basically
constrained by the labor demand elasticity to wages, is not considered in the micro
framework but rather taken as given by the macro-economic conditions described by
the DSGE model.5 Considering the following functional form of the household utility
function in QUEST, given by expressions (F.1.21) and (F.1.22) below 6, for skill group
s ∈ {H,M,L},
V1−L,h,s,t =
ωs
(1− Li,s,t)κ , s ∈ {H,M,L} (F.1.21)
and,
UC,h,s,t =
1− habc
Ci,t − habcCt−1 , s ∈ {H,M,L} (F.1.22)
and substituting them in the inter-temporal condition of the system in (F.1.19), we
obtain the expression for the labor supply function in QUEST:
Li,s,t = 1−
[
ωs
ηs,t (1− habc)
Pc,t (1 + tc,t) (Ci,t − habcCt−1)
Ws,t (1− tW,s,t − b)
] 1
κ
(F.1.23)
⇔ Li,s,t = 1−
[
ωs
ηs,t
1
Ws,t (1− tW,s,t − b)
Pc,t (1 + tc,t)
UC,h,s,t
] 1
κ
(F.1.24)
If we now consider that there are N identical households on the skill group s ∈
{H,M,L} we can rewrite (F.1.23) as follows:
4This corresponds to equation (E.1.26) in Appendix E.
5Notice that not considering labor demand in the micro model can be problematic in what concerns the
coherence between the micro and macro settings. It may be difficult to obtain convergence on the
main economic aggregates between the two models.
6These correspond to expressions (E.1.8) and (E.1.9) in Appendix E.
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(Ls,t = N
1− [ ωs
ηs,t
1
Ws,t (1− tW,s,t − b)
Pc,t (1 + tc,t)
UC,h,s,t
] 1
κ
 (F.1.25)
Expression (F.1.25) can be compared with expression (F.1.17), the expected number of
individuals that was derived in our simplified discrete choice setting. First of all, notice
that both expressions are optimality conditions derived from a utility maximization
problem, conditional on how much the household wants to consume. To see this better,
we can write expression (F.1.25) in the following terms:
(Ls,t = N (1− g (Xt;Tt; Ω)) (F.1.26)
where g(.) is a function of a vector of aggregated endogenous variables, Xt, a vector of
policy exogenous variables, Tt, and a vector of parameters, Ω, , with
Xt =
(
Ci,t,W s,t, Pc,t; ηs,t
)
; Tt = (tW,s,t, tc,t, b) ; Ω = (κ, ωs, habc) .
In a similar way, we can rewrite (F.1.17) as follows:
(Lj Ó=0 = N (1− F (Uij; Θ)) (F.1.27)
where F(.) is the distribution function depending on the arguments of the deterministic
utility function Uij = (Cij, Hij, Zij) and on a set of parameters Θ. However, while
expression (F.1.25) denotes the optimal amount of labor services supplied, in terms of
total number of hours, for any level of the net adjusted wage (the intensive margin),
expression (F.1.17) denotes the expected number of individuals working in the economy
(the extensive margin). Furthermore, notice that, in QUEST, unemployment is obtained
endogenously and is equal to:
UNEMPL = 1−NPARTL,t − LL,t (F.1.28)
where NPART is the non-participation rate. In QUEST households only decide on
the amount of hours supplied in the labor market, but they do not choose between
unemployment and non-participation, explicitly. The non-participation rate is calibrated
as the proportion of inactive people in the total population. The non-participation rate
(NPART) must therefore be seen as an exogenous policy variable characterizing the
generosity of the benefit system. However, in our discrete choice model the choice of
non-participation, or being unemployed voluntarily, is one of the possible alternatives
of individual i. The choice of participating in the labor market is nested together with
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the decision on supplying different number of hours (which can be seen as the different
working modalities). We reconcile the two models on this issue by calibrating in QUEST
the non-participation rate according to the expected number of individuals that choose
to be out of the labor market, i.e. equation (F.1.16) in the discrete choice model.
F.2. Labor Supply Elasticities
In our dynamic scoring exercise, labor supply elasticities are crucial to understand the
effects of a particular tax reforms on the households’ disposable income, in particular,
and on the economy as a whole. More specifically, the labor supply elasticity is a good
measure of the work effort incentives, and, in this way, crucial to understand the effects
of the tax reforms implemented on the workers behavior. Moreover, the analysis of the
elasticities in both models is important to see whether we can calibrate QUEST with
the elasticities obtained from our microeconometric model, so that a greater consistency
can be achieved in linking the two models. In what follows we derive analytically the
labor supply elasticities in the micro and macro settings, and see how these relate to
each other. Recall that in what concerns QUEST, the parameter that we are interested
in calibrating is the parameter κ.7 This parameter relates the Frisch elasticity to the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, as we will see in what follows.
In QUEST, the Frisch elasticity is defined as the elasticity of the labor supply, as
defined in equation (F.1.25), with respect to the wage, maintaining the marginal utility
of consumption constant. In this way, we can define the Frisch elasticity as follows:
εFL,W =
∂Ls,t
Ls,t
∂Ws,t
Ws,t
<=> εFL,W =
1
κ
(
N − Ls,t
Ls,t
)
(F.2.1)
The elasticity in (F.2.1) suggests a positive relationship between wages and labor
supply, depending on the level of labor hours supplied. This implies that the Frisch
elasticity might differ (and, in fact, it will) for the three skill groups considered in QUEST.
In this way, we expect that some groups will be more reactive to changes in the wage level
than others. Besides the Frisch elasticity, another important result in macroeconomic
models such as QUEST is how labor supply evolves over time, given temporary changes
in the wages path. This is known as the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, εIES.
In this way, this elasticity measures the relation between the changes in the ratio of
labor supplied tomorrow and today, and the ratio of wages paid tomorrow and today. In
order to derive this elasticity, we need to find the inter-temporal labor supply function,
7See the functional form given in expression (E.1.9) in Appendix E.
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where we can relate the path of labor supply with the path of wages. For that consider
the QUEST model described in Appendix D. Consider also the labor supply function in
equation (F.1.25) of this appendix section. In order to derive the inter-temporal labor
supply function, one needs to combine the intra-temporal optimality condition with
the inter-temporal one (the Euler equation). Let us consider first the intra-temporal
optimality condition given by equation (E.1.17) and write it one period ahead, as follows:
V1−L,h,s,t+1
UC,h,s,t+1
1
ηs,t+1
= Ws,t+1 (1− tW,s,t+1 − b)
Pc,t+1 (1 + tc,t+1)
(F.2.2)
From this condition we can obtain the labor supply function of the N households in
group s, one period ahead:
Ls,t+1 = N
1− [ ωs
ηs,t+1
1
Ws,t+1 (1− tW,s,t+1 − b)
Pc,t (1 + tc,t+1)
UC,h,s,t+1
] 1
κ
 (F.2.3)
We can now substitute in (F.2.3) the marginal utility of consumption UC,h,s,t+1 by its
expression one period ahead, given the functional form in expression (E.1.8)):
Ls,t+1 = N
1− [ ωs
ηs,t+1
1
Ws,t+1 (1− tW,s,t+1 − b)
Pc,t (1 + tc,t+1)
1− habc (Ci,t+1 − habcCt)
] 1
κ

(F.2.4)
At this point, we need to consider also the intertemporal optimality condition of the
household problem—the Euler equation. This condition is obtained by combining the
first order conditions with respect to consumption and bonds of the household problem,
i.e. equations (E.1.11) and (E.1.12) in Appendix D respectively, and it explains the path
of consumption over time. From these two conditions, we obtain an expression for the
Lagrangian multiplier, λi,t:
λi,t =
Pt
Pc,t
Uc,i,t
1 + tc,t
(F.2.5)
And writing (F.2.5) one period ahead, we get:
λi,t+1 =
Pt+1
Pc,t+1
Uc,i,t+1
1 + tc,t+1
(F.2.6)
Now that we have the expressions of the Lagrangian multiplier, at t and t+1, we can
substitute them in the first order condition with respect to bonds to obtain the Euler
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equation:
Uc,i,t
Pc,t (1 + tc,t)
1
β (1 + it)
= Et
[
Uc,i,t+1
Pc,t+1 (1 + tc,t+1)
]
(F.2.7)
where we can explicitly include the expressions of the marginal utility of consumption
at t and t+1. Then, the Euler equation can be re-written as follows:
Et [Pc,t+1 (1 + tc,t+1) (Ci,t+1 − habcCt)] = β (1 + it)Pc,t (1 + tc,t) (Ci,t − habcCt−1)
(F.2.8)
The next step is to include the Euler equation derived in equation (F.2.8) in the
labor supply function, equation (F.2.4) to obtain a relation between the labor supplied
tomorrow and consumption today, as follows:
Ls,t+1 = N
1− [ ωs
ηs,t+1
1
Ws,t+1 (1− tW,s,t+1 − b)
β (1 + it)Pc,t (1 + tc,t) (Ci,t − habcCt−1)
1− habc
] 1
κ

(F.2.9)
Recurring again to the intra-temporal optimality condition, and substituting the
marginal utilities of leisure and consumption, we find that:
Pc,t (1 + tc,t) (Ci,t − habcCt−1) = ηs,t (1− habc)
ωs
Ws,t (1− tW,s,t − b) (1− Li,s,t)κ
(F.2.10)
Substituting the previous result in the labor supply equation given by (F.2.9), we will
obtain finally an expression which includes Ls,t+1, Li,s,t, Ws,t+1and Ws,t, shown below.
Ls,t+1 = N
1− [ ηs,t
ηs,t+1
Ws,t (1− tW,s,t − b)
Ws,t+1 (1− tW,s,t+1 − b)β (1 + it) (1− Li,s,t)
κ
] 1
κ
 (F.2.11)
After some algebraic computations we can derive the following expression, which relates
the path of leisure hours (and labor supply) with the path of wages, as follows:
1− Li,s,t+1
1− Li,s,t =
[
β (1 + it)
ηs,t
ηs,t+1
1− tW,s,t − b
1− tW,s,t+1 − b
] 1
κ
(
Ws,t+1
Ws,t
)− 1
κ
(F.2.12)
Similarly to the Euler equation, equation (F.2.12) represents the inter-temporal op-
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timality condition for leisure (labor). We can now denote 1−Li,s,t+11−Li,s,t =
̂(1− Li,s) and
Ws,t+1
Ws,t
= Ŵs and rewrite equation (F.2.12) as follows:
̂(1− Li,s) =
[
β (1 + it)
ηs,t
ηs,t+1
1− tW,s,t − b
1− tW,s,t+1 − b
] 1
κ (
Ŵs
)− 1
κ (F.2.13)
We can now compute the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution for leisure since the
results are very easily extrapolated in terms of labor supply. We apply logarithms to
equation (F.2.13) and then compute the derivative of the ln ̂(1− Li,s) with respect to
ln
(
Ŵ
)
s
. In this way, we obtain the following expression:
̂ln (1− Li,s) = 1
κ
ln
[
β (1 + it)
ηs,t
ηs,t+1
1− tW,s,t − b
1− tW,s,t+1 − b
]
− 1
k
ln
(
Ŵs,t
)
(F.2.14)
and
dln ̂(1− Li,s)
dln
(
Ŵs,t
) = −1
k
<=>
d ̂(1−Li,s)
̂(1−Li,s)
d
(
Ŵs,t
)
(
Ŵs,t
) = −
1
k
<=> εIES1−Li,s = −
1
k
(F.2.15)
As we can observe from expression (F.2.15), parameter k guides the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution, and the smaller this parameter is, the higher (in absolute terms)
is this elasticity, and the more willing is the household to change the path of leisure (or
labor), given temporary changes in wages. Moreover, we can see clearly that the relation
between the Frisch elasticity and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution depends on
the parameter k. In this way, we can establish the following relation between the two
elasticities:
εFL,W = −εIES1−Li,s
(
N − Ls,t
Ls,t
)
(F.2.16)
In the nonlinear discrete choice econometric model, labor supply elasticities cannot
be derived analytically. However, using the estimated structural utility function, we
can calculate choice probabilities for varying incomes. Wage elasticities are calculated
after simulating a marginal increase in the wage rate and predicting the probability
distribution over the choice categories for the increased wage rate. The wage elasticity
is defined as the change in expected working hours (that is, the probability-weighted
average of working hours) with respect to the change in the wage rate. Similarly, we
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calculate expected incomes, benefits, and tax payments before and after the simulated
income change. In this way, using the estimated structural utility function, we predict the
probability distribution over the hour’s categories that emerge after simulating a marginal
increase in the wage rates. As the estimated utility function depends on the net income,
the predicted probability distribution will change after the simulated income change.
Recall from equation (F.1.14) the expected hours supplied by household i. Denote by
U˜ij the predicted utility of the household from working j hours at the marginally increased
wage rate. Then expected hours for the new wage can be calculated in the same way:
L˜i =
∑
j∈{0,20,40,60} j ∗ eU˜ij∑
s∈{0,20,40,60} eU˜is
=
∑
j∈{0,20,40,60}
P˜robij ∗ j. (F.2.17)
The labor supply elasticity can be calculated as the change in predicted hours with
respect to the marginal change in the wage rate:
εLi,w =
∂Li
Li
∂wi
wi
=
(
L˜i−Li
)
Li
(w˜i−wi)
wi
(F.2.18)
The econometric framework from which the elasticity is calculated is static in nature.
We rely on cross sectional data and do not observe households at multiple points in time.
Moreover, the econometric model does not encompass saving decisions. The elasticities
we estimate are uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticities. The Marshallian elasticity
is related by the Slutsky equation to the compensated (Hicksian) income elasticity. In
studies focusing on the deadweight loss of taxation or steady state responses to tax
changes, the Hicksian elasticity is the crucial parameter. However, these studies usually
assume that tax revenue is redistributed as a lump sum payment to households, shutting
off the income effect. As we do not make this assumption, tax changes have income effects,
and the Marshallian elasticity is the appropriate parameter to use. In principle, we could
obtain the Hicksian elasticity as the residual of the Marshallian elasticity (the one we
estimate) and the income effect (which we could calculate by simulating a marginal
increase in non-labor income) but since we focus on a situation with income effects, we
refrain from doing so.8
Comparing the elasticities defined both in the micro and in macroeconomic settings,
we conclude that, in fact, the elasticity defined in (F.2.18) is the micro-equivalent to the
8Note that Bargain et al. (2014) estimate uncompensated, income and compensated elasticities us-
ing EUROMOD. They find that income effects are almost zero and hence the difference between
compensated and uncompensated elasticities is small.
172
F. Labor Market Modelling: Labor Supply Function, Labor Supply Elasticities and Tax Incidence
elasticity derived in (F.2.1), i.e. the Frisch elasticity, in the macro setting. This is a
very important result, because we can greatly improve the consistency between the two
models by calibrating the Frisch elasticity with the labor supply elasticities estimated
from the discrete choice model. In this way, parameter κ in QUEST can be obtained
from the following expression:
κ = 1
εFL,W
N − Ls,t
Ls,t
(F.2.19)
where εFL,W = εLi,w.
F.3. Tax Incidence in QUEST
For our exercise is very important to assess how the tax incidence mechanism works in
the labor market defined in the QUEST model. In this way, following Fullerton and
Metcalf (2002) analysis of tax incidence and considering the labor market of the QUEST
model, workers face the statutory burden of paying the fraction tw of the gross wage,
receiving the net wage defined as follows (for simplicity we abstract here from time and
skill type indices):
NW = (1− tw)W (F.3.1)
The firms pay gross wages and social insurance contributions, i.e. a total compensation
of employees defined by:
TC = (1 + ter)W (F.3.2)
where W is the gross wage, facing, in this way, the statutory tax rate of ter. However,
the economic incidence of these taxes may be different from their legal incidence, and
this will basically depend on the labor supply and demand elasticities with respect to
wages. Let us define labor supply elasticity with respect to net wage as follows:
εLS =
dLs
Ls
dNW
NW
=
dLs
Ls
d[(1−tw)W ]
[(1−tw)W ]
∼= L̂s
Ŵ − t̂w
, (F.3.3)
where the symbol ˆ represents percent changes. The changes in labor supply will
depend on the changes on gross wages, taxes and on the elasticity parameter as follows:
L̂s =
(
Ŵ − t̂w
)
εLS (F.3.4)
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In the same way, we can define labor demand elasticity with respect to the total
compensation of employees as follows:
εLD =
dLd
Ld
dTC
TC
=
dLd
Ld
d[(1+ter)W ]
[(1+ter)W ]
∼= L̂d
Ŵ + t̂er
(F.3.5)
and the changes in labor demand will depend equally on gross wages, taxes and on the
elasticity parameter as follows:
L̂d =
(
Ŵ + t̂w
)
εLD (F.3.6)
Tax changes will lead to a new equilibrium in the labor market, which implies that:
L̂s = L̂d. (F.3.7)
Substituting (F.3.4) and (F.3.6) into (F.3.7), we find that, in order to reach the new
equilibrium, changes in gross wages will be given by the following expression:
Ŵ = εLS
εLS − εLD t̂W +
εLD
εLS − εLD t̂er. (F.3.8)
Since in QUEST, 0 < εLS <∞ and ÔLD < 0, the final change in the equilibrium wage
will depend on the relative magnitude of the elasticities and the signs and magnitude
of the fiscal policy shocks, i.e., the relative changes in tW and ter. In the same way, we
can also find the changes in the net wages and total compensation of employees, given
the changes in the tax rates for employees and employers. Consider the definition of net
wages in (F.2.19). Applying logarithms and differentiating, we obtain:
N̂W = Ŵ − t̂w. (F.3.9)
Substituting (F.3.8) in (F.3.9), we obtain that:
N̂W = εLD
εLS − εLD
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
(F.3.10)
The ratio εLDεLS−εLD is negative. This means that there is an inverse relationship between
the change in total taxes on labor and net wages. The same algebraic reasoning can be
done in order to find the change in the total compensation of employees. Consider in
this case the definition of the total compensation in (F.3.2). Applying logarithms and
differentiating, we obtain:
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T̂C = Ŵ + t̂er. (F.3.11)
Substituting (F.3.8) in (F.3.11), we obtain that:
T̂C = εLS
εLS − εLD
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
(F.3.12)
The ratio εLSεLS−εLD is positive. This means that there is a direct relationship between
the change in total taxes on labor and the total compensation. As we can conclude, tax
incidence in QUEST, i.e. the sharing of the tax burden between workers and firms, will
depend on the sign and magnitude of the elasticities of supply and demand.
In case of the Belgian reforms, when cutting employee paid contributions, the responses
of net wages and of the total compensation of employees to an increase in labor tax
are negative and positive, respectively, and are constrained by the elasticity of labor
supply (εL,s > 0) and labor demand (εL,d < 0). Our shocks imply that t̂w < 0 and
t̂er = 0, then from equation (F.3.8) gross wages should go down, i.e. Ŵ<0. In the
same way, and now from equation (F.3.10), we should expect the net wages to rise in
the new equilibrium. Note that
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
< 0, and, according to equation (F.3.10),
there is an inverse relationship between the change in total taxes on labor income and
net wages. This is also confirmed by the impulse response functions of the net wages
(graph G.1. Finally, in what concerns the total compensation of employees paid by the
firms, and according to equation (F.3.12), we should expect it to decrease. Equation
(F.3.12) implies a positive relationship between the change in total taxes on labor income
and the total compensation. In our case,
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
< 0. So, the total compensation
of employees will decrease in the new equilibrium. Again this is shown in the impulse
response functions of the total compensation of employees, in graph G.2.
A similar analysis can be done in case of cutting employer paid contributions. Again
drawing from our tax incidence analysis and since our shocks imply that t̂w = 0 and
t̂er < 0, from equation (F.3.8) gross wages should go up, i.e. Ŵ<0. In the same way,
and now from equation (F.3.10), we should expect the net wages to rise in the new
equilibrium,
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
< 0, and, according to equation (F.3.10) there is an inverse
relationship between the change in total taxes on labor income and net wages. This is
also confirmed by the impulse response functions of the net wages (graph G.3). Finally,
in what concerns the total compensation of employees paid by the firms, and according
to equation (F.3.12), we should expect it to decrease. Since
(
t̂w + t̂er
)
< 0, the total
compensation of employees will decrease in the new equilibrium. Again this is shown in
the impulse response functions of the total compensation of employees, in graph G.6.
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G.1. Reform on Employees’ Contributions
Figure G.1.: Net Real Wage of Employees by Skill Level
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Figure G.2.: Total Compensation of Employees by Skill Level
G.2. Reform on Employers’ Contributions
G.3. Transition Path Towards the New Steady State
The tax reforms were only implemented temporarily by setting off the debt-stabilization
rule (equation (E.1.33).) for 15 years. After 15 years the reforms are reversed and
employee paid labor taxes are used to raise additional tax revenues in order restore
the pre-reform debt to GDP ratio. Tables G.1 and G.2 below show the macroeconomic
impact of the reforms on selected variables over several years towards the re-established
pre-reform steady state. The reforms generate positive GDP effects in both cases up to the
first 10 years but these output gains gradually diminish as the financially unconstrained
households increase precautionary savings while preparing for the forthcoming labor tax
hike. After 20 years, i.e. five years after the debt-stabilization rule is restored, GDP
is falling below the baseline as the government has to decrease the debt by raising
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Figure G.3.: Gross Real Wage by Skill Level
taxes. Note that the speed of adjustment towards the pre-reform steady state can be
controlled by the and parameters in the debt-stabilization rule: higher values imply
stronger reaction from the government with larger tax hikes in order to reduce the
debt. Note that as the SICer reform implies a larger reduction in labor tax-revenues,
the corresponding debt-consolidation also requires a larger tax-hike with even stronger
negative GDP effects compared to the SICee reform. As Belgium is part of the euro
area without independent monetary policy, the change in interest rates is negligible. In
the long-run the economy returns to its pre-reform steady state, therefore, the variables’
deviation from the baseline is nihil. As noted before, the QUEST model offers a wide
range of fiscal rules to stabilize the debt over the long-run. Exploring the long-run
implications of these various alternative rules goes beyond the scope of the paper. Since
we focus only on the short-run implications of the reforms and their direct feedback
effects on the tax-revenues, by switching off the debt-rule for a relatively long period we
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Figure G.4.: Employment by Skill Level
can ensure that the short-run behavior of economic agents is not strongly influenced by
the debt-stabilization rule.
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Figure G.5.: Net Real Wage of Employees
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Figure G.6.: Total Compensation of Employees
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Figure G.7.: Gross Real Wage
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Figure G.8.: Employment
Table G.1.: Macroeconomic impact of the 30% reduction on the SICee tax rate (percentage
deviation from baseline).
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Table G.2.: Macroeconomic impact of the 30% reduction on the SICer tax rate (percentage
deviation from baseline).
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4. Automatic Stabilizers in Monetary
and Fiscal Unions
4.1. Introduction
Automatic stabilizers are elements of fiscal policy that have the potential to smooth the
business cycle by automatically adjusting government spending and revenue. While “very
little work has been done on automatic stabilization [...] in the last 20 years” (Blanchard,
2006), fiscal stabilization policies in general and automatic stabilizers in particular have
seen an increased focus from researchers, especially since the 2007–2008 financial crisis
and the following recession.1
Many economists now agree that automatic stabilizers are an important part of macroe-
conomic policy, and understanding their workings and optimal design is of considerable
interest to researchers, institutions and policy makers alike.2 This is partly driven by
the recent experience that monetary policy alone may not be enough to stabilize the
economy, especially after large and adverse shocks that constrain monetary policy.3 In
turn, the recent literature also shows that fiscal stabilization is particularly powerful when
monetary policy is constrained. Automatic stabilizers, in particular, mitigate the losses
in aggregate output and consumption significantly more during episodes of a zero lower
bound (McKay and Reis, 2016). The reason is that monetary policy generally does a
good job of stabilizing the economy, but is unable to do so (using conventional measures)
if interest rates are effectively zero. Tax and transfer systems serve an important role
under these circumstances, providing insurance against income fluctuations over the
business cycle.
This paper contributes to the literature by developing a framework to quantify how
automatic stabilizers in Europe influence the business cycle. To this end, I develop a
multi-country New Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets
1See Dolls et al. (2012); McKay and Reis (2016, 2017); Kekre (2017); Dolls et al. (2019b).
2These include for example Auerbach (2009); Dolls et al. (2012, 2015); McKay and Reis (2016, 2017),
Fedelino et al. (2005); Spilimbergo et al. (2008); Darby and Melitz (2008).
3Corsetti et al. (2016).
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calibrated to the euro area, in which countries are linked through trade and hit by
country-specific shocks. Each country is populated with heterogeneous households and
has its own tax and transfer system, but is bound by the union-wide monetary policy. I
analyze how trade linkages between European countries affect business cycle stabilization.
Using the model, I propose experiments by shutting off automatic stabilizers to gauge
their effect on the business cycles in the EU by measuring aggregate volatility with and
without automatic stabilizers. On the methodological side, this paper is, to the best
of my knowledge, the first multi-country heterogeneous agents New Keynesian model
calibrated to the euro area.
This paper is placed in a recent literature of heterogeneous agent models with incomplete
markets in the presence of aggregate shocks.4 The model incorporates international
trade in this framework to account for demand spillover.5 Modeling both aggregate and
individual-level fluctuations is necessary, as they allow to study the social insurance
and redistribution effects of tax and transfer systems, which are particularly powerful
channels of stabilization. This setup gives rise to an equilibrium distribution of wealth
across households. The model is solved using the method of Reiter (2009), first deriving
household policy functions that are non-linear in idiosyncratic risk, approximating the
wealth distribution by a histogram, and then linearizing the model in aggregate variables
to solve for aggregate fluctuations.
What makes automatic stabilizers in Europe particularly interesting to study?
For one, in the European currency area, the effectiveness of nominal adjustments is
limited, putting fiscal stabilizers into focus. Countries in monetary unions incur two
inherent constraints on nominal adjustment to shocks. First, monetary policy cannot
condition on country specific shocks but has to resort to a “one-size-fits-all” policy.
Second, countries in the union also give up the stabilizing potential of flexible exchange
rates.6 This situation resembles the case of a constrained monetary policy through a zero
lower bound outlined above. The recent research on fiscal policy in monetary unions
indicates that membership in a currency union substantially enhances fiscal stimulus.7
4See Krusell and Smith (1998); Gornemann et al. (2016); McKay and Reis (2016); Kaplan et al. (2018);
Bayer et al. (2019).
5See House et al. (2017) and Dupor et al. (2018).
6This holds not only for the 19 states of the Euro Area (EA), but also for the rest of the EU states,
who have agreed to adopt the euro in the future and hence have to keep their exchange rates within a
narrow fluctuation band. In particular, the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) is voluntary,
but must be followed for at least two years before a country can adopt the euro. Currently, only
Denmark is a member of the ERM II. Bulgaria has been pegging their currency to the Deutsche Mark,
and subsequently to the euro. The Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden
have free-floating currencies (Convergence Report 2014).
7E.g. Erceg and Lindé (2013); Ilzetzki et al. (2013); Nakamura and Steinsson (2014); Suárez Serrato
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Therefore, in a monetary union, automatic stabilizers are of particular importance to
insure against country specific shocks.
Moreover, high trade linkages between European countries introduce cross-country
spillover effects from demand stabilization. In other words, automatic stabilizers in one
country have a stabilizing effect in others.8 In my model, in each country, firms produce
an intermediate good from domestic capital and labor. The inter-regional spillovers then
enter the model through trade in the intermediate good. This way, international trade is
a new stabilization channel in my model.9 Another finding in the public finance literature
is that richer countries tend to have a larger government size (and thus higher automatic
stabilizers, see Dolls et al., 2012). If these are the countries that also rely more on trade
openness, this indicates that improving automatic stabilizers in Southern and Eastern
European countries could benefit the rest of Europe, because the ‘core’ relies more on
stabilization of foreign demand.
The third reason to focus on the case of Europe are the variations in wealth distributions
between countries. They lead to heterogeneity in stabilization from redistribution and
social insurance, with a scope for possible benefits of union-wide automatic stabilizers.
For instance, a proposal that is currently discussed is an EU unemployment insurance
scheme, which would redistribute at a supra-national level towards the unemployed.10
The gains for output stabilization are potentially large, because redistributing towards
households who have a high propensity to consume has a particularly high stabilizing
effect.11
The different wealth distributions in Europe are to a large extent determined by
economic conditions and institutions, such as taxes and transfers and the social insurance
and Wingender (2016); Farhi and Werning (2017); Dupor et al. (2018).
8For instance, after the car scrappage scheme enacted in Germany after the 2008 reces-
sion, Fiat and Renault were major benefactors of the reform, with German car buy-
ers opting for smaller cars manufactured in Italy and France instead of German lux-
ury cars from BMW or Mercedes. See “Cash for Clunkers Car-Scrapping Plans – Ger-
many’s Lessons”, published on Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/
cash-for-clunkers-car-scrapping-plans-germany-s-lessons-a-623362.html, retrieved 2019-01-
17. Although being an example of discretionary stimulus and not an automatic stabilizer, it still
illustrates the possible spillover mechanism.
9Through this spillover effect, more open economies benefit more from stabilization of foreign demand.
In turn, this also means that very open economies have a lower effectiveness of output stabilization
through domestic demand. My paper provides a framework which allows to translate closed-economy
automatic stabilizers into open-economy stabilizers, similar in spirit to the open-economy fiscal
multiplier in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Dupor et al. (2018).
10For example, EU unemployment insurance systems are discussed in Jung et al. (2017); Ábrahám et al.
(2018); Dolls et al. (2018); Enders and Vespermann (2018).
11McKay and Reis (2016). See also Oh and Reis (2012) for the gains of redistributing towards high MPC
households.
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system.12 This heterogeneity in social insurance and tax policies is another reason why
it is worthwhile to take a closer look at how automatic stabilizers affect the EU business
cycle.
This paper develops a heterogeneous agents model that can reflect international dif-
ferences in wealth distributions to account for these important channels. It provides an
interesting framework, because it allows to study the interactions of distributional ques-
tions, fiscal policy and the business cycle in the EU. Introducing household heterogeneity
increases the stabilizing role of fiscal policy because it enables redistribution and social
insurance channels to play a role. That is why it is important to analyze the questions
asked in this paper through the lens of a heterogeneous agent model with differences in
wealth.
This paper is still work in progress. It is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a
brief overview over the literature. Section 4.3 presents the main automatic stabilizers in
the EU that are reflected in the model, which is presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 has
details on the intended quantitative exercise and the calibration. Section 4.6 presents a
brief discussion and outlook for future work.
4.2. Literature
The main feature and advantage of automatic stabilizers is that they work automatically,
without discretionary action of the government.13 This makes them difficult for researchers
to measure, because they are inherently endogenous to the business cycle. While fiscal
stimulus or monetary policy are also aimed at stabilizing the economy, they are not
automatic stabilizers, because they require discretionary action. For researchers trying
to single out automatic stabilizers, discretionary policy changes pose another problem
because they act as additional confounders in empirical studies.14
The recent empirical literature on automatic stabilizers solves this problem by analyzing
fiscal stabilization capacities using household micro-data and tax policy simulations
(Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Auerbach, 2009; Dolls et al., 2012, 2019b,a).15 These
papers use the “normalized tax change”, that is, the ratio of the change in the disposable
12For instance, Pham-Dao (2018) analyzes wealth inequality in the euro area and finds that it is influenced
by the differences in pension systems.
13See Solow (2004), cf. McKay and Reis (2012).
14For example, macro-econometric approaches (e.g. Fatás and Mihov, 2001) rely on correlations of
aggregate variables.
15In this literature, the automatic stabilization property of the tax and transfer system is called its
“built-in flexibility” (see Musgrave and Miller, 1948; Pechman, 1973) or “normalized tax change”
(Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000).
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income to a change in market income, as a metric for automatic stabilization.
The micro data and the tax models used in these papers allow for a detailed and
fine-grained representation of household incomes, taxes and transfers, but a shortcoming
of this methodology is that it does not allow to solve for dynamics and the volatility of
aggregate variables over the business cycle.
McKay and Reis (2016) analyze the effect of automatic stabilizers on business cycle
volatility in the US. To this extent, they develop a New Keynesian model with incomplete
markets and aggregate shocks, that features the main automatic stabilizers, calibrated
to the US business cycle. They find that the quantitatively most important channels
through which automatic stabilizers influence the business cycle are redistribution and
social insurance. Besides that, automatic stabilizers are more effective when monetary
policy is constrained (through the zero lower bound). In a follow-up paper, McKay and
Reis (2017) solve for the optimal automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance and
tax progressivity), taking into account aggregate volatility and the state of the labor
market.16
House et al. (2017) analyze the effects of austerity in Europe after the crisis using a
New Keynesian model with international trade, calibrated to the EU. I build on their
model to introduce international trade and spillovers into my model.17
Another related strand of literature estimates fiscal multipliers in open economy settings
and cross-border spillovers from fiscal shocks. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) estimate
open economy multipliers from military spending data for the US and propose a two-region
New Keynesian model to translate the classic (closed-economy) fiscal multiplier into an
‘open-economy relative multiplier’. Similarly, Dupor et al. (2018) estimate consumption
multipliers from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and develop a
two-region heterogeneous agents New Keynesian model for the US. Their model highlights
trade linkages as a transmission mechanism of fiscal policy.18
Another strand of literature studies fiscal policy in monetary unions, with a focus
on the EU and EMU. Blanchard et al. (2016) argue that periphery countries benefit
from expansionary fiscal stimulus when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound.
Their model is a two-country representative agent model with perfect insurance. With
heterogeneous agents and imperfect insurance, as in this paper, the stabilization gains
16Similarly, Kekre (2017) develops a theoretical model of macroeconomic stabilization through unemploy-
ment insurance, but treats it as discretionary policy.
17Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) also calibrate a DSGE model to several European countries to study
questions of taxation.
18Recently, Auerbach et al. (2019) use local defense spending data to estimate local fiscal multipliers,
accounting for spillovers across regions and industries.
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are potentially even larger (see McKay and Reis, 2016). Blagrave et al. (2018) find that
spillovers are larger at the effective lower bound. Hettig and Müller (2018) argue that fiscal
policy should be coordinated in a currency union when monetary policy is constrained by
the zero lower bound. Similarly, Corsetti et al. (2010) find that coordinated stimulus is
important, but depends crucially on how spending is financed. Galí and Monacelli (2008)
analyze optimal monetary and fiscal policy in monetary unions and show that a role
for national stabilization of the “local” governments is warranted when the union level
monetary authority takes care of aggregate inflation. Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2019)
analyze optimal transfers in fiscal unions, also in the context of constrained monetary
policy.
Also related is the growing literature studying monetary or fiscal policy in incomplete
markets models (e.g. Oh and Reis, 2012; McKay et al., 2016; Gornemann et al., 2016;
Auclert, 2017; Bhandari et al., 2017; Auclert et al., 2018; Kaplan et al., 2018; Bayer et al.,
2019). More broadly, my paper is also related to the study of international business cycles
(Heathcote and Perri, 2002) and optimal monetary and fiscal policy in open economies
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004, 2006).
4.3. Automatic Stabilizers in the EU and EA
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Figure 4.1.: Normalized Tax Change of the Tax Systems in the EU
Note: Measured as the change in taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits, respectively, relative
to a change in gross income. The left panel depicts a simulated proportional drop in gross income and
the right panel depicts a simulated five percent increase in the unemployment rate. Source: Dolls et al.
(2019b), based on calculations using EUROMOD.
This section provides a brief description of automatic stabilizers with a particular focus
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on the EU and then describes the channels through which they work. Figure 4.1 gives an
overview of automatic stabilizers in the EU, measured by the normalized tax change. In
recent studies, Dolls et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2019b) have analyzed the presence of
automatic stabilizers in the EU, building on the method pursued for the US by Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000) of the “normalized tax change”. The normalized tax change shows
how changes in tax revenue, social insurance contributions and benefit expenditures with
respect to a change in gross income determine the change in disposable income.
While most Western European countries in the core have rather high automatic
stabilizers, Southern and Eastern European countries often have lower stabilizers. To
date, there is no study analyzing how this affects the aggregate volatility over the business
cycle of the whole union and its member states.
Comparing automatic stabilizers in the EU and the US, Dolls et al. (2012) find that
the cyclical reaction of government budget to the business cycle is stronger in the euro
area than in the US.19 The difference is particularly large when the recession goes along
with a large increase in unemployment, because the benefit system is typically more
generous in the EU and the EA. The right panel of Figure 4.1 shows the normalized
tax change after a simulated increase in the unemployment rate, revealing an overall
larger stabilization for EU and EA (compared to the income shock) as well as a larger
heterogeneity across European countries. Also, it shows that in this case, unemployment
insurance plays a larger role as a stabilizer than after the income income shock.
4.3.1. Channels and Main Stabilizers
The literature suggests four channels through which the stabilizing power of taxes and
transfers can work: (i) the disposable income channel, (ii) the marginal incentives channel,
(iii) the redistribution channel and (iv) the social insurance channel (McKay and Reis,
2016).
The disposable income channel works through a mechanical effect of the tax system
to absorb fluctuations in gross income, which stabilizes aggregate demand through the
stabilizing effect on disposable income.20 This means that, with taxes and transfers,
disposable income will fluctuate less than gross income. This will stabilize aggregate
demand and, assuming output is demand-determined, will stabilize output as well.
The marginal incentives channel works through the change in the marginal tax rate
when a household is subject to an income shock: In a progressive tax system this will
19See also Dolls et al. (2015) for a recent political report on automatic stabilizers in the EU with similar
results.
20This is the main channel in Pechman (1973); Auerbach and Feenberg (2000); Dolls et al. (2012).
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lead to an increase in work incentives, which increases labor supply (Dolls et al., 2019a).
The redistribution channel takes into account that receivers of transfers may have
higher propensities to spend out of their income, which then also leads to an increase in
aggregate demand.
Through the social insurance channel, automatic stabilizers influence household income
risk. In particular, they may reduce the need for precautionary savings, which increases
welfare from increased consumption, but reduced precautionary savings may also lead to
an increased likelihood that household will be liquidity constrained after a shock. The
downside of reduced precautionary savings is that households are then less likely to be
able to smooth their consumption demand after a series of “bad” shocks.
McKay and Reis (2016) include the personal income tax, transfers (unemployment
benefits and safety-net payments like “food stamps”, family assistance etc.), a group of
proportional taxes consisting of the corporate income taxes, property taxes, and sales and
excise taxes, and the budget deficit in their analysis. In their quantitative analysis, they
find the effect of the group of proportional taxes to be small for business cycle volatility.
In this paper, I focus on the most important stabilizers on the household sides, most
notably consumption taxes, the progressive income tax and transfers, to keep the model
tractable. Hence, I omit the property tax (the tax on capital) and the corporate
income tax. One reason is that my model is more complex by introducing trade, so any
simplification is welcome to keep the model tractable. Second, the New Keynesian model
in McKay and Reis (2016) generates the wrong sign of the covariance of the revenue from
the corporate income tax with detrended GDP when comparing the model to the data,
effectively working as a destabilizer in the model. For the property tax on capital, the
same is true, but the correlation is much smaller and its share is less than a third of
the revenue coming from proportional taxes. Hence, I will mainly focus on the personal
income tax, transfers (namely unemployment benefits and social assistance), and the
sales tax.
Personal income tax. First, the personal income tax works as an automatic stabilizer,
because tax revenue falls when incomes go down. This effect is larger when income
taxes are progressive, but a stabilizing effect on disposable incomes is also present with
a proportional tax. For instance, consider a household that has to pay a proportional
tax of 30 percent and faces a decline in gross income of 100 euro. Then 30 percent of
the shock would be absorbed by the proportional tax, leaving a decline of 70 euro of
disposable income.
When the income tax is progressive, there is an additional marginal incentives effect
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on labor supply, coming from the change in the marginal tax rate.21 Furthermore, tax
systems redistribute income, which can be stabilizing if the receivers have higher marginal
propensities to consume than the spenders (see also Oh and Reis, 2012). Additionally
to income taxes, most countries levy social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes),
which work similarly as personal income taxes.
A progressive personal income tax appeals to all four channels mentioned at the
beginning of this section: It stabilizes disposable incomes ‘mechanically’, it changes
marginal incentives, it redistributes and it provides insurance against ‘bad’ states of the
world. Hence, as it works through all four channels above, it is an important stabilizer
that is included in my model.
It is also important to include the progressive tax rate in the welfare considerations,
because, in spite of serving as an automatic stabilizer, it also provides a disincentive to
work, which means that there is a trade-off between stabilization and discouraging work.
The heterogeneity in tax systems in Europe also warrants a careful analysis of the
income tax. For instance, in related work that focuses on the marginal rates in European
tax systems (Dolls et al., 2019a), we see a large heterogeneity in the progressivity of tax
systems. Some countries in Eastern Europe have flat rates, while other countries like
Belgium, Denmark or Germany have very progressive systems.
Transfers. On the spending side, transfers such as unemployment benefits have the
potential to stabilize the economy, especially so when unemployment rises during a
recession.22 In fact, McKay and Reis (2016) find that transfers are even more important
quantitatively than the income tax as an automatic stabilizer in the US, because they
work through the stronger redistribution and social insurance channels. In Europe,
unemployment benefits makes up an even larger share of GDP than in the US for almost
all countries except the UK (OECD, 2017)23. Hence, transfers are also included in my
model.
Sales tax. As a proportional tax, I include value added taxes in the model. In the
US, they are the largest proportional tax, compared to the property and the corporate
income tax. In Europe, value added taxes are larger than sales taxes in the US, so a
21This effect is studied in Dolls et al. (2019a) in a micro setting with labor supply.
22In the US, additional safety-net programs like food stamps to the very needy play a role, but they
are not prominent in Europe, which typically has more generous unemployment insurance and social
assistance.
23These data are from 2017. As unemployment benefits rise with the number of unemployed, they can
vary over time.
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larger effect is expected. However, because the proportional tax rates do not change with
respect to the business cycle, their overall effect is limited.
4.3.2. Measuring the Stabilizing Effect on the Business Cycle
Following Smyth (1966) and McKay and Reis (2016), I measure the macroeconomic
stabilization effect as
S = V
′
V
− 1, (4.3.1)
where V is the ergodic variance of macroeconomic variables (output, consumption) in
the calibrated model (“baseline”) and V ′ is the ergodic variance under a counterfactual.
This measure differs from the normalized tax change. While the normalized tax change
measures the presence and size of automatic stabilizers in a static setting, it is not a
measure of business cycle volatility. Equation (4.3.1) is the percentage reduction in the
variance of aggregate variables, so that it measures how automatic stabilizers reduce
aggregate fluctuations.
The model experiments are the following. For simplicity, I will consider first a stylized
experiment of a monetary union with only two countries that are linked through trade.
The counterfactual experiment to assess the importance of automatic stabilizers is to
switch off the stabilizers in one country and calculate the variance of aggregate variables
in the second country. I also analyze how these values change when I allow for country
specific monetary policy.
The counterfactuals are (i) some or all stabilizers switched off, (ii) country-specific
monetary policy (including flexible exchange rate regime), (iii) no trade spillovers. In
model experiment (iv), I plan to analyze elements of a centralized budget. These could
mean, for example, a centralized unemployment insurance or other forms of transfers
between countries.24
4.4. Model
In this section, I describe the quantitative model. It combines an incomplete markets,
heterogeneous agents model25, with an open economy framework26.
24It should be noted that my analysis abstracts from moral hazard considerations at the regional
government level at this point. Instead, as a first step, I focus on the positive aspects on the business
cycle.
25McKay and Reis (2016)
26House et al. (2017) and Dupor et al. (2018)
199
4. Automatic Stabilizers in Monetary and Fiscal Unions
4.4.1. Model Features
I develop a multi-country New Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets. As the focus of this paper is the impact of automatic stabilizers on EMU
countries’ business cycle volatility, I implement a business cycle model similar to McKay
and Reis (2016). To capture the redistribution and social insurance properties of automatic
stabilizers, the model features heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. The model
also incorporates nominal rigidities to allow for stabilization through aggregate demand.
To model regional spillovers and trade linkages, the model has an open economy setting
similar to House et al. (2017) and Dupor et al. (2018). Table 4.1 summarizes the main
ingredients of the model.
Table 4.1.: Model features and relation to the literature
McKay and Reis (2016) House et al. (2017) Dupor et al. (2018)
Nominal Rigidities X X X
Open Economy/Multi region X X
Incomplete markets X X
Aggregate shocks X
Automatic Stabilizers X
EU calibration X
4.4.2. Description of the Economy
I consider a model with a finite number N of countries, indexed by n. The model is
written down generally, so it could be calibrated as in House et al. (2017) to 30 countries
(EU28, the US and ‘Rest of World’). The main quantitative exercise shall, however, be
first carried out in a stylized model with two countries, indexed by n.27
The household-side of the model is close to McKay and Reis (2016) and Dupor et al.
(2018). Each country is populated by a fully insured and patient agent alongside a
continuum of impatient agents, who are subject to idiosyncratic uninsurable income
risk who make consumption, labor hours and savings decision. Impatient households do
not have state contingent assets available so they cannot insure against idiosyncratic
labor income risk (Bewley, 1986; Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994), but they can build up
precautionary savings using a government bond.
Each region has its own stock of capital, wage wn and rate of inflation pin. Region-
specific capital and labor cannot be traded across countries. They are used in the
production of intermediate varieties by monopolistic sub-intermediary firms that face
27This is a slight abuse of notation, as n also stands for labor supply of households.
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nominal rigidities. The varieties are combined into a country-specific intermediate good
and regions trade in this intermediate good. This tradable good is used in domestic and
foreign production of the final good. The final good is consumed or used for investment
and government purchases.
There is a government in each region that levies a progressive income tax on households.
It buys final goods from its respective region. Taxation and spending happen at a regional
level. Households can save in government bonds. The interest rate is the same in all
regions that belong to the currency union.
4.4.3. Households
A household in country n consumes the final good produced in their region.28 They
supply labor and receive a real wage wn. While the impatient households are subject to
shocks to their skill level s, changing their effective labor supply, and their employment
status e, the patient household has a fixed skill level s¯ and effective labor supply s¯n.
The implicit assumption is that the patient household can insure all idiosyncratic risk.
The patient household can be thought of as a representative agent, while the impatient
households are heterogeneous.
Patient Households. The patient household has a utility function
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σn,t
1− σ − ψ1
n1+ψ2n,t
1 + ψ2
)]
The representative patient household has access to insurance markets and can insure
all idiosyncratic risk. β denotes the discount factor, σ is risk aversion (which is set to
σ = 1, leading to log-utility in consumption), ψ1 is utility cost of labor and ψ2 controls
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Patient households can save using risk-free nominal bonds and invest in capital and
they receive a share of the intermediate firms’ profits.29 Her budget constraint is
Pn,tcn,t + (bn,t+1 − bn,t) = Pn,t
(
xn,t − τ¯xn (xn,t) + T pn,t
)
,
which consists of consumption expenditures and net bond purchases on the left and real
28The presentation and modeling follows McKay and Reis (2016) and Dupor et al. (2018).
29Dupor et al. (2018) make a similar assumption, which is that dividends are non-uniformly distributed
across the skill distribution to avoid unrealistic distribution of firm profits towards the low end of
the skill distribution. The assumption here is similar by assuming that the dividends distribution is
“degenerate” in the sense that all profits are distributed to the fully insured agents.
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pre-tax income xn,t minus taxes τ¯xn,t(xn,t) on the right. Pn,t is the price of the final good
in country n. T pn,t is set to zero in the baseline but is used in counterfactuals to make up
for lost revenue as a lump-sum tax.
The real income of the patient household is equal to
xn,t =
In,t−1
Pn,t
bn,t + dn,t + wn,ts¯nnt, (4.4.1)
which includes real interest payments on the government bond, dividends from owning
firms dn,t, and labor income.
The personal income tax system in country n is defined as
τ¯xn (x) =
∫ x
0
τxn (x′)dx′, (4.4.2)
where τxn is the marginal tax rate.
The region-specific inflation rate pin,t+1 is defined as the change in the price of the final
good in region n:
pin,t+1 =
Pn,t+1
Pn,t
− 1
The first order conditions of maximization problem for the patient household are given
in the appendix in section H.1.
Impatient Households. In each country, there are ν impatient households, indexed by
h ∈ [0, ν]. In the baseline calibration, ν = 4, so that there are four impatient households
per patient household. They can be thought of as the lower four quintiles in the
distribution. By assuming βˆ < β, they are less patient than the representative household.
Like the patient households, the impatient households also choose consumption, working
hours and bond holdings to maximize their utility, but they neither own capital nor
receive dividends from the firm.
Formally, they maximize
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βˆt
(
cn,t(h)1−σ
1− σ − ψ1
nn,t(h)1+ψ2
1 + ψ2
)]
,
where βˆ is the discount factor, σ denotes the degree of risk aversion, ψ1 represents
disutility of work and ψ2 controls the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The budget constraint is
Pn,tcn,t(h) + (bn,t+1(h)− bn,t(h)) = Pn,t
(
xn,t(h)− τ¯xn (xn,t(h)) + T sn,t(h)
)
.
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These households further face a borrowing constraint bt+1(h) ≥ 0.
Impatient households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk on their employment status
en,t(h) as well as on their skill sn,t(h). When the household is employed, she can choose
her working hours and receive her labor income wn,tsn,t(h)nt(h). When the household is
unemployed, she receives only unemployment benefits (her labor income is zero). The
third state, called ‘needy’, is a state of long-term unemployment, during which the
household receives social assistance. The real income of impatient households consists of
stochastic labor income
xn,t(h) =

In,t−1
Pn,t
bn,t + wn,tsn,t(h)nt(h) if employed;
In,t−1
Pn,t
bn,t + T un,t(h) if unemployed;
In,t−1
Pn,t
bn,t if needy.
(4.4.3)
The unemployment benefit is modeled as
T un,t(h) = T¯ un min {sn,t(h), sun} . (4.4.4)
T un can be thought of as a replacement rate out of previous income, here captured by the
current skill level sn,t(h). Overall benefits are capped at a maximum value T¯ un sun.
The idiosyncratic state variables are real bond holdings b˜, the skill level s and the
employment status e. Letting s denote the set of all values of s(h) and S the collection
of aggregate states, the problem can be expressed recursively as30
V (b˜, e, s,S) = max
c,n
{
cn(h)1−σ
1− σ − ψ1
nn(h)1+ψ2
1 + ψ2
+ βˆEV
(
b˜′, e′, s′,S ′
)}
subject to
(1 + τ cn)cn + b˜′npi′n − b˜ = xn(h) + T sn(h) (4.4.5)
x(h) = (1 + I(S−1)) b˜n + 1employed · wn(S)sn(h)nn + T un (h) (4.4.6)
where 1employed is one if the individual state is ‘employed’ and zero otherwise. The
transition matrix of moving between skill states and employment states (Γ and Π
respectively, where Γss′ denotes the probability of moving from state s to s′ and Πee′
the probability of moving from emplyoment state e to e′) are given in the appendix.
The expectations operator in the Bellman equation of the impatient household reflects
30The time subscript can be dropped as usual with infinite horizon optimization problems and the prime
indicates next-period variables. See also McKay and Reis (2014).
203
4. Automatic Stabilizers in Monetary and Fiscal Unions
uncertainty in both aggregate and idiosyncratic variables.31
4.4.4. Firms
There are three ‘layers’ of firms that produce intermediate and final goods in two stages.32
These layers introduce the following model features. The sub-intermediary firm introduces
price stickiness into the model. The second-stage intermediary assembles a country specific
tradable good. Through this, the international spillovers enter the model. The final
goods producer assembles a country specific domestic final good.
Final Goods Producers. There is a single final good in every country n. Each is
produced by a final good firm that packs tradable intermediate goods by the various
countries into the non-tradable final good according to a (country-specific) CES function.
Each final good is sold at price Pn,t within each country.
The firm in country n solves the problem
max
ymn,t
{
Pn,tYn,t −
N∑
m=1
Em,t
En,t pm,ty
m
n,t
}
(4.4.7)
subject to the production technology of country n,
Yn,t =
(
N∑
m=1
(ωmn )
1
µy ymn,t
µy−1
µy
) µy
µy−1
. (4.4.8)
For countries in the monetary union, nominal exchange rates En,t are equal to 1 so that
exchange rate terms drop out. In the production function, ymn,t denotes the amount of
country-m intermediate good used in production by country n at time t. The parameter
ωmn reflects the preference of the country-n final good firm for input coming from country
m. I assume ωmn ≥ 0 and
∑N
m=1 ω
m
n = 1 for each n. In general, this specification allows a
country-specific input mix that can be calibrated to match bilateral import shares (House
et al., 2017). In the simplified two country model, ωnn = 0.71 is the home bias (fraction
of domestic goods used in production) and ωmn = 1− ωnn = 0.29. Parameter µy governs
the degree of substitutability between the intermediate goods.
31McKay and Reis (2016).
32The modeling and presentation in this section follows House et al. (2017), Dupor et al. (2018) and
McKay and Reis (2016).
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The optimization results in iso-elastic demand functions
ymn,t = Yn,tωmn
[
Em,t
En,t
pm,t
Pn,t
]−µy
and a nominal price aggregate of the final good of
Pn,t =
 N∑
m=1
ωmn
[
Em,t
En,t pm,t
]1−µy 11−µy .
I now turn to the production of the intermediate good, which happens in two stages.
First stage: domestic varieties. In each region, a continuum of varieties indexed by
j is produced from domestic capital and labor. Neither capital nor labor can be moved
across regions. The production happens using a Cobb-Douglas technology
qn,t(j) = zn,t (kn,t(j))α (ln,t(j))1−α . (4.4.9)
The sub-intermediate firms are monopolistically competitive and take into account the
demand they face. Because of nominal rigidities as in Calvo (1983), they can adjust their
price ϕn,t(j) only infrequently. The probability that a firm can adjust its price is θ and
its optimal reset price is denoted ϕ∗n,t(j). The firms are owned by the patient household
in each country, so their stochastic discount factor is used in the optimization.
A firm j that sets its price at date t maximizes the discounted sum of dividends
max
ϕ∗t,n,{ks(j),ls(j)}∞s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
Λt,s(1− θ)s−t
[(
ϕ∗t,n
Pn,s
)
qn,s(j)− wn,sln,s(j)− (rn,s + δ)kn,s(j)
]
(4.4.10)
subject to the production function (4.4.9) and the demand it faces:
qn,s(j) = Qn,s
(
ϕn,t(j)
pn,s
)−µq
(4.4.11)
or (with the production function substituted in):
Qn,s
(
ϕn,t(j)
pn,s
)−µq
= zn,t [kn,t(j)]α [ln,t(j)]1−α . (4.4.12)
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The labor market clearing condition is
ln,t =
∫ 1
0
ln,t(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
sn,t(h)nn,t(h)dh+ s¯nt (4.4.13)
Assuming time-constant markups µq, the latter of the FOCs can be rearranged to yield
ϕ∗n,t
Pt
= − µq1− µq ·
Et
∑∞
s=t Λt,s(1− θ)s−tMs
(
Pt
Ps
)−µq−1 Qn,s
Ps
Et
∑∞
s=t Λt,s(1− θ)s−t
(
Pt
Ps
)−µq Qn,s
Ps
(4.4.14)
pn,t =
[
(1− θ)p1−µqn,t−1 + θϕ∗n,t1−µq
] 1
1−µq (4.4.15)
Second stage: intermediate goods. The second stage firm combines the domestic
varieties in country n to produce the tradable intermediate good according to the CES
production function
Qn,t =
[∫ 1
0
qn,t(j)
µq−1
µq dj
] µq
µq−1
, (4.4.16)
where qn,t(j) is the input of the j-th variety in country n at time t.
These firms maximize their profits
max
qn,t(j)
E0
{
pn,tQn,t −
∫ 1
0
ϕn,t(j)qn,t(j)dj
}
(4.4.17)
subject to the production function above. They pay a price of φn,t(j) for its input variety
j and take as given the intermediate goods price pn,t.
The optimization yields the first order condition
qn,t(j) = Qn,t
(
ϕn,t(j)
pn,t
)−µq
. (4.4.18)
The price can be summarized as
pn,t =
[∫ 1
0
ϕn,t(j)1−µqdj
] 1
1−µq
. (4.4.19)
4.4.5. A Two-Country Example
The household problems remain as before, with a patient agent and a continuum of
impatient agents in each country. There are two countries, “core” (H) and “periphery”
(F ).
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Domestic varieties and intermediate goods Production of variety j in each country
is
qH,t(j) = zH,t
(
kH,t
lH,t
)α
lH,t(j) (4.4.20)
qF,t(j) = zF,t
(
kF,t
lF,t
)α
lF,t(j) (4.4.21)
After integrating over varieties, intermediate good production is
SH,t ·QH,t = zH,t
(
kH,t
lH,t
)α
lH,t (4.4.22)
SF,t ·QF,t = zF,t
(
kF,t
lF,t
)α
lF,t (4.4.23)
Final goods The final goods firms maximize their profits
max
yFH,t,y
H
H,t
{
PH,tYH,t − pH,tyHH,t − pF,tyFH,t
}
(4.4.24)
max
yHF,t,y
F
F,t
{
PF,tYF,t − pH,tyHF,t − pF,tyFF,t
}
(4.4.25)
subject to
YH,t =
(
(ωHH )
1
µy yHH,t
µy−1
µy + (ωFH)
1
µy yFH,t
µy−1
µy
) µy
µy−1
(4.4.26)
YF,t =
(
(ωHF )
1
µy yHF,t
µy−1
µy + (ωFF )
1
µy yFF,t
µy−1
µy
) µy
µy−1
(4.4.27)
The resulting demand functions read
yHH,t = YH,tωHH
[
pH,t
PH,t
]−µy
, yFH,t = YH,tωFH
[
pF,t
PH,t
]−µy
yHF,t = YF,tωHF
[
pH,t
PF,t
]−µy
, yFF,t = YF,tωFF
[
pF,t
PF,t
]−µy
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and the nominal prices of the final goods are
PH,t =
(
ωHH (pH,t)1−µy + ωFH (pF,t)1−µy
) 1
1−µy
PF,t =
(
ωHF (pH,t)1−µy + ωFF (pF,t)1−µy
) 1
1−µy .
4.4.6. Government Budget
The government budget constraint in each country is
Pn,t
(
τ cn
(∫ ν
0
cn,t(h)dh+ cn,t
)
+
∫ ν
0
τ¯xn,t (xn,t(h)) dh+ τ¯xn (xn,t)
−
∫ ν
0
[
T un,t(h) + T sn,t(h)
]
dh
)
= Pn,tgn,t + It−1Bn,t + (Bn,t −Bn,t+1) + Pn,tT pn,t. (4.4.28)
The government budget constraint reflects the simplifications made regarding some
automatic stabilizers. Notably, revenue from property and corporate income taxes are
dropped. Hence, the government raises revenue from consumption taxes and the personal
income tax (first line). In the second line are transfers (unemployment benefits and social
assistance). On the right-hand side, Pn,tgn,t denotes nominal government purchases, Bn,t
denotes government bonds and interest payments are In,t−1Bt.
Aggregate bonds Bn,t consist of bond holdings by the patient and impatient households:
Bn,t =
∫ ν
0
bn,t(h)dh+ bn,t (4.4.29)
As in McKay and Reis (2016), government purchases adjust according to the deviation
of government deficit from steady state value according to
ln(Gn,t) = ln(G¯n)− γG ln
(
Bn,t/Pn,t
B¯n
)
, (4.4.30)
T pn,t = T¯ p + γT ln
(
Bn,t/Pn,t
B¯n
)
. (4.4.31)
The parameters γG and γT control the speed at which deficits return to their steady
state value. When they are large, the level of government debt is adjusted immediately,
when they are close to zero, adjustment takes arbitrarily long (McKay and Reis, 2016).
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4.4.7. Monetary Authority
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a simplified version of the Taylor rule
It = I¯ + φ∆ log
(
P¯EAt
)
− εt, (4.4.32)
where the interest rate depends on a weighted average of the country-specific inflation
rates P¯EA. The counterfactual Taylor rule in the case of independent monetary policy
that conditions on country-specific inflation is In,t = I¯n +φ∆ log (Pn,t)− εn,t. The Taylor
rule does not condition on the output gap to focus on the role of automatic stabilizers.
An “inferior monetary policy rule” like this emphasizes the role of fiscal policy (McKay
and Reis, 2016, p. 154).
4.5. Quantitative Analysis
4.5.1. Calibration
Table 4.2 summarizes the calibration parameters of the model. The discount factors of
patient and impatient households (β and βˆ, respectively) are chosen based on McKay
and Reis (2016) for comparability, but can later be calibrated to match the differing
wealth shares of the top twenty percent, in each country.
The disutility of labor ψ1 is set to 1 based on Martin and Philippon (2017), to start with
the simplest possible specification. The intertemporal labor supply parameter ψ2 is set to
2, yielding a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 as in Chetty (2012). An interesting robustness check
would be to allow the Frisch elasticities to differ by country. They could be calibrated
using empirical estimates from Dolls et al. (2019a), in an exercise similar to Barrios et al.
(2019), to take into account cross-country differences in labor supply elasticities.
The coefficient of risk aversion σ is set to 1 (i.e., log-utility, see McKay and Reis, 2016;
House et al., 2017). Idiosyncratic shock processes of productivity and employment status
are calibrated based on McKay and Reis (2016) and documented in the appendix (section
H.2).
The trade preference weight of the tradable good is calibrated to match data on trade
in the EMU. From House et al. (2017), I calculate an average home bias of 0.71 for the
“core” EU.33 In a multi-country setting, I use the country specific import share. The
elasticity of substitution between tradables µy is set to 0.5 as in House et al. (2017). The
other production parameters are set to standard values from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
33Core countries consist of Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Finland.
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and House et al. (2017).
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Figure 4.2.: Marginal Tax Rates: Germany and Lithuania
Notes: Marginal income tax rates on the y-axis, gross monthly earnings on the x-axis. Smoothed rates
are the fitted values from regressing statutory marginal tax rates on a cubic function of income, combined
with a linear spline above a threshold. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Marginal tax rates. To estimate the progressivity of the tax systems of EMU countries,
I make use of the European tax model EUROMOD. EUROMOD is a European tax and
benefit calculator similar to TAXSIM for the US (Sutherland and Figari, 2013). I use it
to calculate the marginal tax rates for a representative single-earner along the income
distribution.
Figure 4.2 shows the exemplary cases of the German tax system in the left panel and
Lithuania on the right. The statutory rate is calculated using EUROMOD, and then
approximated by the cubic spline. The graph shows the differences in the tax systems,
Germany having a progressive system with a relatively high rate, while the Lithuanian
system is almost flat and regressive at the top.
Figure J.1 in appendix section J shows statutory and smoothed marginal tax rates for
all Euro area countries. The smoothing is done to facilitate numerical application of the
tax function.34
34Bick et al. (2018) provide tax functions to be used with Matlab, but provide only a small sample of
countries.
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Table 4.2.: Calibration
Parameter Symbol Value Source or Target
Preferences
Discount factor (patient) β 0.989 McKay and Reis (2016)
Labor supply (disutility) ψ1 1 Martin and Philippon (2017)
Labor supply (Frisch elasticity) ψ2 2 Frisch elasticity = 0.5 (Chetty, 2012)
Risk aversion σ 1 Log-utility
Income and Wealth Heterogeneity
Discount factor (impatient) β̂ 0.979 McKay and Reis (2016)
Impatient HH per patient HH ν 4
Skill level of patient HH s¯ 3.72 McKay and Reis (2016)
Technology
Capital share α 0.38 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), House et al. (2017)
Depreciation rate δ 0.028 House et al. (2017)
Calvo price stickiness θ 0.2 House et al. (2017)
Investment adjustment cost ζ 2.48 House et al. (2017)
Substitution of varieties µq 10 House et al. (2017)
Trade and Country Size
Trade preference weights ωnn 0.71 Home bias (House et al., 2017)
Trade demand elasticity µy 0.5 House et al. (2017)
Tax Rates
Labor income tax τx Country-specific
Consumption tax τ c Country-specific
Transfers Tun,t, T sn,t Country-specific
Government
Taylor Rule (output gap) 0 McKay and Reis (2016)
Taylor Rule (inflation) φ 1.5 House et al. (2017)
211
4. Automatic Stabilizers in Monetary and Fiscal Unions
4.5.2. Numerical Solution
The model is solved using the method from Reiter (2009) to keep track of wealth
distributions (see below). To keep the numerical analysis tractable, I use an algorithm
similar to the “precomputation” approach in Maliar et al. (2011). The idea is to construct
policy functions for labor and savings based on a household problem with idiosyncratic
risk, outside of the main iteration loop over the countries. The policy functions are then
recycled and interpolated in the country loop.
First, I calculate the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and real and
nominal exchange rates equal to one. The trade flows are determined by the preference
weights ω and relative country sizes. Second, I solve backwards from this steady state to
obtain an initial guess of household policy functions using the endogenous grid method.
Third, the guess for the policy functions is used to solve the Euler equation using
Broyden’s method. This involves, for each household type, interpolating savings and
labor supply functions using splines. Having end-of-period assets and current-period
assets, one can solve for current consumption and expected marginal utility. The solution
gives new household policy rules. Fourth, using the algorithm by Reiter (2009), I compute
the transition matrix to get the distribution of wealth. Fifth, I solve for the steady state,
given household policy rules and the distribution of wealth.
The aggregate equations are linearized in aggregate states to simulate time series of
aggregate incomes, consumption and investment.
Keeping track of the wealth distribution and solving the model. A challenge
in incomplete markets models with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk is the question of how
to keep track of the wealth distributions. When there are aggregate and idiosyncratic
fluctuations, the (infinitely dimensional) wealth distribution becomes a state variable
in the model. This problem is solved in McKay and Reis (2016) using the algorithm
developed in Reiter (2009). The seminal paper to solve this problem is Krusell and Smith
(1998), which summarizes the wealth distribution with just a few of its moments. A
more recent solution algorithm is Reiter (2009), which is also used in McKay and Reis
(2016). The advantage of this solution method is that it is able to handle models with
a rich structure well. The algorithm works through discretization of both the wealth
distribution (by a histogram) as well as the household decision problem (by a spline). In
this way, the problem is converted into a finite-dimensional one, and can be solved with
conventional algorithms (e.g. backward induction). The household problem is non-linear
(so it can reflect risk and precautionary savings at the individual level). In the next step,
the algorithm uses automatic differentiation to linearize the model in aggregate variables
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and then calculates aggregate dynamics using a standard solver for rational expectations
models (e.g. Sims, 2002).35
4.6. Discussion and Outlook
This paper presents a framework for studying the effect of automatic stabilizers on the
EU business cycle. A new feature of the model is its open economy setting, in which the
heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model is embedded, allowing for positive spillovers
of stabilization between the closely connected countries in the Euro area. The effect of
automatic stabilizers on the EU business cycle can be quantified in a model experiment,
in which I shut off all or some of the automatic stabilization channels. In another model
experiment, I intend to shut off trade to gauge the spillover of automatic stabilizers
between countries in the EU.
While the numerical solution is not yet implemented, I conjecture that the business
cycle volatilities differ in these scenarios, pointing to the relevance of automatic stabilizers,
and the importance of studying them in the setting of a closely integrated monetary
union.
Within the setting of this model, several important questions can be answered in the
future. One example is the debate regarding the EMU moving closer to a fiscal union.36
One hypothetical reform looks at a unified unemployment insurance in the EU. This
could be evaluated by recalibrating the relevant parameters in the model.
Another hypothetical reform is a unified tax system in the EMU. The model could be
extended to substitute the national governments with a single government for the whole
monetary union.
35See also a recent paper by Pröhl (2018) for an overview of solution algorithms and a new approach for
heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk using methods from the engineering literature.
36For instance, in 2015, the “Five Presidents’ Report” (Juncker et al., 2015) has identified steps for
deepening the EMU. Since then, a convergence concept for a euro area budgetary capacity and
concepts toward a fiscal union have been discussed (European Commission, 2017).
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H.1. Patient Household’s First Order Conditions.
The first order conditions of this problem are
βtc−σn,t = mn,t
βtψ1n
ψ2
n,t = mn,t(1− τn,t)wn,ts¯n
mn,t = Et
[
mn,t+1
1 + in,t
piCPIn,t+1
]
mn,t
(
1 + ζ∆kn,t+1
kn,t
)
= Et
1 + rn,t+1 + ζ
(
∆kn,t+2
kn,t+1
)
kn,t+2
kn,t+1
− ζ2
(
kn,t+2
kn,t+1
)2 c−σn,t+1

These can be rearranged to yield
ψ1n
ψ2
n,t = c−σn,t (1− τn,t)wn,ts¯
c−σn,t = βEt
[
1 + in,t
cσn,tpi
CPI
n,t
]
c−σn,t
(
1 + ζ∆kn,t+1
kn,t
)
= βEt
1 + rn,t+1 + ζ∆kn,t+2
kn,t+1
kn,t+2
kn,t+1
− ζ2
(
∆kn,t+2
kn,t+1
)2 c−σn,t+1

H.2. Idiosyncratic Shock Processes
The Markov processes for skill and employment are calibrated as in McKay and Reis
(2016):
Γ =

0.985 0.015 0
0.015 0.970 0.015
0 0.015 0.985
 (H.2.1)
The diagonal elements are the probability of remaining in the same skill group, the
off-diagonal elements are the transition probabilities from one state to another.
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The employment status transition matrix is calibrated as in McKay and Reis (2016):
Π =

E → E E → U E → N
U → E U → U U → N
N → E N → U N → N
 =

0.97 0.03 0
0.54 0.20 0.26
0.09 0 0.91
 (H.2.2)
The ‘E’ denotes employed, ‘U’ denotes unemployed and ‘N’ stands for needy (long-term
unemployed). In the transition matrix, for example E → U denotes the probability of an
individual currently employed becoming unemployed, and so on. Once a person is long-
term unemployed (‘needy’), they cannot go back to ‘unemployed’ (zero probability) and
they have a lower probability than the unemployed of regaining employment. Similarly,
an ‘employed’ agent does not transition into ‘long-term unemployment’ immediately.
215
I. Firm equations
I.1. Capital
The capital is owned by the patient household in each country, taking rn,t as given. The
market clearing condition for capital is
kn,t =
∫ 1
0
kn,t(j)dj. (I.1.1)
The sequence of capital {kt+1, kt+2, . . . } is chosen so as to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=t
Λt,s
(1 + rn,s)kn,s − kn,s+1 − ζ2
(
∆kn,s+1
kn,s
)2
kn,s
 , (I.1.2)
leading to the first order condition
(
1 + ζ∆kn,t+1
kn,t
)
= Et
Λn,t,t+1
1 + rn,t+1 + ζ∆kn,t+2
kn,t+1
kn,t+2
kn,t+1
− ζ2
(
∆kn,t+2
kn,t+1
)2
(I.1.3)
The dividends from capital are distributed together with the variety-producing firms’
profits to the patient households:
dn,t =
∫ 1
0
din,t(j)dj + dkn,t (I.1.4)
I.2. Firms’ Reset Price
Λt,s = βs(cs/ct)−σ denotes the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s.
LettingM denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the first order conditions
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Table I.1.: Pricing notation
Name Symbol
Reset price of sub-intermed firm j in country n at time t ϕn,t(j)
Optimal reset price ϕ∗n,t(j)
Competitive price of tradable intermediate (weighted avg of sub-intermed) pn,t
Price of final good in country n in period t Pn,t
for capital and labor are
−(rn,s + δ) +Msαzn,skn,s(j)α−1ln,s(j)1−α = 0 (I.2.1)
−wn,s +Ms(1− α)zn,skn,s(j)αln,s(j)−α = 0 (I.2.2)
Dividing the first two FOCs shows that the first stage intermediary firms have the same
capital-labor ratio:
wn,s
rn,s + δ
= 1− α
α
kn,s(j)
ln,s(j)
(I.2.3)
The production of variety j is then
qn,t(j) = zn,tkn,t(j)αln,t(j)1−α (I.2.4)
= zn,t
(
kn,t(j)
ln,t(j)
)α
ln,t(j) (I.2.5)
= zn,t
(
kn,t
ln,t
)α
ln,t(j) (I.2.6)
And by substituting in production and then integrating over varieties:(
ϕ∗n,t(j)
pt
)−µg
Qn,t = zn,t
(
kn,t
ln,t
)α
ln,t(j) (I.2.7)
⇔
∫ 1
0
(
ϕ∗n,t(j)
pt
)−µg
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sn,t
Qn,t = zn,t
(
kn,t
ln,t
)α ∫ 1
0
ln,t(j)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
ln,t
(I.2.8)
⇔ Sn,t ·Qn,t = zn,t
(
kn,t
ln,t
)α
ln,t, (I.2.9)
where Sn,t reflects the efficiency loss due to price dispersion.
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The condition for the optimal reset price is
Et
∞∑
s=t
Λt,s(1− θ)s−t
(1− µq)
(
ϕ∗n,t
Ps
)−µq
Qn,s
Ps
−Ms(−µq)
(
ϕ∗n,t
Ps
)µq−1
Qn,t
Ps
 = 0
(I.2.10)
Equation (4.4.14) can be split in two recursively defined expressions:1
p¯At = Et
∞∑
s=t
Λt,s(1− θ)s−tMs
(
Pt
Ps
)−µq−1 Qn,s
Ps
=MtQn,t
Pt
+ Et
∞∑
t+1
Λt,s(1− θ)s−tMs
(
Pt
Ps
)−µq−1 Qn,s
Ps
=MtQn,t
Pt
+ Et+1Λt,t+1(1− θ)
(
Pt
Pt+1
)−µq−1 ∞∑
s=t+1
Λt+1,s(1− θ)s−t−1Ms
(
Pt+1
Ps
)−µq−1 Qn, s
Ps
=MtQn,t
Pt
+ Et+1Λt,t+1(1− θ)piµq+1p¯At+1
and
p¯Bt =
Qn,t
Pt
+ Et+1Λt,t+1(1− θ)piµq+1p¯Bt+1.
The nominal price of the tradable intermediate good is sticky (because first-stage
intermediate producers adjust their prices only infrequently) and evolves according to
1See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006); McKay and Reis (2016).
218
J. Marginal Income Tax Rates
0
20
40
60
0 10000 20000 30000
Gross earnings
Statutory marginal tax rate Smoothed rate
(a) AT 2010
0
20
40
60
0 10000 20000 30000
Gross earnings
Statutory marginal tax rate Smoothed rate
(b) BE 2010
0
20
40
60
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Gross earnings
Statutory marginal tax rate Smoothed rate
(c) CY 2010
0
20
40
60
0 10000 20000 30000
Gross earnings
Statutory marginal tax rate Smoothed rate
(d) DE 2010
0
20
40
60
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Gross earnings
Statutory marginal tax rate Smoothed rate
(e) EE 2010
Figure J.1.: Marginal Tax Rates
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K. Model
K.1. Aggregate Shocks
Aggregate shocks follow the following law of motion:
zt = Azt−1 + εt, (K.1.1)
where A is an n× n-matrix and ε are n× 1 random disturbances that are distributed as
εt ∼ N (0,Σ) and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of country-specific shocks.
K.2. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, households behave optimally and firms maximize their profits, for countries
n = 1, 2. The equilibrium consists of the following equations.
• Household Euler conditions
• Labor market clearing condition for each country n
• Capital rental market clearing condition for each country n
• Final good production in country n
• Intermediate good production in country n
• Domestic demand for intermediate good
• Price of the final good in each country n
• Price of the intermediate good in each country n
• Market clearing for the final good (domestic, in each n)
• Market clearing for intermediate goods (tradable)
• GDP for each country
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• Taylor rule for monetary authority (4.4.32)
• Bonds in zero net supply (4.4.29)
• Government budget and purchases follow (4.4.28), (4.4.30), (4.4.31)
Final goods Final goods must equal consumption plus investment plus government
purchases. Investment is defined implicitly through kt+1 = kt − δkt + Xt ⇒ Xt =
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
Yn,t = Cn,t +Xn,t + gn,t (K.2.1)
Intermediate goods
Qn,t =
 N∑
j=1
ynj,t
 (K.2.2)
Nominal net exports
NXn,t = pn,tQn,t −
N∑
j=1
Ej,t
En,t pj,ty
j
n,t = pn,tQn,t − Pn,tYn,t (K.2.3)
Nominal GDP
NGDPn,t = pn,tQn,t = NXn,t + Pn,t (Cn,t +Xn,t +Gn,t) (K.2.4)
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